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Shatalin Views Relations With Gorbachev

91UN1124A Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN
in Russian 23 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Academician Stanislav Shatalin, "former member of the former Presidential Council," by writer Yevgeniy Borisov, in a hospital on 29 January; reprinted from TVERSKAYA ZHIZN: "A Dialogue Behind the Kremlin Wall"]

[Text] It happened last summer. It was sunny and hot in Moscow. All systems were operating properly in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses where the 28th Congress of the communists of our country were meeting, but there was not enough fresh air...

On the second or third day, during a long recess, they finally went outside, to the Kremlin courtyard warmed by the July sun, having made their way with difficulty through a dense circle of delegates, visitors to the congress, and domestic and foreign reporters.

At the time, press photographers "hunted" both of them with particular zeal, trying to snap a picture of the two of them together. It appears that the press photographers guessed how closely these two were linked by the events happening not only here, behind the Kremlin wall in the hall where the party congress was being held, but in the country and the world at large.

But among those who subsequently saw this picture on the front page of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, hardly anyone could have foretold how complex and at times dramatic would be the progress of this dialogue, which seemed to begin quite calmly, or that half a year later one of them would resolve to utter the following words, filled with bitterness and regret, for the entire country to hear: "I am no longer a player on Gorbachev's team."

However, this was yet to happen, whereas at that time... The Presidential Council had not yet been dissolved, the "Shatalin" program had not yet seen the light of day, the voices of Colonels Alksnis, Petrushenko, and Colonel General Makashov, who joined them, had only begun to get forceful. Soviet tanks had not yet rumbled through the streets of Vilnius and Riga, and common Soviet citizens, humiliated and insulted yet again by their own native state, had not yet formed distraught lines in front of savings banks...

That was a nice summer day. Two men walked together along the Kremlin wall. They were still together. What did they discuss then?

[Borisov] Indeed, Stanislav Sergeyevich, what did you discuss? I bet one remembers such conversations for a long time.

[Shatalin] Do you suggest that I "roll the tape back" half a year and start with this picture? Let us try. Incidentally, I was later told that in the West they even christened our walk "the walk of the year." They showed this episode on TV for two days there. Guys from the TASS gave me as

a gift a picture exactly like this one, but in color and larger (you have seen it). On 24 August, my birthday, the following caption appeared on it: "Dear Stanislav Sergeyevich! As fate would have it, we stood together at a great time for our land. M. Gorbachev."

If it is indeed fate, I am prepared to thank it and confess wholeheartedly: Indeed, these were bright days of inspiration when my comrades and I (never mind us—the entire country!) believed and hoped that "a great time for our land," our last chance, would not be wasted by us this time around.

Yes, I trusted the president. I will say more: It was precisely for this reason that I decided not to speak at the party congress and notified him of that: I did not want to drive a wedge between the president and the general secretary. Keep in mind that by the end of July a political alliance between M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin had emerged, and I was asked to head a team to develop a concept of the Union Program—I stress this—for a transition to a market economy. After all, the famous "500 days," which was subsequently buried with equal pomp and circumstance, was not born overnight. But who could have known this at the time!..

[Borisov] If we once again recall the fate which "would have it" this way rather than otherwise, all I can do is throw up my hands: It turns out that this is what fate chose. Could it be that it was not fate, after all?

[Shatalin] Let us go back to our conversation last year (KALININSKAYA PRAVDA, 31 June). We had a good discussion then, but some questions remained, and there were even new ones. Well, at the time, before the party congress, you said that the position of the president would mean a lot for you. Differences? You admitted that you had differences, which were sometimes quite fundamental. However, you said that these differences were not capable of changing your firm conviction that he was a genuine leader.

[Borisov] Have your own convictions changed in any way in this half a year? How does your own position depend on that of the president at present?

[Shatalin] This is, as they put it, a direct question. I will try to answer it just as straightforwardly and honestly. Right now I do not believe that the president is a genuine leader of our country. Leadership and authority are not gained through one's superior position, appointment, or title, but rather through deeds and actions. I cannot understand or accept the current actions of M. Gorbachev. Well, I can understand them all right; but this makes it even worse. I say this with pain and regret, but I cannot refrain from this because... "Plato is my friend, but truth is dearer to me." Despite the fact that my personal relationship with Mikhail Sergeyevich is a private matter, I will still add, in order to avoid idle talk: Unlike some political and other figures, I do not apply my political and ideological convictions to my personal

relationships. Of course, this principle does not apply to those with whom I do not wish to have any relationship at all.

If the president's actions change (which I would very much like to believe) my attitude toward him will also change. However, the flag on the president's clock is down, he is experiencing horrible time trouble, and he should only play to win.

[Borisov] What are your differences after all? Please tell us briefly about the principal ones.

[Shatalin] First of all, I am resolutely in favor of all forms of property, including private, and I am in favor of free enterprise. Unlike L.N. Tolstoy and like P.A. Stolypin, I consider the introduction of private ownership of land to be a necessary though, of course, insufficient condition for reviving the country and for having a regular, new, organic, non-"Slavophile" peasantry. Intimidating us with the restoration of "capitalism" (who among us knows thoroughly what this is?) is the ideological quackery of bankrupt politicians who have managed to reduce the richest country to poverty. One indeed needs the ability of a "genius" to mess everything up in order to leave Russia without grain. Zhvanetskiy is right: Last year's bumper crop ultimately finished off our economy which has been cursed by God. We are criminals!

Furthermore, I do not believe that creating a "renewed" Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the immediate future is politically realistic. Holding a referendum on this account and the question put to the people amount to phantasmagoric nonsense. We might as well ask: Would you like to create, say, some renewed "Union of Stalinist Top Secret Republics?" For example, some people will cross out the word "Stalinist," some will not like the fact that this "renewed" Union is "top secret," and they will likewise cross it out. However, the abbreviation USSR will remain unchanged, as it was. Who are we kidding?

Here is the final and, perhaps, the most important confession I am prepared to make publicly: I am a resolute opponent of the "monopoly-vanguard" party in principle.

[Borisov] I can predict the response of your opponents. However, does your very main opponent know about this?

[Shatalin] Are you referring to Mikhail Sergeyevich? Of course, he knows. Something else is the issue: How sincere and independent is his rejection of my positions?

[Borisov] I suspect that I will not be able to ask him this question in the immediate future.

[Shatalin] Would you like me to answer for him? Well, no, let everyone answer for himself. But I have already stated my point of view on this issue: The general secretary prevents the president from being ultimately sincere and realistic, and both of them are aware of this.

[Borisov] When did you feel for the first time that your dialogue was entering, to put it mildly, a different, more acute stage? Let me guess: Did it happen when the president had to choose which program was to be given preference? Or were there other reasons?

[Shatalin] You guessed it. The position of the president on our "500 days," which I absolutely failed to understand, was the main reason for the differences which developed and grew with every passing day. It appeared to me that I had a sufficiently good idea of the actual array of political forces in our country and in the Supreme Soviet at the precise moment when we came up with our program. This was a time of upsurge in the democratic movement and an ethnic renaissance, a time which was quite favorable for implementing radical reforms. The Supreme Soviet received our program well, and it looked like our team was headed for a "win." At this point, we hit a snag... It turned out that our "senior coach" had other plans, and I could not disobey him. It was like a "fixed" game when players who are in good shape and are confident of victory go out onto the field, having heard their coach's instructions to "throw" the game right before the match. We threw the game. We showed a lack of spirit, that is all there was to it. Retribution came later in the form of days of tormenting, bitter reflections, emotions, and disappointment...

[Borisov] Was there a desire to "justify yourselves before the people?"

[Shatalin] You are right. This is precisely what I came to—that article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Let us not talk about that!..

[Borisov] Let us talk about other things then. As you see it, what is the role of Russia in economic perestroika? Also, several words on the relationship between Union and republic structures... If the center rejects the "500 days" program and at the same time continues to actually exercise power, ignoring republic legislation and initiatives in the process, is it reasonable to proceed from your program on the republic scale?

[Shatalin] The ideology of my team is as follows: Pursuant to the principle of the effective division of responsibilities and declarations of political sovereignty (of course, not absolute), the republics delegate joint government functions to the center. This is an elementary rule for forming effective, complex hierarchical structures. This is precisely how the idea of an economic union of sovereign republics which, we might say, is built on "a marriage of convenience" developed. This is the case when convenience is absolutely necessary in a marriage. All republics agreed to this, with the exception of Estonia, which failed to accept this variant for reasons which were far from fundamental.

As far as Russia and its role in economic, and not just economic, perestroika is concerned, I am not be afraid to say that it is vital. In this sense, I supported the principled line of B. Yeltsin on "the Russian issue," understanding full well that this is an extremely complex

and quite sensitive issue. This called for a particularly keen sense of moderation which, alas, many of our contemporary bellicose defenders of Russia badly lack on occasion.

In my philosophy, I am a follower of the teachings of N.A. Berdyayev, and I would like to respond from precisely this position to my former colleague from the Presidential Council, writer V. Rasputin, who published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA his reflections on the topic "The Intelligentsia and Patriotism." It seemed to me that there were too many half-truths and the deliberate desire to appear objective, too much mimicry in this article by Rasputin. This is to say nothing about his high-flown style, through which it is hard to discern a good man of arts. In general, the same was discussed—the sovereignty of Russia, which cannot be inferior. There should be more love to give than love to receive in it. Incidentally, is this not the dividing line between patrician and parvenu philosophies, and between "aristocratic" and "ochlocratic" revolutions?

[Borisov] Now that we are on the topic of the intelligentsia... I. Antonovich, secretary of the Communist Party of Russia Central Committee who recently visited Tver, having said many "kind" words before the oblast party-soviet aktiv about the liberal-arts intelligentsia in general, and the authors of the "500 days" program in particular, apparently decided not to restrict himself to this. He went on and set you against leading American economist John Galbraith (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, No. 22). How did you view this?

[Shatalin] If you are interested in the "kind" words the secretary of the Communist Party of Russia addressed to the intelligentsia, it is a great pity that among those who listened to him...

[Borisov] And, they say, even applauded...

[Shatalin] ...and, even worse, applauded, there was not a single real intellectual who could have responded to these words. As far as Galbraith is concerned, pardon me... Talking to a serious scientist-economist through a dabbler, even if he happens to be a secretary of the Communist Party of Russia Central Committee, resembles the movie "Volga-Volga": Let Ivan Ivanovich pick up the phone, I will talk to him. I have things to discuss with John Galbraith, but without intermediaries. I value direct and open dialogue.

[Borisov] In this case, let us discuss values, for example, our socialist values. Have we not accumulated too many of them... given our poverty? For example, how do you explain the following paradox? It appears that it is now clear to all that a market economy is not viable in the absence of private ownership of the means of, and the results of, production. However, in referring to market relations, the president misses no opportunity to affirm his loyalty to the socialist orientation and socialist values. Is this not where the main contradiction is found which will ultimately cause an impasse in the country?

[Shatalin] First about the contradiction... This is a pig which by now would not be kept in any poke. All of those who have common sense have long seen and understood this. I believe that our president has too, but.... This is where the same old story begins. In all honesty, I am fed up now with listening to stories and telling them! Now about the impasse. The contradiction has already brought this about—hopefully, not once and for all. However, to this end we need to resolutely abandon stories about the so-called socialist values which at present (may the zealous keepers of these values forgive me) conjure up for me personally labels on empty bottles with broken necks: You can neither turn them in for a deposit nor use them in the household...

[Borisov] What about our main value, the common Soviet people, for whom the state cares day and night? What is to be done with them? Incidentally, from this point of view how do you view the recent presidential decree on the confiscation of large bills from the populace? How economically feasible was this confiscatory measure? Or is this another convulsion, an attempt to grasp at straws?

[Shatalin] I believe that this, in essence the first political action of our prime minister, is altogether nonsensical economically. Perhaps, only the anti-alcohol campaign was more stupid; however, there was no dearth of other stupidities either. My fellow economists have already comprehensively substantiated the absolute economic unfeasibility of this reform, and the conclusion is as gloomy as can be: The monetary system has ultimately collapsed; the economic union is dead, there is neither the ruble nor the market.

I estimate the economic losses caused by this "grand master" move, which was in preparation for about a year (from the time V. Pavlov decided he wanted to become prime minister), to be approximately 10 billion rubles [R]. I believe this result to be a convincing victory for the Soviet mafia (this also has a bearing on the issue of our values) and the shadow economy and a crushing sneak blow at all honest people who had already lost a stable position in our unsteady, uncertain times.

I will not comment on the legal aspect of this action; let professionals do this. It is immoral to discuss its unethical aspect in terms of ethics. Indeed, this is a convulsion, but not an attempt to grasp at straws because we no longer have this instrument of salvation. I say this with the full weight of responsibility and with ever greater alarm: What is going to happen tomorrow?

Indeed, where are we headed if once again the infamous "panels of three" venture to decide whether I have earned my money honestly or not. I am distressed and ashamed to look the old people in the eye. I take offense for the people and our great country. However, this is the only great country we have! Does this mean that we need to save it once again?

[Borisov] Who is up to saving it now? Who is the savior? They say that the role of a king is executed by his

entourage. Perhaps, having been in the president's "entourage" you notice better than anyone how the role of executor has changed recently. Incidentally, the skeptical, slighting attitude of the authorities toward professionals was, in the opinion of N. Petrakov, one of the reasons why the "500 days" program became a casualty: "We were not born yesterday; do not tell us what to do."

[Shatalin] Petrakov is right; undoubtedly, this is one of the main reasons. You recall that Karamzin was asked on one occasion to express in one word everything he thought about mother Russia. He said with sadness: "They steal." If you asked me this question today, I would answer: "Lack of professionalism," though, of course, there is still theft. However, I am certain that amateurs rob and trash the country to no less an extent than thieves. At the very least, you can catch a thief or grab him by the hand, whereas amateurs... They are omnipresent and unpunished. We have non-professionals everywhere. Everyone, from the janitor to the prime minister, is engaged in what is not properly his business. There is no concealing it: Personally, I have also felt out of my element, and all because of... Meanwhile, they tell me that I was not all that bad a scientist. Now there are "open letters," interviews in quick succession, some for the West and some for the East, meetings, and chairmanships of dozens of commissions...

[Borisov] Trips to the airport to see off yet another ranking official departing by plane... I admit that I shuddered on one occasion when I saw you on TV among this "soft-landing" group: Why does he, an academician, need this?

[Shatalin] Indeed, I do not need this... However, this is beside the point. The people get poorer and starve, and lose their humanity. Meanwhile, I also "contribute" to this: It appears that we are poor professionals, and there are innumerable people like us.

To my chagrin, the president is now increasingly surrounded not just by non-professionals but, to put it mildly, by people who are not very gifted (though this category is akin to sturgeon which is not quite fresh), incapable of original, bold, and—most importantly— independent thinking. There are fewer and fewer discreet people, and more and more pliant "comrades-in-arms." Incidentally, recently some people attempted to publicly call me under suspicion of being pliant. As God is my witness, I would admit to a hundred other shortcomings, but not this one...

I may say the same about Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov. I believe that we have "lost" Algirdas Brazauskas, Kazimiera Prunskiene, serious and highly intelligent people and knowledgeable politicians. I could continue this list, but, with minor exceptions, these people, alas, are not on Gorbachev's team, and they are not to blame for this.

[Borisov] Mutual relations between the authorities and the intellectuals, the apparatus and the men of art are a

topic for a long discussion. Still, I cannot refrain from this... The rejection of our concerns by the powers that be is too belligerent at present. Once again we hear the painfully familiar: "After us, the deluge!" However, it is happening while they are still "here!" In Tver, the oldest university library in Russia is in danger of being flooded (Editorial note—at the time of publication it had been flooded), but the authorities have not moved a muscle. They closed down an oblast publishing house—there are fewer problems that way. Writers huddle in cramped nooks, but it is not the concern of the authorities.

[Shatalin] I can see that you have snapped! It looks as if we could trade places in this interview...

[Borisov] Honestly, it hurts! You can go and ring all the bells at... White Trinity! There is nowhere else to go.

[Shatalin] I admit that I expected compassion from you because of the article by A. Karpychev, "One Does Not Renounce if He Is in Love," which was published in PRAVDA recently.

[Borisov] This is what I was getting at. As you recall, in this article A. Karpychev regrets that such people (he also means you as one of the authors of a declaration published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No. 3) have lost faith in renewal, that they, supposedly, have renounced a lot, including what they used to be respected for. Do you acknowledge these charges leveled against you?

[Shatalin] Let us do it in proper order. The issue of mutual relations between the intellectuals and the authorities is a profound and serious one. Incidentally, there is going to be a chapter called "Power: An Inside Look" in my book which little by little I "dictate" into a tape recorder in my spare time, mainly in the hospital. I will definitely refer to this in that chapter. For now, just a few words... Power is and will be inferior if economically dependent people obtain it. Is this not the reason why communists, our disinterested people of the 20th century, combat private property with such detachment: Economic poverty and ideological commitment make them unconstructive.

As far as the A. Karpychev article is concerned... The citizens of Tver could read my response to this article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on 27 January. I will not repeat myself, but I will say one thing: Personally, I have not renounced, and do not renounce what I used to be and, hopefully, still will be respected for. As far as all the others who are greatly upset by my views and positions, I am not a 10 ruble note which everyone likes, as your ex-boss, respected Sergey Vladimirovich Mikhalkov, is fond of saying.

A. Karpychev does not like me either. Having poured a sea of denunciatory rhetoric on the "apostates," the author was careful to cover up the actual enemies of renewal. However, they cannot be hidden: all of them are

in plain view, and, incidentally, not very far away—among some luminaries writing in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and their ilk.

[Borisov] When a player leaves the team, it does not become weaker. Perhaps, a good player does the right thing when he leaves a bad team: One or two players will not help this team. But who is the ultimate loser in all this? This is a question, so to say, outside the framework of ethics in sports.

[Shatalin] I get your meaning... Are you saying that one or two players will not help? What about Pele, Cruiff, Maradona, or Cherenkov?.. The force of one is no force—this is the philosophy of the poor in spirit. But I left a bad team which did not play by the rules and played "a different game." Here is all the ethics of sports for you...

[Borisov] The two issues of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA containing your articles are still, as they say, very much in the spotlight. They are read and reread to one another by people oppressed by the endless lines for our daily bread, who are tired of adversity in life, of abundant verbiage at all levels, of the foolishness and confusion which prevail in our cold and hungry country, which has not, in these years, moved away from the edge of the abyss but has rather moved closer to it. They read and try to find an answer: Who and what should be expected to rid us of all our troubles?

[Shatalin] There is an answer, and I remind you: "Nobody will redeem us—neither a god, nor a tsar, nor a hero..." And so on, as they say, according to the text. These are wise and correct words. For more than 70 years, we sang them in unison at our party congresses... and yet we found heroes for ourselves who gave rise to both gods and tsars. This makes you want to scream: People, do not be tempted! Thou shalt not create!...

[Borisov] In your "open letter" to the president you proposed to return to the harsh version of the "500 day" program. Do you hope to be heard, and by whom—by the president, or by the people's deputies of the country who, having gathered for yet another congress and having already said a funeral mass and marked "the 40th day" after your program, as you admit, "did not even breathe a word about how to overcome the most profound economic crisis and complete economic collapse, despite discussing the issue of power (it is about the same thing, still the same thing!) against the background of a general and obvious shift to the right." This is a quote from your writings.

What happens next, Stanislav Sergeyevich? After all, it is not enough to "justify yourself before the people." The people expect action rather than excuses. After all, you refer to this yourself as you demand such actions from the president. Indeed, your letter to the president is an act which, I believe, few people would have the courage for even in our time of free discussions. But do you now believe that your call and your admonitions (which, incidentally, were stated as early as in our last interview

and which, as you told me, have long been known to the president) will be heard and understood this time?

Incidentally, it is customary to respond to letters, especially if they are "open." What about an answer?

[Shatalin] Are you asking me what is to be done? Personally, I have not written a work with this title, and this is why I will refer you to well-known authors—Chernyshevskiy, Lenin, and... Gavriil Popov.

Incidentally, he is another interesting author. Try to find an answer there.

Will I be heard? I would like to know myself. However, I am very hopeful. Incidentally, I have an idea about this. If you would like me to, I will ask academician T. Zaslavskaya to conduct a sociological public opinion survey in Tver on this. Let my fellow countrymen voice their attitudes towards my letter, and at the same time towards our program.

What about a response from the president? Are you sure that one needs to respond to all letters? No response is also a response. As the French say, no news is good news. As far as undesirable news is concerned: God forbid, they may close down TVERSKAYA ZHIZN after our interview. You know how it is here: Only current "counselors" are held in high esteem, and the attitude towards those who have resigned is chilly, even if they happen to be your fellow countrymen. In addition, I suspect editor Valeriy Kirillov personally poured oil on the fire with his bold article, "Trees Grow on Stones Too." I read this article with pleasure, and I believe that he hit the nail right on the head.

[Borisov] Still, if you ask me for wishes or advice for the immediate future, apart from wishing you good health, I would wish that the two of you, you and the president, carry on your dialogue.

[Shatalin] Thank you for your wish of good health. This is all the more appropriate because our conversation is taking place in a hospital. Thank God, it appears that things are improving—inasmuch as they can improve at all.

As far as carrying on the dialogue is concerned, let us wait. In mid-February, a joint conference will be held of the council of representatives of our country's independent trade union of miners and representatives of worker strike committees from the mining areas of the Union. I want to manage to return from Japan and deliver a report on the political and economic situation in our country and a program of joint actions for the workers in the mining regions. You understand, this is an imposing and serious audience. However, I hope to be understood not just by the miners.

Come to Moscow and listen to me. I promise that you will get a charge of optimism. If not, the guys will let you have some coal. It appears that this winter is going to be cold and long.

Editorial note. This interview was taken on 29 January, on the eve of the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission, which stated its disagreement with the latest publications in the press by academician S.S. Shatalin, Central Committee member, and found the views expressed in them to be incompatible with being a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to say nothing of its Central Committee.

Academician S.S. Shatalin could not take part in the proceedings of this plenum because of a previously arranged business trip to Korea and Japan.

Leningrad Poll on Gorbachev Handling of Baltic Conflict

91UN1076A Tallinn *VECHERNIY TALLINN*
in Russian 4 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Leonid Keselman, head of the Center for the Study and Projection of Social Processes: "A Conflict of Ideas Stands Behind the Conflict Between People"]

[Text] The day after the emergency Leningrad City Soviet session devoted to the political situation in the Baltic republics the Center for the Study and Projection of Social Processes went to Leningraders and asked them about their attitude toward the situation, which is unfolding rapidly according to easily envisioned scenarios.

The representation of various social groups—men and women, young people and old people, blue-collar workers and engineers—among the 2,500 individuals surveyed corresponded, as in all the Center's work, to those groups' representation among the city's adult population. This makes it possible to regard the data obtained not simply as the opinion of those actually surveyed, but as a reliable indicator of the opinion of the entire adult population of Leningrad on the issues discussed.

The data obtained indicate that during these days TASS reports, broadcasts of USSR Supreme Soviet sessions and other information convinced only seven percent of our city's population that "the President's actions helped resolve the problems which have arisen in the Baltic republics." Roughly the same number—seven percent—are inclined toward that view but without particular certainty. They are opposed by over one-half—**56 percent—of Leningraders who categorically disagree** with that assessment of our state's highest official. Roughly one person in 10 (11 percent) inclines toward that view, but not so categorically.

Overall, following the introduction of airborne troops into the Baltic republics, the nighttime assault on the Vilnius Radio Center, acquiescence to the emergence of conspiratorial "national salvation committees" and explanations on this point given by B. Pugo, D. Yazov and M. Gorbachev himself only one in seven (15 percent) of the city's adults residents believed to one extent

or another in a positive orientation in the USSR President's actions in regard to this issue, while **seven out of 10 Leningraders (69 percent) did not believe the President**, while the remaining 16 percent did not have a firm position on this matter.

Confidence was not lost just as a result of these events, though the two days of silence which followed the bloody drama in Vilnius and the refusal to resolutely condemn the criminals could scarcely have done anything for the prestige of someone who was the most popular man in our country 18 months ago.

As is evident from the data in the table below, **today women have significantly less faith in the President**. That is understandable: for them human life is least of all a means of settling scores.

The influence of age on people's confidence in the President is quite clear. **For every one person under the age of 30 who believes in his positive contribution toward a solution to Baltic problems there are more than 10 who do not believe it.** The older a person is, the greater the likelihood that that person still has faith in our head of state. However, even among the most loyal—**veterans over the age of 60—the number of persons who believe in the President is less than that of those who have lost their faith by a factor of two...**

The number of people who believe that the President has made a positive contribution toward solving the problems of the Baltic republics **among those who work in the administrative apparatus and military personnel exceeds the corresponding figure among blue-collar workers.** However, we find predominance of disbelief in all vocational groups. Whereas the ratio of those who believe in the President as opposed to those who do not in the administrative apparatus is 1:2, this ratio is 1:4 among skilled workers and 1:13 among students.

The number of people who have faith in a President who combines his state post with the duties of CPSU General Secretary **is almost equal among firm members of that party is almost equal** (though somewhat less) than the number of people who believe that he has made a positive contribution toward solving Baltic problems. However, among the members of that party who have stated their intention to quit the party (as well as almost one-third of the Leningrad Party Organization, which has shrunk by a factor of two), for every person who has confidence in the General Secretary there are 20 who have lost confidence in him. This is substantially more than among those who were never CPSU members or who have recently quit the party, for whom the ratio is somewhat more modest, i.e. 1:7.

We find a **preponderance of people who believe in the General Secretary's goodwill in the question of the Baltics** only among those who approve of using the army to solve problems of that nature. Yet only 14 percent of Leningraders approve of that means of preserving the Union, while three out of four (76 percent) reject it.

There was also noticeable confidence in the President among those who reject the idea of a positive contribution by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman in regard to normalization of the present situation. True, persons of that opinion in our city are fewer by a factor of three than those who are convinced that "the actions of the Russian Supreme Soviet chairman are helping to resolve the problems which have arisen in the Baltic republics." Yet among this majority those who have faith in our country's President are fewer by a factor of 14 than those who have lost their faith in him!

A conflict of ideas and structures lies behind the conflict between people. The goodwill of one side, despite all that has been said by those who would frighten us with the specter of democracy, is quite evident. The choice of the majority is also clear. And Leningrad is no exception. The data given below mirror almost to the percentage point the results obtained during the same period by our Moscow colleagues from the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion.

Or does the President think that the support of bayonets is more reliable than the will of millions of his fellow citizens?

Dynamics of Attitudes Among Various Social Groups in Leningrad Toward the Possibility of the Baltic Republics' Secession From the USSR (September 1989, February and July 1990 and January 1991)

Secession From the USSR by the Baltic Republics Must Be Forcibly Prevented	Agree				Disagree*			
	September	February	July	January	September	February	July	January
City's Population As a Whole	31	24	24	8	56	65	66	87
Women	29	25	24	7	60	62	64	88
Men	33	23	25	8	52	66	68	87
Under Age 30	19	14	17	5	70	77	77	93
Age 30-45	28	19	20	7	59	71	70	89
Age 45-60	36	29	28	9	51	60	63	86
Over 60	48	37	36	8	34	48	46	83
Unskilled Workers	40	47	37	10	44	36	44	80
Skilled Worker	36	23	31	6	51	65	57	87
Unskilled Office Workers	40	26	27	5	44	53	48	90
Medium-Skilled Office Workers	39	33	22	4	44	54	64	91
Students	18	22	13	4	73	82	83	92
Technical Intelligentsia	26	19	22	9	62	73	72	88
Humanities Intelligentsia	23	15	21	6	68	79	76	88
Administrators	34	23	24	22	58	58	64	76
Military Personnel	31	37	34	19	50	51	63	79
CPSU Members	34	25	40	17	56	66	54	76
Non-CPSU Members	30	23	21	7	56	65	68	89
Low Sociocultural Status	44	44	25	18	34	43	38	65
High Sociocultural Status	22	10	11	4	70	84	85	95
Of Those With Confidence in the President of the USSR				19				73
Of those with no confidence in him				5				93
Of Those With Confidence in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman				5				92
Of those with no confidence in him				16				78
Of Those Approving of Use of the Army				22				71
Of Those Disapproving of Use of the Army				5				92
City's Population As a Whole	31	24	24	8	56	65	66	87

*The sum of "agree" and "disagree" is less than 100 percent due to the number of persons with no firm opinion.

Baltics

Roundtable on Estonian Communist Party Split

91UN1125A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 2

[N. Kuznetsova report: "A SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA Roundtable: This Is a Difficult Time of Choice"]

[Text] So, there are now two Communist Parties in Estonia. The congresses that took place in December and January reinforced the split in the communist movement in Estonia. What caused it? Was it inevitable? How do the Communist Parties differ one from the other? How are they similar? What is it about the independent Estonian Communist Party that is attractive for Russian-speaking communists? Do their interests match the goals of the Estonian Communist Party?

These and other problems related to the activity of the independent Estonian Communist Party were the subject of a roundtable discussion attended by Russian-speaking members of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and Control Commission elected at the 15 January 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress: Yu. Rakitskiy, Estonian Communist Party Central Committee secretary; V. Yelkin, member of the Control Commission; Kh. Barabaner, senior associate at the Estonian Academy of Sciences Institute of Electrophysics and Thermal Physics; serviceman G. Tabachnik; A. Khmyrov, Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Political Department instructor and member of the Council of the Club for Democratic Initiatives; S. Smolyakov, chief mate [in the merchant navy]; N. Mikheyeva, Estonian Communist Party Central Committee secretary and first secretary of the Ida-Virumaask Uyezd Committee; and B. Yulegin, deputy chairman of the Tallinn City Soviet. Of course, it is difficult to convey a major, serious conversation in a single piece published in a newspaper. Today we offer fragments of it for the attention of our readers.

Why Did a Split Occur in the Party?

[Rakitskiy] The question really is not simple. And the causes do not lie on the surface. And in any event, they are in no way connected with the "ill will" of certain bad people, first and foremost, as it obviously seems to some, the leaders of the Estonian Communist Party and their "desire for separatism."

The split was evidently foreordained. It was caused precisely by objective reasons. And I repeat, it was not some insidious design; the basis of the split is ideological, social, economic, and other reasons.

Let us start with the ideological-theoretical bases... To put it briefly, without going into long discussion, it can be formulated thus: The independent Communist Party of Estonia to which we belong believes that the ideological-theoretical bases of the party should be associated directly with the realities of life, directly with the situation in which all of society now finds itself. And specific

policy should stem from this. What does this mean? There is no need to deceive ourselves, no need to mislead people. Then the party will not lose its link with life. Ideas that have not been affirmed in life, unsubstantiated ideas, must be promptly reviewed or rejected. It goes without saying that I hold to the main thing, namely, the ideas of social justice, both for the various social groups and for each individual person.

[Correspondent] But sometimes the Estonian Communist Party is called a "bourgeois party." Although, of course, a Communist Party "fighting for restoration of the bourgeois order" is somewhat strange, somehow incompatible...

[Rakitskiy] I think that some people are saying this out of bad faith, others out of ignorance. Or out of credulity. Someone was the first to use those words, of course... But if one really wants to know, all one has to do is read the program propositions and speeches. And compare them with the statements by the leaders of the CPSU and the materials from the 28th CPSU Congress. At the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress in January it was emphasized once again that the Estonian Communist Party is a party of socialist choice, and it supports the ideas of democratic socialism and proceeds from the basis of the common human values of Marxism.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, where is the difference?

[Rakitskiy] I have already talked about the Estonian Communist Party. As far as the Estonian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) is concerned, it does not link the complex situation in which society finds itself with ideology. It is considered that the most important thing is loyalty to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and, moreover, in the form in which it has existed hitherto. This is perhaps how it can be best briefly defined.

[Smolyakov] Incidentally, let me remind you that at the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee I. Polozkov, leader of the Russian Communist Party, talked about the need to return to the class approach. However, in the summary documents of the plenum the idea of common human values was clearly seen. And here we have no differences with the CPSU. Although it is common knowledge that it is precisely on this point that the accusations of "anticommunism" and "a slide toward social democracy" leveled at the leaders of the Estonian Communist Party are based. And I say nothing here of the criticism from Estonian parties and movements, the national fundamentalists, and so forth. Their criticism and their dislike of the Estonian Communist Party are based precisely on its allegiance to the ideas of socialism. For them, it is too "red"...

[Yulegin] The independence of the Estonian Communist Party is the next point, the basis for delineation... Think about it. For all the republics are specific and different processes are taking place in them. For example, is Kirghizia really like Estonia? If all the Communist Parties in the Union republics act in the same way,

according to universal laws common to everyone, not to mention their uniqueness, then they will be unable to influence the processes taking place and will really be unable to react flexibly and immediately by understanding the real situation. Moreover, this will lead to the refusal by an overwhelming majority of communists, especially those of indigenous nationality, to participate in the activity of such a party. The party will simply be unable to express their interests, the interests of the population of that particular republic. And in this event, it will be deprived of support. How can this not be understood?

[Barabaner] Under conditions of the further development of the USSR the diversity and specific natures of the republics will lead to the emergence of various political parties, and indeed even different political systems. Moreover, as a result of democratic choices, different political parties may come to power. The situation today already suggests these possibilities. Is this not so? And under these conditions, the Communist Parties should become independent and be part of the structure of the republic political system. And of course, the struggle for power... But not with the help of the army, assault troops, and special purpose militia detachments [OMON], but exclusively through legal political methods, giving due consideration to the specific features of the republics.

[Rakitskiy] I would like to remind you that the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress in January underscored in particular the need to maintain close ties with the CPSU, and the need for the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee to participate in the activity of the Politburo. Today this is one of the program provisions of the Estonian Communist Party, and we hardly see any secret or dishonest motives here.

[Correspondent] And finally, perhaps what is the main nub of things. Some people define the differences between the two Communist Parties simply as this: One of them (that is, the Estonian Communist Party) favors Estonia's secession from the USSR, while the other (the Estonian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform) is against that. And it is this that primarily determines their sympathies and antipathies...

[Smolyakov] So much has already been said about the position of the Estonian Communist Party on the issue of Estonia's statehood that it would seem that everything should be clear. But it appears that it is still unclear to some people. Yes, **the Estonian Communist Party does support the people's desire for independence.** This, incidentally, cannot and should not always be labeled "nationalism." For naturally, people do not want to live according to foreign prescriptions. The more so since the fear of directives from the center is really justified in Estonia. The numerous deportations, people being sent into exile, the breakup of families—all these things still live in the memories of generations. We Russians have also endured much, but they were nevertheless our

mistakes. And we are stuck here. So it is not nationalism that the Estonian Communist Party supports. It supports the desire of the people to live their own lives. **But...** And this "but" is crucial. The Estonian Communist Party believes that **secession from the USSR is not an end in and of itself, just as not seceding is also not an end in and of itself.** It is necessary to strive to achieve an arrangement in the country, a position in which the republics would be happy to be in it, and in which Estonia would strive to be...

[Barabaner] For a very long time, for years and decades, the official propaganda in the Union claimed that there were no conflicts in the country at all, social or national. But they were simply suppressed. And now the pendulum has swung the other way: Everyone wants to be sovereign.

What am I trying to say? In time people will see that they do have common interests. The stormy stage will end and it will become clear that cooperation is good for everyone. To the credit of the independent Estonian Communist Party it must be said that it talks about this all the time, and warns that no ill-considered steps should be taken, that no harm should be done to the living, that no matter how terrible they may seem, instantaneous decisions accomplish nothing. There is a **stage-by-stage road, the road of negotiations, of explaining positions, of explaining these common interests and reaching agreement on them.**

[Correspondent] We also hear this opinion: that the working class is for the Estonian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform), and that means that only it is right.

[Barabaner] That is not true. And indeed, who says that it is only the working class that now unambiguously reflects the common national interests? I do not think that it is worth delving into theoretical considerations now. What we have here is the purely practical aspect of the matter, for if we look into it, each of two Communist Parties has its own.

The Social Base

[Barabaner] In fact, let us consider this. In the Estonian Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) it is mainly the social groups associated with enterprises of Union subordination that are represented. As we know, it is mainly **non-Estonians** who work at those enterprises. This is Tallinn and the northeast of the republic. But in the Estonian Communist Party it is the social groups associated primarily with **local and light industry and the agro-industrial complex, science, culture, and so forth** that are represented. As the result of the processes taking place in the country and the republic, a contradiction has arisen between the republic and the centralized administration, between the all-Union and republic forms of ownership. So now you have **two socioeconomic bases** for two communist organizations in Estonia. **That is, the socioeconomic contradictions have become political...**

As far as the working class is concerned, as you see, it is going with both Communist Parties. Both enterprise workers and rural workers in sovkhozes, and the kolkhoz farmers, and technical intelligentsia stand behind the Estonian Communist Party.

[Rakitskiy] So far we have been talking about causes that are economic, political, and social in nature. But there are also psychological causes. Let us put it simply: Many people do not even really recognize these causes. For them the priority is fear and concern for their own future, and worry about the fate of their children. Who will safeguard and defend their interests? Out of habit many people see their bastion in the CPSU. It seems to many people that it will defend precisely them as a state party. This is what it was in former years.

[Yelkin] And let us explain this fear. On the human level it is understandable. For in the People's Front and the other Estonian movements they have done too much to antagonize the Russian-speaking population and put it on its guard, and to sow the seeds of confrontation and opposition. Now, the mistakes are in some cases being admitted. But they have occurred.

[Mikheyeva] It is for this reason, incidentally, that many people decided not to join the Estonian Communist Party. Even though they sympathize with it. And there is another reason. Too much intolerance. And as has often been the case in history, dissidence is punished. If you openly support the Estonian Communist Party you lose your job. We know of such cases, do we not? For the democracy that we have here is, unfortunately, still mostly words.

[Barabaner] And there is simple habit and tradition. My uncle, for example, a veteran communist, says this: I sympathize with the Estonian Communist Party and, moreover, I do not support the methods of the Estonian Communist Party (CPSU). But... tradition. He remains in the CPSU to which he has devoted virtually his entire life.

[Yulegin] There are many such people, those who do not support Annus' party and sympathize with the Estonian Communist Party, but cannot tear themselves away from the CPSU. It was precisely for them that **dual membership (in the Estonian Communist Party and the CPSU)** was established. The CPSU Central Committee commission that was working recently in the republic agreed to this, but with reservations. Of course, dual membership is unusual. It is at variance with the party Rules. But you cannot squeeze real life with its complexities into a rigid framework of prescriptions and instructions.

[Mikheyeva] Meanwhile, at the 21st Estonian Communist Party Congress the provision on dual membership met with no objections. Estonian communists, including those who have unambiguously defined their own attitude toward the independent Estonian Communist Party and membership in it, have understood the situation and

the state of mind of many Russian-speaking communists. And they supported the provision on dual membership precisely because they understood that **the Communist Party cannot and should not be mononational**. By its very nature it cannot be that... And again, what some people say out of ignorance notwithstanding, the Estonian Communist Party is not mononational. And more than 20 percent of those elected to the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and the Estonian Communist Party Control Commission are non-Estonians, and they include representatives of servicemen and enterprises of Union subordination.

[Khmyrov] I think that now, when communists, first and foremost **Russian-speaking communists**, are finding their positions and sorting out who is who and what the difference in positions is, many are joining the Estonian Communist Party. The more so since there are now many who are vacillating. Of the 42,000 communists who were on the CPSU rolls on 1 January 1991, only 20,000 to 22,000 have paid their membership dues. But even they include many who have not defined their own positions. And even some who have paid their dues...

[Correspondent] But an important question arises, and it is often heard in the various collectives:

What Does Joining the Estonian Communist Party Offer Russian-Speaking Communists?

[Smolyakov] We are living here. On this land. And most of us have nowhere else to go... But how will we live? In a closed Russian-speaking commune? In a state of constant hatred? In a state of mutual suspicion? Or by establishing links with the Estonians? The Estonian Communist Party is the bridge, the opportunity for us together to resolve our **common** problems, the problems of life in the republic. Moreover, we must have **allies among the indigenous population**, those who fight for our rights. For of all the Estonian parties and movements, only the Estonian Communist Party has right from the start supported and still supports the thesis that both the Estonians and the non-Estonians living in Estonia should have **equal rights**—political, economic and social.

[Barabaner] While we are in a party that does not assume sharp stances of confrontation, stances of acute opposition, we are moreover supported by Estonian communists and we have **greater opportunities** to be heard. **And this means that we can do not less but perhaps more for the Russian-speaking population.** Perhaps someone may have the idea of causing a certain mistrust. In vain. It is better to solve problems when people listen to you, when you solve them with other people. Not by shouting, not at meetings. But actually...

Sooner or later independence will be achieved for the republic. It is inevitable. This is the logic of the development of the processes. It is possible, of course, to try the Lithuanian version again, with shots and casualties, but it is already impossible to halt the desire of the people to resolve their destiny for themselves.

What kind of republic will it be? **What kind of republic do we want to see?** For this is very important for us. Extremely important... And it is precisely the Estonian Communist Party that can and must exert influence on these processes.

[Yelkin] And there are different trends in the CPSU. F. Burlatskiy, O. Lapsis, and S. Shatalin are still in the party, and behind them a great number of communists who think the same way. I do not at all think that the party of Polozkov is the entire CPSU. This is precisely why I and many of my comrades—Russian-speaking communists—are keeping our CPSU party cards. **And for us, being in the Estonian Communist Party means having an opportunity to realize our own democratic views and positions. In terms of its positions and methods, the independent Estonian Communist Party is closer to the democratic forces in the CPSU. And that is important for us. We can go there with our thoughts and ideas.**

[Correspondent] **You talked about methods... Can you define HOW on this plane one Communist Party is different from another? People often ask precisely WHAT makes this party, and how this is manifested.**

[Barabaner] To put it briefly

We Want To Be in a Constructive Opposition...

[Khmyrov] We are now living through a period in which we do not have different parties or essentially clearly formulated programs. People are defining their own positions according to methods, tactics, and leaders...

[Barabaner] You see, it is easier to be noticed if you make a lot of noise. God forbid, I want to offend no one. But... If calls are heard for strikes, and meetings are organized—it seems that a great deal of energetic work is being done. But it is impossible to be always in a state of confrontation... To work only for the "No," for the negative... Something must also be proposed.

It is common knowledge how serious the situation now is in the economy. And, while criticizing the government, we (and not only we) say that it has no clearly formulated, integrated policy or concept for the economy. It is, of course, possible to abuse it for this, both in the press and at gatherings and meetings. But something must also be proposed...

Incidentally, the tone and atmosphere of our 21st Congress surprised some journalists. Some even thought that it would be possible to wax ironic about it. Obviously, they have become so accustomed to constant disputes and shouting and sharp words that they think that that kind of atmosphere is normal. But that is not so...

At our congress we tried to work out an **integrated vision of the very acute problems** of life in the republic and in its economy.

[Tabachnik] In fact the congress was constructive. I, for example, was also surprised by the clearly expressed,

sober, and calm position with respect to the military units deployed on the territory of Estonia. Well, that is by the way...

[Barabaner] Meanwhile, the economic documents adopted at the Estonian Communist Party (CPSU) Congress in December last year were prepared by us when we were still in the coalition. And I would say that that was the most positive and constructive part of that congress.

[Smolyakov] I think that in our complex situation the path of dialogue is the correct one.

[Rakitskiy] **As a political force we are striving for stability, steadiness, and civic peace**, so that all, I emphasize all, inhabitants of the republic can have a sense of a calm, comfortable, and guaranteed home. It is impossible to live constantly on a volcano and be throwing flammable material into it.

Nothing is more important than to preserve the peace on this land and insure the primary right of each person, namely, the right to life.

Estonia To Introduce Identity Cards

LD1803221291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1900 GMT 18 Mar 91

[Text] It has been decided at a session of the Congress of citizens of Estonia, which unites citizens of the former bourgeois republic, to introduce identity cards for citizens of the Estonian Republic. The said identity cards which, in the view of members of the movement, should be officially recognized by all organizations on the territory of Estonia, have been printed in Canada and will cost each citizen R15. Supporters of this action, though they acknowledge its lack of juridical basis, believe the institution of identity cards to be the most important step since 1988 when, as is known, the desire for the restoration of Estonia's sovereignty was first declared.

Latvia's 'Equality' Faction Legislators Fined

91UN1129A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 22 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by A. P.: "Economic Levers"]

[Text] What makes up the pay of a permanent Supreme Soviet deputy? Base pay of R500 [rubles]. Plus something like a bonus: R10 for each attendance at a plenum or commission session. According to an amendment to the Statute on Material Provision for Deputies adopted on 3 October absenteeism without proper cause, "i.e. without the permission of a permanent commission's chairman," will result in a fine of one-twentieth of the base salary, R25, being deducted from the deputy's pay, in physical terms. And, of course, no bonus is paid!

In January on the basis of this statute a financial penalty was imposed on "Equality" faction deputies holding session outside of parliament. For example, whereas in

December S. Dimanis earned R620, in January his pay was only R285. A.S. Buka earned R700 in December, but only R175 in January.

This is what Supreme Soviet Secretariat head Yu. Dobelis had to say: "S. Dimanis, 'Equality' chairman, himself drew up his faction's schedule and was expecting full pay. But that is absolutely illegal. According to statute the schedule is to be drawn up by a commission secretary and approved by its chairman. Any differences of opinion or disputes are to be settled solely by the chairmen of permanent commissions. No matter what political motives force the opposition to leave parliament, the law is nonetheless the law!"

What will the opposition get in February for failing to fulfill its work quota?

Latvian Democratic Labor Party Assesses Role in Republic

91UN1129B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 22 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Juris Goldmanis, Latvian Democratic Labor Party Central Committee secretary, conducted by Yevgeniy Orlov: "Conversations in Room 1109": "The Latvian Democratic Labor Party: 'Pinkos'? 'Frauds'?"]

[Text] *People tend to view this party with a certain amount of caution. It is equally disliked as a Communist Party supporter and as an alternative to it, as anticommunist. Because the word "communist" has been dropped from the party's name some people call them renegades and "frauds," while others call them "pinkos." Some people despise the members of this party for rejecting "communist ideals," while others suspect them of playing both sides. In one way or another the former Independent Latvian Communist Party, now the Latvian Democratic Labor Party (or, as it is called, the "Kezbers Party") is taking hits from all sides.*

I admit that I myself was skeptical about the Latvian Democratic Labor Party. But as more differences of opinion arose between the "former Communists" and radicals at both ends of the spectrum, the more attentively I followed the course of their political struggle.

I met with Juris Goldmanis, Latvian Democratic Labor Party secretary, following a recent plenum, and I asked him to talk in greater detail about what his party represents today and how it views its position in our republic.

[Goldmanis] The tragic events in Latvia in January played a sobering role. Now at least everyone must realize that we must not deviate from the democratic path or bypass democratic standards, that we must not play around with such serious matters as observance of commonly accepted human rights. Now we are witnessing a certain split both within the Latvian People's Front and among those who opposed the 4 May Declaration. In this situation we feel that the Goldmanis government and the leaders of the Latvian Supreme

Soviet now have a new chance to expand their base for the sake of democratic, realistic and constructive changes in our parliament and in society.

At the plenum we expressed our disapproval of Latvia's fate being decided by the all-union referendum of 17 March. We supported the idea of conducting a poll of Latvia's permanent residents on 3 March. Yet at the same time we put forward once again the prerequisite of uniting all democratic forces in our republic. In connection with this we adopted a special resolution on activities by the Latvian Republic Citizens' Committee leadership. We disagree, to put it mildly, with the Citizens' Committee on a wide range of issues. These include the treaty between Latvia and Russia, and attitudes on the poll, and citizenship. The position taken by the Citizens' Committee leadership and its main leader Aigars Irgens is definitely dangerous. Recently one of our party members in Ventspils put it this way: "What sort of democratic Latvia should I vote for in the poll? A democratic Latvia 'according to Gorbunovs' and a democratic Latvia 'according to Irgens' are two different Latvias. I could vote for the former, but not for the latter..."

[Orlov] Many people have their own ideas about what democracy is. Yet virtually everyone calls themselves "democrats." Some people are of the opinion that the only democrats are those who supported the Declaration of Independence. Do you acknowledge the existence of democratic forces in the opposition camp?

[Goldmanis] Absolutely. And it is a great pity that following the adoption of the Declaration the government and the Supreme Soviet, or more precisely the majority faction, not only failed to increase the number of their supporters but actually did the opposite, losing some people and increasing the number of doubters and even opponents.

[Orlov] Tell me what in your opinion were undemocratic steps taken by our Supreme Soviet over the past eight months and which undemocratic ideas prevalent in society were not properly rebuffed by official "greater Riga."

[Goldmanis] Firstly, the Supreme Soviet itself has lowered significantly the threshold of democracy by repealing the quorum statute, thereby essentially depriving the "Equality" faction of a chance to influence the Supreme Soviet's work. Secondly, there was the now-suspended resolution which in effect infringed upon the rights of military personnel and their families. Unfortunately, tactical mistakes were made in the building of an independent state: we declared a transition period yet failed to draw up economic or other guidelines by which we could make consistent progress. We have devoted a great deal of attention to the West but realized too late that without the support of the East and democratic forces in Russia, without dialogue with Moscow—step by step, as Goldmanis says—we will not get very far. A specific example is the case of the Press Building. Whoever relied on the parliament's decision

and it alone proved to be a shortsighted politician. We should have worked with Moscow more, debated more, worked toward agreements. Of course, it is difficult and impossible to fight the "berets," but in my opinion Bishers did not do everything he could have in the dialogue with Moscow...

[Orlov] What is your personal view of the prospects for a "horizontal" union of republics?

[Goldmanis] Today, especially after the events of January, after Gorbachev portrayed the events in Vilnius to the Supreme Soviet as "clumsiness in actions by the army," the most important thing is recognition of real Latvian independence. After that it will be possible and necessary to talk about some sort of economic cooperation, about some kind of union advantageous to the republics. Remember that Finnish diplomats used to say that before one gets into politics it is best to study geography carefully. Latvia's geographic location is such that bad relations with Russia or Belorussia could prove tragic for our republic...

[Orlov] Let us get back to our discussion of the referendum and the poll. It seems to me that in both cases the phrasing is strongly reminiscent of the question: "Would you eat meat if it were tastily prepared?" Therefore it is very hard not to assume that both are the usual political game, playing with the people, just the latest declaration...

[Goldmanis] Unfortunately that is the weakness of the phrasing used. In our version we proposed that the phrase regarding a democratic Latvian Republic be amended with a statement guaranteeing "observance of international standards for the protection of human rights." Note that I say "human rights," not "civil rights"—that precludes differences of interpretation...

[Orlov] Juris, literally a couple of words about the Democratic Labor Party itself.

[Goldmanis] Our party is not presently at its best. In society we see a certain decline in activism; we see apathy. Whereas prior to our congress we counted roughly 21,000 party members, upon completion of re-registration we will clearly have only about one-half that number. We have been forced to give up our apparatus, and we are doing so for two reasons: our financial situation does not permit us to maintain the superstructure, and we also have a strong desire to rid ourselves of the heritage which we have from the period when we existed as the "ruling party."

We also hope to make ourselves heard in parliament, where there are currently 10 deputies who are members of our Central Committee...

As you can see, the views of the "Kezbers Party" today are notable for their striving toward reason; they are oriented

above all toward people and toward the creation of the basic requirements for our republic's democratic development.

At the very least the "former Communists" who might initially have been suspected of playing both sides of the game have over the past year made fairly consistent efforts to make both their own party and our society more democratic. SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH readers will probably notice that, too...

Latvian Newspaper Backs Negotiations With USSR

91UN1131A Riga LAUKU AVIZE in Latvian 1 Feb 91
p 2

[Unattributed article: "This 'Dependent Independence.' What Is To Be Done?"]

[Text] We now have a hymn, flag, and coat of arms. There is the Declaration of Independence and the name of the Republic of Latvia (true, in the congress in Moscow, it is still the Latvian SSR). We have our own parliament and a series of well intended laws and resolutions. **NEVERTHELESS, WITH EACH COMING DAY, LIFE BECOMES MORE COMPLICATED AND THREATENING, AND AN INVISIBLE FORCE PROPELS US, ALONG WITH OTHERS, TOWARD THE ABYSS.** And how can it be otherwise, for the great state—upon which we are so dependent (energy, raw materials), with which we share a common lifeline (money, banks, supply), whose armed forces control our borders, and whose passports are in the hands of our citizens—is in agony.

This strange situation, this "dependent independence," creates in some—confusion and uncertainty, in others—fear, and in a certain number—hostility, as well. It seems that it is only in a small number of people that such a situation creates the incentive for energetic activity for the good of Latvia (here I do not wish to include the great vanguards of the shadow economy, for I do not consider robbers to be heroes, even if, admittedly, they perform their work with "inspiration"). We have proclaimed privatization to be the main economic stimulus and, it would seem, this principle does not cause particularly great differences of opinion in Latvia (although there are those who advocate "socialist equality").

But let us take a look around! Why does the barber still go to the *kombinat* barber shop? Why the shoemaker—to the big footwear workshop? Why doesn't the carpenter craft some product while a fallen tree rots in the forest? Why do several saleswomen twiddle their thumbs in a shop where there is nothing to sell? Why is the state cafe—where coffee is only served black—still operating? Why, why...? Why then don't energetic private entrepreneurs begin feverishly working in these and hundreds of other places? But they do not. Buying something cheap and selling it for a lot—now that catches on; but serious production has hardly begun at all.

Even the many cooperatives that are now buying, and making it big by selling with a minimum of work, will fail once market prices establish themselves, for they do not represent any truly productive activity, but merely take advantage of the flaws of the government's pricing policies. In other words, the process of the advent of true entrepreneurs is taking place slowly. So much is lacking at this time. And everyone would be ready to buy—many have the money—so why doesn't an entrepreneur produce, if nothing else, candles, or maybe stools, or toilet plungers, or good hoes? The smiths know how to do it, but the factories cannot. Why is this so?

And here I recall the article by a Swedish scientist that I read a year ago, where he says that "restructuring" will only truly begin when the whole of society joins into this process. But society will only join in when people have faith in the state. In turn, people will only have faith in the state when they know why they must work, and they will only know why they must work when stores have goods but their pockets are empty.

Thus, for economic activity to begin, in addition to passing legislation, we must (and this first of all) create a situation where there are goods in the stores but not enough money in the wallet.

Just recently, the government has begun work on price regulation in order to create more correct price ratios, and do away with subsidies. The wage supplements envisaged for the social protection of inhabitants—coming as they do partly from state and partly from enterprise resources—have the side effect of creating pressure to raise output prices. To what extent could this move bring us closer to the abovementioned principles on goods and money?

It could bring us closer if wage levels above the minimum for sustenance were frozen. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that this could take place, for the head of an enterprise could not withstand the psychological pressure, and wage increases would follow, initially threatening production, then resulting in output prices being increased in order to ensure production. In addition, this enterprise will not be able to radically influence the amount of money circulating in the web of the "shadow economy" (unless some time in the future the product becomes inconvenient for circulation [there]). If we assume the possibility that wages are successfully frozen, then this would gradually lead to a levelling out of salaries and to a decrease in work activity at the work place itself. That would not at all be what should be achieved, but rather, the very opposite.

Be that as it may, let us objectively assess that which has been begun. The increase in prices and wages may regulate price ratios and perhaps protect the market somewhat (for there are instances where the market price is already higher). More correct price ratios for foodstuffs will result in objective preconditions for the restructuring of our menu toward the already cheaper

vegetables, which is much more correct and can be observed throughout the western world.

What is most important about this step is that the price increases at many cooperatives that have thus far been "living it up" on the basis of faulty pricing, will now put them in the same situation that state enterprises are in, which is quite an achievement.

Of course, the measure also has an undesirable side to it—a precedent for new inflation is created, for as yet there is no labor market, and anti-inflationary measures will be ineffective. But avoiding this is not possible at the present time, and the measure taken by the government must therefore be deemed very positive. It will have a mobilizing effect.

In order for people to have faith in the state as an entrepreneur, full stores and empty wallets are not the only thing, though it is a fundamental condition. Lack of faith is caused by political uncertainty, a dubious tax system (it does not promote the accumulation of capital), credit policies, and social protection and the threat of outside (USSR) inflation. All this must gradually be adjusted, and then, after twenty years or so, we will be living in a completely different situation. To some this will seem like a long time to wait. Let us remember that West Germany hopes to privatize and rearrange the German east in seven years.

What direction should our actions take? It seems to me that the most fundamental matter is the exclusivity of the economic system—in other words, economic independence with a firm economic border.

The border control begun by the government is a good first step toward a genuine customs system. I believe that the technical arrangements for this are largely within the capability of our own government.

And what about economic independence? Economic independence was formally "given" to us at the end of 1989. Just how genuine it is, and how successfully we have been able to take advantage of the formal possibilities, is another matter.

These fundamental questions require a persistent dialogue with Moscow and a clear, consolidating position in Latvia. I emphasize—consolidating.

Since the People's Front came to power, we have managed take quite a few polarizing measures, and that works against our efforts toward independence. It seems to me that it would behoove us to listen more carefully to the pronouncements of Mr. Johansons (KGB), though his ambiguous position is very understandable. Nevertheless, negotiations, negotiations, and more negotiations. The development of new options, then negotiations again, and not just with Moscow, but serious negotiations with the "Equality" faction, as well.

There must be a reduction in the tension between the nationalities, which often arises purely as a result of theoretical formulations. In this regard, it is difficult to

understand the simplistic approach of many radically inclined deputies—to wait for the collapse of the empire, whereupon freedom will fall into our laps. There can be no doubt that before that [ever happens], everything that took place in the USSR between 1920 and 1940 will also occur. And what is going on now is proof. The direction of events testifies as to where we are heading at this moment: As Shevardnadze warned—toward dictatorship. Therefore, negotiations must be arranged while there is still someone with whom to negotiate.

We are surprised by the low activity of the Supreme Soviet in the negotiations, all the more so because at the beginning of last September, the economic program drawn up by Academician Shatalin and accepted by Gorbachev envisaged associated-state status—that is, states existing outside the USSR and maintaining ties with it in the implementation of established economic programs. This opportunity has unforgivably been missed, only because under the influence of our declarations, we lived in the illusion of an independent Latvia (despite the events at the press building and the abduction of recruits). But in the most literal sense of the word, together with the United and Indivisible [USSR], Latvia is sinking. Even more so. The nations of the developed world analyze all the programs of the USSR, for they influence their actions. We, out of principle, do not analyze these programs, and our press does not even reflect them. In this regard, too, I believe the situation in parliament must radically be changed, if we have any sense of responsibility.

Vice Premier Urges Lithuanians Be Prepared for Active Resistance

91UN0712A Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in *Lithuanian* No 47, 22-28 Nov 90 pp 1,2

[Interview with Romualdas Ozolas, Lithuanian Republic vice president, by Ceslovas Grincevicius: "On Love of Country and Shaking Loose: Resistance - The Possible Price of Independence"]

[Text] "If need be, I will take up arms and I will fight for Lithuania." Every time I hear these words I see that the speaker, deep down, does not believe it will come to this. But the case of Lithuania's independence is becoming increasingly complicated and ROMUALDAS OZOLAS, the Republic's vice president, without skirting the issue, is urging people to be prepared for active resistance. GIMTASIS KRASTAS asked him the following questions.

[Grincevicius] In the Sunday opinion section you stated that "it is time to stop playing diplomatic games" But it seems to me that there has been very little diplomatic astuteness and flexibility until now. Mostly there has been a direct appeal to the West for recognition and repeated demonstrations of our righteousness in the hopes of shaming the great Eastern neighbor by spitting in his face.

[Ozolas] I for one am against those sorts of games. There should be methodically developed diplomatic strategy appropriate to the current situation, with an eye toward the distant future, and toward creating possibilities for a future Lithuania to exist. But to deflect like a ping pong ball every urgent message sent to us or to become incensed at every speech by some third-tier messenger is not a serious approach.

I do not know if it is possible in general to handle these matters more effectively if we do not understand what we are obliged to do, if we have not yet formed a concept of what that country will be like and related to it programs of behavior or life. Not some sort of program for the operations of government, but on the whole, programs for thinking and orientation. Who in Lithuania today can really say what we are doing? Some can, of course. But those are the opinions of isolated, albeit high-ranking, individuals. And in respect to what should the policy of the country be based upon, the country we are creating together? Our foreign policy and diplomacy can proceed only from what we wish to create and do. I could say a lot of unpleasant things at this juncture to everyone, but enough of blaming the government. Without consensual agreement and general action there will be nothing, no government will be able to hold out. For a country developing from a revolution, there needs to be a concept for its creation.

[Grincevicius] You have spoken out about an armed resistance. In what case, in your opinion, would it be necessary? Is there anything to be gained by it? And finally, where would we get guns—or would we be pulling out swords from museums?

[Ozolas] Armed resistance—the most extreme form of defense—would be a way to possibly safeguard independence at such a price. Up until that point—negotiations and explorations—in some way to squeeze through the eye of a needle to the side of freedom without a scuffle, because only by agreement can we get to that side. But what if the other side, for some reason, loses interest or the possibility to negotiate with us? Well, excuse me, but that is not why I stood up! Regardless how the situation develops around me, I will not be one of those whose children will be able to accuse him saying, see, just as in the 1940s, not a shot was fired. Only by resisting the act of annexation and occupation, should annexation be repeated, can our independence be transferred back from reality to just a possibility, as it has been for five decades.

As for what to resist, don't worry. Having taken such a road, Lithuanian will surely find what to take advantage of.

[Grincevicius] The leadership, in fact the entire governmental structure, is accused of being isolated from the daily needs of the people, reacting only to the needs of its own surroundings. Just by your very incitements and

warnings, people could hold the government to be powerless or impotent in seeking dialogue to find agreement in a civilized manner.

[Ozolas] It is their choice to believe what they wish. It is getting hard in Lithuania today to agree upon anything. We are experiencing a major crisis in our government's institutions, in our government. This is not just a leadership crisis, however one may wish to imagine it, but one of our own thinking, of our own conscience. And I am not prepared to try to explain this to someone who does not want to understand. I get plenty of such "evaluations." It would be somewhat worse if, later on when it becomes possible to evaluate this with a clear head, it is admitted that this leadership was inadequate. I am convinced that no one will be able to blame us if, at the fateful moment (if there is one) we were not decisive. Only with time will people be able to find out if it was only the leadership and the governmental organs that were at fault. And how much at fault. We are all responsible for what a nation does not manage to do.

[Grencevicius] What recent events have sharpened your opinions?

[Ozolas] The fact that certain questions have been decided in the world and in Europe. The world is not prepared for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to be independent, for the Soviet giant to fall. They need this conglomerate. They need it as a balance to other world "structures." The unification of Germany has underscored that the world wants the Baltic States to be some sort of associative derivative of the USSR, which is, let's say, 90 percent of what we want. But we will accept only 100 percent!

And now the USSR, having gotten the opportunity, acts, as is said by the decisive bill of its Supreme Soviet to assure "by all possible means" that the USSR does not break up. That is why I say: we will resist by all possible means. If the USSR does not manage to avoid making a new fatal mistake and starts a war against Lithuania, it will herald its own quick demise. We surely will not be silent and will behave as it suits us. Whoever is unwilling may sit it out. They are already sobbing in advance. They can write me letters. More than once I have gotten them. Is it possible that in those 50 years we have become so foolish that we are afraid to think that it might be necessary to risk and perhaps to die for some intangible—not for "mago," not for a suite of furniture, not for a piece of sausage. It seems to me that we have gone too far down the road of powerlessness, there's nowhere else to turn. We have to make up our minds.

Brazauskas, Others Assess Lithuania's Current Situation

91UN0712C Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian No 49, 6-12 Dec 90 pp 1, 4

[Interviews with Jonas Boruta, priest; Algirdas Brazauskas, vice premier Lithuanian Government and first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee;

Viktoras Alekna, former exile; Vladislavas Svedas, Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) second secretary and Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council deputy; and Juozas Tumelis, council chairman Lithuanian Sajudis Seym; by Ceslovas Grencevicius and Jurgis Pekarskis: "Lithuania in the Range of Danger"]

[Text] Of course not everyone in Lithuania assesses the current situation, this danger that has arisen in our land, in the same way. Our interview with Vice-Premier of the Government R. Ozolas "On Love of Country and Shaking Loose" (GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 47) had wide repercussions. We hereby offer the thoughts of other well known personages in Lithuania on the current situation, reflecting a variety of opinion on Lithuania.

Those Ideas Die That Are Not Died For

Jonas Boruta, priest at St. Casimir Parish, Vilnius

From the communist East we can expect anything. The devil rarely follows logic. Now what is clearly present: resounding threats, fabrications, slander. A real threat has arisen, that Lithuania could once again be flung back to previous times. But our Christian optimism does not allow us to become despondent: even were that to happen, it would be only temporary, because evil does not reign forever.

How should we behave? I believe that the most important condition is to remain true to one's ideals. If we do not shirk from them, then no one will be able to overcome us. Opposition forces inside the country will, of course, try to pit one Lithuanian against the other. We are very familiar with this alien principle. The nation must be prepared for this because we have no protection from betrayal.

We cannot forget that spiritual gains, our rebirth and our independence, come through sacrifice. Only the cross brings salvation and light. Maironis said: The cross carries life. So we must view sacrifice as a privilege granted by God. For there are values greater than health and life. One of them is love of country. Those ideas die that are not died for.

We must prove our fidelity to Lithuania should that be required. To defend one's country and faith for 600 years has been our nation's greatest treasure.

One Step at a Time

Algirdas Brazauskas, vice premier Lithuanian Government, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee

No politics can be divorced from economics, from real life. On March 11 we decided as a nation to rebuild independence, without formulating concretely our relations with the Soviet Union. That is all I shall have to say here about politics. But today we are faced with a very delicate question: how will we live through next year?

This situation all the more clearly requires grave decisions or, more accurately, the right to decide for ourselves. Our position, that we will maintain only interstate commercial relations with the USSR, is well known to Moscow. But they raise certain concrete demands that Lithuania participate in the work of the currency committee, in formulating the Union's budget, that it retain the Soviet Union's financial system, etc. There are two choices: either we accept some of these conditions and participate in the USSR market at the same price and under the same conditions as the other republics or we get treated as a foreign country at international prices.

There should be some middle choice—a transition period (as in Latvia and Estonia). In this way, over the course of one or two or three years, our relations with the USSR should normalize. Such a transition period and an appropriate development in relations to that end, in my opinion, is inevitable (I speak here primarily about economic relations).

We can choose another path, accumulating dried bread crumbs, but I wonder if we would be able to insult three million people with them. Unfortunately, my suggestions and those of others are often taken politically as some sort of retreat. I repeat, to evaluate reality only by political measures or to act on it only by political methods is impossible. But anyone who believes that we can survive all blockades through stoicism and heroism is mistaken.

The government offered and will act strictly to stop any rise in prices or inflation. We must speed up priorities: laws and regulations for a new economic system, privatization, pricing policy, foreign capital investment, banks, etc.

Keeping in mind a greater goal which could unify the populace, it might well be worth reviving the idea of a united or "people's front." But everyone would have to support it. We proposed this not only at the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party, but also later. However the leaders of the newly formed Sajudis apparently did not hear us. So a confrontation among political forces is building for unclear reasons at a time when we really need to have faith in our leadership and trust among each other. People are aware, after all, that the current situation only does harm to our goals. This is unconscionable.

If the Soviet central authorities refuse to speak with us as human beings, we should not get upset: if you cannot get in through the door, try the window; if you cannot get in through the window, crawl through the roof. For we have no other choice—we do not have the physical power. Only factors which affect the entire Soviet Union can benefit us, as well as our own stubbornness, our ability to strike a compromise. Experience has shown us and I believe the future will confirm that the "step by step" tactic is the correct one, the only one. Finally, more than

one foreigner (and I meet with several every day), has told me, has advised me that there are possible leaps to fake.

Let Us Be Patient

Viktoras Alekna, resident of the Sirvintu region, Kantramiskis Village, a former exile.

Lithuania is threatened today not so much by USSR aggression as by economic pressures. People in the countryside talk about this frequently. The eyes of fear are huge. That is why I doubt if a blockade awaits us such as that of last spring. I think that it will be more subtle and will not last long because the USSR will realize one day that it is cutting off the branch it is sitting on.

Our greatest problem is that most people are firm in their idealistic conviction. Consequently, this is a ripe opportunity for various instigators. The Government and the Parliament are responsible for this. I do not believe that the standard of living is all that bad. Look around you: no one is barefoot or in rags; the restaurants are full. It is an inflated issue intended to frighten people. We must support everyone these days who works patiently and sincerely. Let us not be quick to accuse; let us learn to forgive.

What Have We Come To, Friends?

Vladislavas Svedas, Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) second secretary, Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council deputy

Aristotle wrote that most tyrants come from demagogues who have won the faith of the people by slandering the higher-ups. A tyrant, among other things, is always inciting the people. He keeps the populace in preparation for war so that they feel the need for a leader. This is the sum of the statements of the Lithuanian Supreme Council issued since March which says in fact that the USSR is preparing to attack Lithuania. Now there is agitation about a threatening danger, an attack, that we (the Communist Party of the USSR - ed.) are preparing some sort of action or provocation. There are even rumors that I arranged the attack on myself in Taurage.

Today those of us who find ourselves in a political, economic, social, and democratic crisis, see a crisis in the Supreme Council and the Government. This is not my opinion alone but also that of several former Sajudis leaders. When there was a danger of losing the government, we began to formulate appropriate laws, to create a repressive apparatus, and once again we sought, as it were, to put people in "frames." I have in mind the draconian measures on party statutes, formed by national security powers (although this has not been agreed upon with the USSR), secret police, etc. What have we come to, comrades!

This unilateral, unconditional withdrawal from the USSR—a process which today Lithuania wants to blame the Soviet Union, will inevitably lead the Soviet Union

into chaos and civil war. According to estimates in the West and in Leningrad, the cost of such a war would be 50 million lives. Why did Estonia proclaim a period of transition? They have learned from Lithuania's experience, whereas we are constructing our withdrawal from the Union by Stalinist means. That is why today not a few non-Lithuanian speakers (and not only they) among Lithuania's inhabitants oppose not independence itself but a method of withdrawal that leaves them no future.

It is terrible that an atmosphere has been created in society to encourage the destruction of monuments as well as anti-Russian propaganda. Why do we not want to become involved in the interests of Poles in Lithuania, why do we attack them? They act just as Lithuania acts with the Soviet Union.

Who can guarantee, that the destruction of monuments will not lead to violence toward human beings? We get many threats implying attacks. The greatest defense under these conditions is openness. That is why we proclaimed on Soviet television a plan to deal with violence and the taking of hostages. I am satisfied, that the people of Lithuania understand it in that way. Now, I am sure, that no one will attempt such actions. But that such plans do exist, I am 90 percent certain. That is why I took certain measures to assure the safety of my family.

What is most frightening is that we are once again proceeding toward a totalitarian regime and people have no guarantees. This comprises my position and that of others who think like I do.

The Mood of Mature Perestroika

Juozas Tumelis, council chairman, Lithuanian Sajudis Seym

We are constantly being offered improved versions of occupation and annexation. Clouds are once again gathering over Lithuania. It is now winter, and forces unfriendly to us understand weather (recall what happened in Poland at the end of 1981, a week and a half before Christmas).

Will we remain united and strong like last year and the year before? Our unity in other years did not always appear genuine. Some rose up for freedom, independence, and democracy; others to hold onto a government stepping away, etc. Fifty years of Bolshevism has made us an inside-out society. A return to normal life is difficult and painful. And we are no exception—just look at Europe this side of the knocked down Berlin Wall. Nowhere are people so alienated as those who have been in a socialist camp. The greatest burden, freedom, is still heavy for us. That is why wherever you look there is confrontation between groups and individuals. Furthermore, the Bolshevik fundamentalists and fans of mature perestroika, in wanting to save themselves by all means possible, are striving to wage war against everybody, to destabilize all aspects of life.

Life for Lithuania's Sajudis is not easy either. Although people's doubts have metastasized horizontally and vertically and Sajudis has been buried and mourned over with crocodile tears, it is still alive. It must be one of the most important guarantors of Lithuanian stability. Moreover, Lithuania will have to be saved not only by those for whom it is a geographic concept, but also a holy obligation.

We must fulfill this obligation knowing that the reconstructed occupier will refine its means of choking us with our own hands. We must be willing to get our hands dirty in the full view of everyone else. It may very well be, that we will be forced to go through various ritual motions (elections, referenda, overt and covert confirmations or denials), threaten to take away jobs and bread. Let us recall those 50 years.

Every calm hour we enjoy in the clock of rebuilding our independence is a victory not only for us but also for Europe. So today we should postpone our real or imposed differences until calmer times. Everything else should be dictated by our wisdom, our conscience, and our personal responsibility for Lithuania and Europe.

State Security Chief Views Lithuania's Situation

*91UN0707A Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian No 59, 13-19 Dec 90 pp 1,2*

[Interview with Mecius Laurinkas, general director of the Security Department, by Ceslovas Grincevicius: "The Breaking Point: Lithuania in the Presence of Danger"]

[Text] Following are the statements and views of representatives of various political movements on the present dangers confronting Lithuania. We think that it would be interesting to hear the opinions of the General Director of the government's Security Department, Mecius Laurinkas.

[Grincevicius] So, as the leader of the institution which worries about the security of the country, what are your views on the current situation in Lithuania and the threats to us all which have emerged?

[Laurinkas] We have to keep in mind what is taking place in the Soviet Union as well as in our own Republic. It seems to me that every thinking person in Lithuania can list the circumstances and factors deciding our situation. Apparently, during the Soviet Union's 4th Congress of People's Deputies, issues regarding that country's structure will be decided (or at least discussed). On the agenda are union treaties, the referendum bill, the composition of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and other important questions. Based on the various decrees and orders by the president of the USSR, one can form the impression that Lithuania is given more attention. But I think that the Kremlin is no less worried about the general state of the USSR. In fact, relations with the army are just as delicate in the Ukraine, Moldavia, and

in the Caucasus. The conservative forces have consolidated now and will speak out at the conference. I have learned that a great amount of work to this end has been carried out behind the scenes—a propaganda campaign. That, of course, causes anxiety.

But one has to realize that the future of the USSR is now being decided, and the breaking point certainly will not be peaceful. The discrepancies are so great that to come up with a rational solution (looking at it even from the other side) is very difficult. Consequently, it is possible to anticipate an unusual situation, such as intervention by the army, and so on. Structures in Lithuania hostile to the lawful governmental organs are preparing for this. That is why we also have to prepare: to protect ourselves (as much as possible) in terms of international rights as well as economically.

The situation in Lithuania is tense because the pace of reform is not what we had hoped for. The breeding ground for this tension can be found in decisions by the government that are uncoordinated among different institutions, as well as in discord among political trends. There is much truth in the criticism lodged against the Parliament and the government. But it is also doubtful whether any other country finding itself in our position would have been better able to influence outside factors. But it is important to note that we were not the only ones responsible for what went on in our back yard.

Right now a battle of laws is being waged between us and the USSR. And the position of the majority of Lithuania's people cannot but clash with the views of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Some people, especially foreign-language speakers, sometimes get pushed into the arms of Yedinstvo or the Lithuanian Communist Party by our inability to fathom their situation or by the thoughtless actions of particular groups. But to have movements born out of change and a diffusion of opinions is a natural process. For example, who would have been able to control the meetings of Sajudis during the Period of Rebirth in Lithuania? The state cannot and should not try to smooth over or standardize all the opinions found in society. It is another matter to insult foreigners or to incite it. But our organs of government do not promote it, do they? On the contrary, they speak out against it.

And there is something else to consider: meetings and pickets against the government or the Parliament are now being intensively used by provocateurs.

[Grincevicius] In the press and elsewhere accusations have appeared addressed to the department you run: the Security Department supports a secret police force to monitor those who are unhappy with the current government and criticize it; that the Security Department, (even though it is a department of the government) is actually run by the Republic's Supreme Council (as previously by the Central Committee) and so on. What kind of answer would you have for this?

[Laurinkas] Simply, it makes no sense to pay attention to every accusation of this kind. He who will want to find fault, to heap on accusations will do so. I maintain this position: we will create structures openly, there is a law prepared for that. Let the Supreme Council debate what is needed and what is not. Right now we are just in the process of organizing ourselves. The expert knows that this is a long and difficult job. And so long as there are no negotiating laws, we are not hiring many people. So accusations of that kind are groundless. Such stories are said about V. Petkevicius. It is alleged that he is being followed because we require trip accounts for travel abroad made by Supreme Council Deputies. That is absurd.

[Grincevicius] What comes to your mind when you hear the widespread hysteria of everyone calling each other KGB agents in security publications and elsewhere? After the well known decision by our Supreme Council did many of those former KGB informers and agents come in and confess? On the other hand, it is said that you took over a part of that agency (together with your own workers) and you are now using their services? [Laurinkas] That is more of society's conscience, psychological things. Our society's law in relation to the KGB is based upon the nation's historical experience and will never change. But even the people whom we hire to carry out intelligence work will be considered for a long time to come differently from those who work, for example, for the FTB [expansion unknown]. What most irritates our people is the ideological function of the KGB, its activity as an organ of the Communist Party.

In creating our institution, we could have avoided using the word "security" in our name and avoided much gossip. But we wanted to demonstrate by our actions that it is not words or a name that is decisive but the substance of the work. Everything will be finalized in a future law.

It seems to me that the activity of former agents should be left up to their own consciences and we should operate according to the well known decisions of our AT [Supreme Council]. Those who own up now assume a great psychological and moral burden. But no one anywhere (not even in Eastern Europe) is about to expose such agents en masse because nothing will come of it. So, some people who used to work for the KGB have expressed an interest in working with us. Every profession has its peculiarities. If, in order to carry out its mission it needs an agency, then it creates one, either a new one or using the old one.

[Grincevicius] What are your current relations with the KGB subgroup in Lithuania?

[Laurinkas] We have tried to be ruled from the start by statute because it is pointless and unnecessary to have artificial confrontations. Most simply put, we are organizing our structure. Everything else is a question of negotiations with the USSR. I have said this before and I repeat, that in order to fight organized crime we will

have to make agreements with appropriate organs in the USSR and in other countries. What does Moscow's subgroup do in Lithuania now? It, as far as I know, is reforming its structure, but carries out almost the same work as it did previously.

Lithuanian Editor Backs Unarmed Resistance

91UN0712B Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in *Lithuanian* No 49, 6-12 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Algimantas Cekuolis: "Brains and Brawn"]

[Text] Finland lost 70,000 citizens during four years of resistance to the USSR. Ten thousand of them were civilians. It was horrible, but they now live in freedom and prosperity. The wound has healed. They never had to experience deportations.

Without firing a shot in 1940, Lithuania lost 312,000 (the counting still goes on) to shootings, executions, deaths in the Gulag, maimings. Half were women and children. No freedom or benefits were gained until now, only continual threat.

The conclusion is obvious. One has to resist. The USSR values resoluteness. And one has to know how to resist.

When we hear talk of restoring our army and hazy promises that it will be armed, does it not sound suspiciously like we want to mechanically repeat the feat of 1918-1920? It would be nice, but the situation now is different. The Soviet Army is no longer scattered as it was then, half of them in partisan groups. We have no Mannerheim line. The Soviet Army is already inside Lithuania and can triple in size at any time. It has traveled our roads many times. It has addresses and an overt and a covert network of collaborators. In other words, our tactics must be new and up-to-date.

We definitely need a strong police force at the border and internally. We definitely need strong mobile units to repel attempts to take over buildings, enterprises, and banks. But we will achieve final victory only when we have learned not to use force openly, and have the entire nation to do this, particularly its young people. This is how India won, the Blacks in the USA, and Poland. There is no weapon against that weapon. The methods are handy and there is a never ending number of them. (I can say no more here). We have to learn them today, we need specialists and the use of quick wits. We should assume the essence of the Sauliai, not just revive their name. When we will need them we will have no TV, no radio, no newspapers, and it will be harder to congregate.

The enemy is awaiting primitive provocations but he will be impotent. Every step he takes in Lithuania will be like walking through a swamp with no path stones to step on. It will cost him more to be here than to leave.

Deputy Assesses Lithuania's Policy Errors

91UN0713C Vilnius TIESA in *Lithuanian* 8 Dec 90 p 2

[Speech by Deputy Bronius Genzelis: "Success Was With Us While We Were One"]

[Text] A Speech by Bronius Genzelis Delivered to the Supreme Council of Lithuania at its December 5 Session

It will soon be ten months since the act restoring independence was proclaimed. Have events followed the course that we hoped they would? Are all of our failures the fault of our enemies? Have we made no mistakes? In my opinion, there have been quite a few of them...

We proclaimed the act restoring independence then began to wage a paper war with Moscow. Instead of looking for the fastest way to get to the bargaining table, we figured out ways to offend the leaders, giving them a legal basis to set up a blockade. Of course, Moscow was looking for legal pretexts, but did we do all we could have to avoid them? At least now we should have the civic boldness to look this straight in the eye. We were ruled by baldfaced ambitions. We were searching for a neutral country in which to hold negotiations while ignoring any sense of reality.

From the very first day we focused on the West, believing in an immediate recognition which we never got. Then we began to yell "The West has sold us out again!" forgetting that every country places its own interests first. That is the logic of diplomacy. Nobody sold us out. We were creating comfortable myths that we wanted to live by.

Diplomatic agreements are crafted so as to contain no language that would prove offensive to either side. Meanwhile, we were expecting that the USSR would recognize us before even getting to the bargaining table. What a prior condition! Having gotten that, what was there left to bargain for?

Proclaiming independence and being independent are not one and the same thing. Is there anyone among us who really believes that we are already an independent country? Our aim is to achieve genuine independence and not to create new myths.

We have already lost the most favorable opportunity for negotiations with Moscow—that was before the Gorbachev-Bush meeting. Moscow won the first diplomatic round.

Our second big mistake was the following. When Gorbachev created a negotiating commission, we should have created one the next day! Our delegation should have been headed by the prime minister. Negotiations between countries are the prerogative of the Government. Parliament ratifies agreements, it does not draft them. The delegation should have received wide authority. If the agreement would have run contrary to the statutes of the Parliament, then it would not be ratified and the Government would have no choice but

to resign. But now, being a mixed Parliamentary-Governmental delegation, headed by the chairman of the Supreme Council, there remains no controlling body. In the case of non-ratification, not only the Government but the leaders of Parliament would have to resign.

In the eyes of the world, the legal status of contemporary Lithuania and that of Lithuania up until June 15, 1940 are not equivalent. At that time Lithuania was recognized by all, including the USSR, as a sovereign state. At that time, armed resistance, from the point of view of international rights, would have been treated as a war against a foreign aggressor. Now, since no one has given our restoration of independence de facto recognition, particularly after the Paris agreement, armed conflict with an occupier, to which we have received an unambiguous invitation, would be viewed by world rulers, though they may be sympathetic to us, as interfering in internal affairs. So from the point of view of international rights, such a battle would not improve our situation in the slightest. To be invited to fight a war which has no chance of being won is a crime of adventurers.

We should be happy that we do not have the problems of the Gruzia, but we are headed there. This is not just the hand of Moscow or Warsaw, but also our spineless politics. How must other nationals in Lithuania feel, for whom Lithuania is also their homeland, when over Kaunas television, at meeting in Vilnius they hear over and over again that they are second class citizens and should leave Lithuania. True, such talk has not been heard from the rooms of the Supreme Council, but they have not officially dissociated themselves from it.

We have waited until the most unfavorable moment: the USSR, following the reunification of Germany and Gorbachev's winning the adulation of world leaders, can manipulate us as it pleases. Apart from this, the conflict in the Persian Gulf opens wide possibilities: it (the USSR) renounced its friendly ties with Iraq, I believe, not without reason. In other words, the USA will not lift a finger over what the USSR military does in our country.

We were successful when we were united. Now we have split up (or been split up). And this poses the greatest danger. Every attacked person defends himself. So do parties. I have nothing against those on the right, every society has them. But our right is turning brown. This is another question entirely. The rulers of Parliament have to make their positions clearly known. They are directly responsible for the destabilization of Lithuania. The so-called governmental newspaper constantly incites one against another. If it were a publication of the Lithuanian Freedom League, I would not raise any objections.

An economic crisis is approaching. Tension is increasing. Tumbling and waiting for Godot, we will await only social disintegration and be totally compromised. Then will the imperial powers begin to have an affect on the idea of independence.

Practically speaking, we have to examine our foreign policy carefully, to make forecasts, to predict all possible scenarios. We should be discussing the army with political leaders, not aggravating soldiers.

It is obligatory that we make an institution for policy planning. The contemporary Government Rebirth Commission does not at all fulfill its mandate. We will emerge from this blind alley if we can understand our responsibility and if we do not try by all means possible to disparage or eliminate everyone who sees a different path for restoring the nation of Lithuania.

Reassessment of Lithuania's Policy on USSR Urged

91UN0713D Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 8 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Julius Veselka, doctoral candidate in economics: "I Risk Being Misunderstood: Independence Means Man's Freedom and Not a History of Leaders"]

[Text] On March 11, the Supreme Council of Lithuania expressed the will of a nation—it legally restored Lithuania's independence. But it is time to realistically consolidate Lithuania's statehood. And patriotism alone will not suffice. This difficult path requires wisdom, patience, willpower, competence, and great diplomatic efforts so that we can see global reality, understand its trends of development, and find our own place.

In my opinion, both the Supreme Council and the Lithuanian government view the consolidation of independence too simply and straightforwardly. Any sensibly thinking person, not to speak of serious politicians, understands that the fate of Lithuania's independence depends upon the development of certain events in the contemporary USSR and in our relations with the Soviet Union. It is well and good that our government's people make frequent trips to the West, but from a practical standpoint those trips have more propaganda value. Of course, one cannot turn them down because in due course they will have great benefit, but one does not have to hail every semi-touristic trip as a significant diplomatic achievement. The people notice these things very quickly and begin to lose faith in those whom they had trusted.

We should, first of all, anticipate in detail and without prejudice how things will proceed in the USSR and construct our practical policies accordingly. I wonder if it is appropriate for Lithuania to maintain the position that the USSR is disintegrating. We must learn to balance so that the force of collapse does not bring us down as well.

Our current politicians view the USSR as the enemy of Lithuanian independence, basing everything on an enemy image. This is a mistake and an example of political shortsightedness. One does not conduct serious economic transactions with an enemy, and we want to cooperate with this territory now known as the USSR because it is the foundation of our economic existence.

Of course, a totalitarian country with a centrally planned economy is unacceptable to us. But the USSR will no longer be like this; it is not like this even today. This country wants to rid itself of its ragged clothing, and we must help it do so. The whole world is helping it. It is not encouragement for altruistic reasons that helps but guidance for purely practical considerations. Turning this militant serpent into a civilized person would open a good future for Europe, for the world, and all the more for Lithuania.

Or again, we often hear voices almost rejoicing that famine is coming to the USSR. That would be a great tragedy and we must view it as so, to try to help those people because that would be Christian. All of us were victimized by the same Soviet system and we should not gloat over another's misfortune.

Obviously, since the former USSR is no more, then our current politics are based on a battle with the past. That sort of politics can be conducted only by people who see only themselves in independent Lithuania. Some have even mentioned the possibility of bloodshed, of a bloody resistance. That is a very dangerous kind of politics which could consolidate totalitarianism in the Republic. National totalitarianism is more dangerous because the healthy energies of a people are destroyed not by the hands of foreigners but by one's own.

If the independence of Lithuania is a much greater value for us than assuring ourselves of this or that position, then we will have to view the USSR as a European country whose economy functions on the basis of a market. It would not be useful for Lithuania, and Lithuanian in general should not be prejudiced against unions of countries. The isolation of any country in today's world inevitably tells upon its very existence. No matter how we may not like it, the reality of the world is such that democratic countries are joining economic and political unions. Only countries taking the path of totalitarianism can wearily exist for some time yet in a closed-off condition. But the Lithuanian people do not need this sort of state.

So our politics must be oriented toward union with one or another country. We can join only by our own wish and will, viewing the benefits of such a union for Lithuania. In this case we have to have, without prejudice, have detailed discussions with the USSR as well. These discussions should be conducted by competent specialists and not by those whose only privilege is patriotism. That, after all, is measured not by words.

Such a policy would facilitate making economic agreements with the USSR. It would guarantee some sort of minimal functioning of our economy in 1991. It would lessen the confrontation with the leaders of that country, who in turn would respond more favorably to our efforts to obtain international recognition of our independence.

Lithuania's participation in discussions about a union of independent countries does not mean that we are obliged to sign it. For example, Lithuania could participate in a

new union for three or five years with the rights of an observer or associate member. If this union favors our economic and political interests in practical terms, then we could participate in it with different rights. But we can also suspend our participation as an observer or associate member.

One way or another, it would be a more flexible policy that, I believe, would be necessary and useful for Lithuania's people because it would guarantee stable economic functioning and the people could feel more secure about the future. During this time we could manage, if we act resolutely, to integrate Lithuania's economy more into the European market.

I have laid out my reasoning and I wonder, will I be understood. Probably not today. But always doubt what those in power do not doubt, and you will be right.

Lithuania's Liberal Union Prepares for Congress

*91UN0713A Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian No 47, 22-28 Nov 90 p 2*

[Interview with Arvydas Sliogeris, philosopher and one of the originators of the Lithuanian Liberals Union, by Rimvydas Paleckis, GIMTASIS KRASTAS correspondent: "Arvydas Sliogeris: Liberalism—Lithuania's Future"]

[Text] On the eve of the founding congress of the Lithuanian Liberals Union (LLS), our (G.K's) correspondent met with one of the union's originators, ARVYDAS SLIOGERIS, philosopher.

[Correspondent] Does Lithuania need yet another political movement?

[Sliogeris] If Lithuania wants to avoid the path of Bolshevism then yes, it is very necessary. This is all the more so because the goals of the liberals coincide with the objectives of the Republic in the aims of political and societal life, i.e., to free the individual from the constraints of the state. An abundance of strong political centers is a guarantee of a democratic country.

The economic and social foundation of LLS should be free entrepreneurs. There is not yet enough of a legal basis for them to exist and operate in Lithuania. The kind of people attracted to our union are those practically thinking intellectuals, who sensibly perceive and appreciate the dangerous political and economic situation in which Lithuania has found itself.

Entrepreneurs and intellectuals opposed to the regulation of their activities is what the liberals are also seeking.

[Correspondent] Your opponents call you idealists.

[Sliogeris] We are pragmatists: If liberalism does not take hold in Lithuania, it (Lithuania) has no future. After

March 11 we trusted that whole scale de-bureaucratization would begin. Unfortunately, we were wrong.

The goal of the liberal is a self-governing society and a free individual. For example, people themselves should implement economic reform, with the state providing only legal arbitration functions.

[Correspondent] Republicans in the USA, conservatives in Great Britain, are the same kind of liberals. Are there many other countries in which they are influential?

[Sliogeris] In almost all Western countries, wherever there is private property. Western society itself is a liberal society.

[Correspondent] The congress takes place this coming weekend?

[Sliogeris] Yes. It should be an intermediate stage between a union and a party. An officially legalized LLS, in my opinion, would become very similar to Western parties: a small nucleus, open membership, special activity at the time of elections. The basic union unit would be chapters or clubs in Lithuanian cities and villages. In essence, it would be as decentralized as possible.

One goal of the congress is to unite people. We also intend to adopt laws and program resolutions.

The Lithuanian Liberals Union, in contrast to destructive political movements in the Republic, will act as constructive (loyal) opposition to the government.

Lithuanian CP Holds Congress, Changes Name

91UN0849A Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
12 Dec 90 pp 1,5

[Unattributed article: "Informational Statement: On the Extraordinary Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party Enters the Political Arena

An Extraordinary Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party took place on December 8th in Vilnius in the Palace of Culture and Sport of the Ministry of the Interior.

In his opening remarks, the first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee announced that, of 560 delegates elected to this forum, 546 were participating. There were delegations of Swedish leftists, Polish social democrats, the Latvian democratic labor party, and the Russian republican and Belorussian union democratic parties. Representatives of active parties and movements in Lithuania also participated. A telegram greeting from the prime minister of Lithuania, Kazimiera Prunskiene, was read at this extraordinary Lithuanian CP Congress to the delegates and guests.

The delegates elect the congressional presidium, secretariat, editorial commission to edit Program and Statute projects, and a mandate commission.

The agenda confirmed by the Extraordinary Lithuanian CP Congress was as follows:

1. A political statement from the Lithuanian CP Central Committee read by the first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, Algirdas Brazauskas.

2. Information from the Financial Commission of the Lithuanian Communist Party read by the Lithuanian CP finance head, Pranas Vilunas.

3. The Party's program determinations read by secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, Povilas Gyls.

4. The Party's statute read by Lithuanian CP Central Committee Secretary Vladimiras Beriozovas.

5. Elections to the party's leadership organs.

Ratification of congressional regulations.

Algirdas BRAZAUSKAS, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, carried out the first item on the agenda.

Information from the Financial Commission was read by the commission's head, Pranas VILUNAS.

Povilas GYLYS, secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, read the statement "On The Party's Programmatic Decisions" and Vladimiras BERIOZOVAS, secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, read the statement "On the Party's Statute."

Discussions on the party's programmatic decisions and statute projects, a political evaluation of the Lithuanian Communist Party's past and its name change was begun by Justinas KAROSAS, dean of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Vilnius.

Congressional delegates greeted: Birita ERIKSON, parliament deputy and member of the Executive Committee of the Swedish Leftist Party; Voitech VISHNEVSKI, member of the Executive Committee of Polish Social Democrats; Ivars KEZBERS, head of the Latvian Democratic Labor Party; Jakas SOBIKAS, member of the Central Committee Bureau of the Estonian Independent Communist Party and first secretary of the Tallinn Party Committee; Viktor BELOV, member of the Russian Federation Republican Party Coordinating Committee and RSFSR people's deputy; Andrey TENKOVSKI, member of the Belorussian Union Democratic Party's council.

Participants in further discussions included Juozas NEKROSIUS, poet and head of the Lithuanian Children's Fund, and Stanislovas RIMKUS, first secretary of the Ukmerge Region Party Committee.

The statement of the Mandate Commission was read by its chairman, Klemensas KAZLAUSKAS, first secretary of the Vilkaviskis Region Lithuanian Communist Party committee.

Discussions were led by: Professor Algis MICKIS, department head at Kaunas Medical School; Vytautas ASTRAUSKAS, laboratory head at the Vilnius Experimental and Clinical Medicine Scientific Research Institute; and Vladislovas STUIKYS, first secretary of the Pakruojis Region party committee.

Congressional participants were greeted by Leopoldas TARAKEVICIUS, deputy head of the Lithuanian Humanists Party; Dobilas KIRVELIS, deputy head of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party; and Valentinas ARDZIUNAS, deputy head of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party.

Discussions were led by: Alvydas SEDZIUS, first secretary of the Siauliai City Party Committee; Juozas BASTYS, head of the Governing Council of the Kriukus Collective Farm in Sakiai Region; Gediminas KIRKILAS, secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee; Academician Jokubas MINKEVICIUS, deputy to the Lithuanian Supreme Council; and Mindaugas STAKVILEVICIUS, member of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee bureau; Jonas BELOPETRAVICIUS, teacher at the Tauragnas secondary school in Utena Region; Vytautas ARBACIAUSKAS, first secretary of the Kaunas city party committee; Karolis SNEZKO, deputy chief engineer at the industrial union "Vilnius Fuel Equipment Factory"; Linas BULOTA, senior instructor at the Kaunas Agricultural Academy and at Kaunas Vytautas the Great University; Antanas VAICIUNAS, director at the Joniskes region film studios; and Ceslovas JURSENAS, liaison officer between the Lithuanian Government and the Supreme Council and press secretary.

Congressional delegates adopted a resolution "On Evaluating the Political Past of the Lithuanian Communist Party" and "On Completing the Reorganization of the Lithuanian Communist Party."

The Lithuanian Communist Party changed its name by secret ballot. In the voting, 515 delegates took part. Upon opening, the boxes were found to contain 513 ballots, 512 valid, one invalid. The name "Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party" was voted for by 432 delegates, 76 voted for the old party name, and four abstained.

The Lithuanian Communist Party will hereafter be called the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party while maintaining continuation of independent Lithuanian Communist Party legal and juridical rights. This decision was adopted by the Congress.

Delegates at the Congress adopted the Party Program and Statute, discussed the way in which to elect the party's governing body, and suggested candidates for the party's governing body.

The second working day of the congress began with a statement by the head of the Vote-Counting Commission, Danute Kristina MACKEVICIENE, on responsibilities distributed among members of the Vote-Counting Commission and on voting procedures.

Following the voting were discussions by writer Vytautas PETKEVICIUS; Antanas BUCINSKAS, associate professor at the Klaipeda Department of the Siauliai Pedagogical Institute; Petras BRAZENAS, first secretary of the Lithuanian Writers' Union; Jonas SEDYS, senior scientific associate at the Vokes branch of the Lithuanian Agricultural Scientific Research Institute; Bronius GENZELINS, professor at the University of Vilnius and AT Deputy; Bronius ABRAMAITIS, general director of the Lithuanian Metal Products Didmenines Purchasing Unit; Irena SIAULIENE, new docent at the Klaipeda Faculty of the Kaunas Technological University; and Poet Algimantas BALTAKIS.

Delegate Mindaugas STAKVILEVICIUS addressed the congress with a proposal. He explained the points made by a group of congressional delegates who suggested that the name of the Lithuanian Communist Party not be changed and that a communist subgroup be instituted in the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. The congress concurred in the suggestions of this group.

Rita URBANAVICIUTE, director of the Vilnius Children's Theater, addressed the congressional delegates and explained that a children's theater production will be staged on Saturday by the Ministry of the Interior's Palace of Culture and Sport not as a protest against the congressional delegates but was a peculiar protest against the Vilnius city authorities who refuse to grant space to the Children's Theater.

Also joining the discussion was Algirdas GRICIUS, first secretary of the Vilnius City Party Committee, and Algis ARBACIAUSKAS, coordinator of the Snieckus Residential Area Committee.

The Congressional Delegates adopted the "Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's Preliminary Action Program"; resolutions "On the Situation in Lithuania"; "On Re-Registering the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party"; "Addressing Global Democratic Forces"; and other documents which will be published in the newspaper TIESA.

Danute Kristina MACEVICIENE, chair of the Vote-Counting Committee, announced the results of the voting: Algirdas Brazauskas was elected head of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party by a vote of 518 to 6. Algirdas Brazauskas thanked the congressional delegates for their expression of confidence in him and invited all of the delegates to work together for the good of Lithuania. Also announced were the results of voting for members of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party Council, Finance and Control Commission, and Ethics and Disputes Commission.

Algirdas Brazauskas gave the closing remarks.

The Congress closed its session with a singing of the Lithuanian Republic's National Anthem.

[Boxed item: First Session of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's Council]

At the first session of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party the following were elected as deputy chairmen: Vladimiras BERIOZOVAS, Vitalijus GERZONAS, Gediminas KIRKILAS, and Justas PALECKIS.

Elected to the Lithuanian Democratic Party's Council Presidium are: Vytautas ARBACIAUSKAS, Bronislovas GENZELIS, Povilas GYLYS, Algirdas GRICIUS, Ceslovas JURSENAS, Justinas KAROSAS, Andrius MESKAUSKAS, Juozas NEKROSIUS, Giedrius PETRUZIS, Juras POZELA, Karolis SNEZKO, Mindaugas STAKVILEVICIUS, Domijonas SNIUKAS, and Virmantas VELIKONIS.]

Democratic Labor Party Issues Resolution on Situation in Lithuania

91UN0849B Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
12 Dec 90 p 2

["Resolution: On the Situation in Lithuania"]

[Text] The Congress of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party declared that Lithuanian independence, based on the natural right of a nation to be sovereign and to determine its own fate, is fully implemented by the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. At the same time, we must acknowledge the contradiction that remains between March 11th's proclaimed act of independence and the very real situation existing today—that of Lithuania's dependence upon the USSR. In part, this is an objective transitional period situation, made all the more acute by certain acts of the Government which could have been avoided. It is impossible to assess either the West's or the East's international political interests or Lithuania's forced economic integration and geopolitical situation in the absence of a serious understanding of our current capabilities and of appropriate measures by our government against the divisive actions of extremist political forces.

Sooner or later we have to get back to reality. It is beginning to become clear that we have to rely on a successful policy which requires a realistic assessment of the situation.

In our opinion, Lithuania's path to independence is beset by the following historical obstacles:

- The USSR will not want to lose control over part of its territory;
- The governments of the world will avoid recognizing the Lithuanian State until the USSR does;
- The appearance on the world political map of sources of recurring tension (the Persian Gulf crisis);

—Unclear relations between the republics of the Soviet Union and the Center, and growing economic and political disintegration in the entire Soviet Union can have negative consequences for Lithuania;

—The activity of USSR organizations within Lithuania that oppose independence, particularly in the southeast where the Soviet army remains a continuing source of tension and is used for USSR interests;

—The political instability of conditioned sluggish foreign capital investment in Lithuania's economy.

No less of a problem for the achievement of real independence have been the following internal factors:

—Political instability: Various political forces, most of all the majority in Parliament, talk about unity while their actions reveal mistrust and suspicion. Constant oath-taking of fidelity to Lithuania's independence, obtained in a ritual manner, sometimes changes concrete actions.

—Genuine creative measures are replaced by symbolic actions. Attempts are made to consolidate society by preparing for an illusory armed resistance which in itself may provoke the use of force.

—The deteriorating economic situation—people's fear of what tomorrow may bring—and the as yet undefined economic ties with the USSR create a vicious circle which leads to unsuccessful and contradictory acts of the Parliament and the Government. There is talk of a market economy while laws are being adopted to limit it. Secondary issues are being discussed while the basics (a budget, privatization, prices, etc.) are left undecided.

—We have succumbed to the illusion that it is possible, regardless of reality and the State's capabilities, to easily implement the principle of private property;

—An inadequate legal system. The passage of the Temporary Basic Law underscores the temporary nature of all other laws. The constant changes in and amendments to the Temporary Basic Law and new laws adopted makes society lose confidence in the law. The passing and implementation of laws, and the legal authorities' not adhering to its limitations, gives rise to a constant dissonance between Parliament and the Government;

—Society's moral crisis: economic and political instability are a breeding ground for corruption, speculation, for dealers and other lawbreakers to flourish;

—A non-one-sided, objective analysis of the situation in the Republic and the reasons for people's dissatisfaction. The path of least resistance has taken to blaming, most often, the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, the press, and the Government;

—An undefined nationality policy: This allows forces opposed to Lithuanian independence to exploit the

situation for their own ends. A stable situation in Lithuania can be assured only through laws which clearly define the status of national groups, not statements and declarations;

- A one-sided assessment of the past: A "Black and White" assessment of the historic period after 1918 prohibits us from understanding the problems and priorities in restoring Lithuanian independence, obstructs our path to the civilized world of the 21st century, and inhibits the formation of free and thinking individuals.

The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party Congress invites everyone to understand that an independent and democratic Lithuania can be created only through the efforts of all its people, and not by one political party or group or another declaring itself the one true creator or defender of independence.

Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party Sets Goals

91UN0849C Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
15 Dec 90 pp 1,2

["Program Statement: On the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's Nearterm Activity Goals"]

[Text] Nothing is more important than a human being. In his development, we see the essence of historic strides. The basic goal of the party is to assure the person opportunities for a free and fulfilled life. Only work can assure the development of every individual and the good of society. That is why the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP) ruling by the conviction that work and creativity are the existential basis of man and society, will concern itself first of all with putting together the political and social conditions for people's normal physical and intellectual activity.

The purpose of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party is to be one of the constructive forces in creating an independent and democratic Lithuania, a parliamentary, social-democratically inclined political organization. The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party is:

- A party whose entire activity is for the purpose of strengthening Lithuanian independence and to whom most important is the guarantee and further enhancement of national values of Lithuanians and other inhabitants of our State.
- A democratic party for which democratic principles are of the utmost importance in its own activity as well as in the management of the State.
- A parliamentary party which will implement its policy through factions in elected government bodies, utilizing democratic competitive methods, declares for a parliamentary State, orients the structure of its organization to parliamentary activity and maintains close ties with deputies, representing the party or supporting it;

—A moderate party, adhering to social democratic values and open to new ideas;

—A working-people's party, defending first of all those people who live by their physical or intellectual labor, and the interests of the most underprivileged layer of society;

—A party of rebirth and reform, helping and encouraging its members and supporters to seek spiritual and economic progress for Lithuania;

This statement is based on party declarations already publicized for the development of the restoration of Lithuania's independence, for Lithuania's current and future cultural activity and general principles of agrarian reform.

The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's immediate and most important tasks are:

Creating a Democratic Society

- To actively participate in preparing the foundation of a new, democratic State based on the Constitution of the Lithuanian Republic;
- To strive to have a Constitutional court established;
- To offer to accept the law on recalling Deputies and the decree on the realization of civilian petition rights;
- To strive to clearly delineate the legislative, executive, and judicial functions;
- To offer to adopt a law on freedom of conscience;
- To adhere to the law guaranteeing all permanent residents of Lithuania, regardless of their citizenship, human rights, declared on the basis of the international rights act, its acceptance and actual implementation;
- To offer to adopt a law on social organizations and movements;
- To strive for the clear, legal regulation and practical implementation of the independence of the activity of institutions of local self-government;
- To strive for equal rights for all political parties and movements, equal judicial opportunities for their activities, and correctness in political battles;
- To speak out on behalf of social groups, factions, and individuals who are persecuted politically, economically, religiously, or psychologically;
- To propose that all political parties supporting Lithuanian independence sign a declaration of nationalities concord;
- To defend freedom of the press, the self-sufficiency and public access of the mass media;

- To support democratic changes in trade union, women's, and children's organizations.

To Create an Economically Stable Society

- To effectively prepare the economic policy decisions of the party, by which the State would have an economic strategy, a stabilizing economy, guaranteeing a minimal standard of living for every Lithuanian citizen, particularly the elderly, invalids, and those just entering the work force, creating new jobs, preparing and implementing educational and recertification programs, encouraging business;
- To encourage a beginning of negotiations with the USSR, to find a consensus, striving to eliminate the state of "weightlessness" in our inter-relations and realistically begin economic reform;
- To speak out on behalf of a balanced policy of foreign investment in Lithuania, taking into consideration, on the one hand, its necessity for our economic effectiveness and, on the other hand, the danger that foreign investors may not sufficiently reflect the interests of the Republic.
- To endorse economic privatization, beginning with the service sector, stores, light and middle industry, agroservice, agricultural product processing. This process should not affect the citizens of the Republic unduly harshly or deepen the economic and social turmoil of the State;
- To support the Republic's economic savings policy. This is one very real way in which to lessen economic dependence on outside forces.
- To approve that toilers of the soil themselves have the opportunities to decide what agricultural reforms they want and at what speed, and assign priority to the development of rural areas;
- To support the agricultural trade union and the practical work of the industrial associations;
- To refrain from overly expensive and not immediately required projects, such as creating and implementing an army;
- To strive that the State's resources be used first of all to support those institutions which aid families and home economies, children, and the elderly;
- To support the health and social welfare system, to strengthen their material base using modern forms of social insurance and the sources of appropriate funds and producers.
- To strive to protect our natural resources for the future during this time of economic reform and economic reconstruction, and not to increase and, in the future, actually to decrease environmental pollution;

To Create a Cultural Society

- To support the spread of education, science, and culture in Lithuania as the most important condition of societal progress. Radical changes are necessary in the material and moral assessment of intellectual activity and the work of the intelligentsia. To increase the share of national earnings that go to culture and education;
- To strive to have laws accepted and acts subsequent to these laws regulating the spheres of science and culture;
- To speak out against new attempts, under cover of depolitization, to forcefully ideologize culture, education, creative art, and against the categorical denunciation and destruction of expressions of yesterday's culture;
- To encourage the decentralization of cultural control, and the self-government of cities and regions to establish and spread regional cultural centers;
- To strive to have secondary education free in Lithuania and elsewhere, appropriate for the level of today's science and culture and the demands of the future, the opportunity for all capable citizens to acquire higher and professional education;
- To endorse a global state education system, to support private initiatives in the sphere of education;
- To support the cooperation of church and state in nurturing the societal good;
- To strive to give every national group in Lithuania the opportunity to protect and foster its authenticity; that a state program would be created to reflect the interests of southeast region of Lithuania and of the city of Snieckus inhabitants and, together, to nurture the political integrity and indivisibility of the Lithuanian State.

The Lithuania Democratic Labor Party, whose basic purpose is the creation of an independent and democratic state, invites the people of the Republic who find our party's goals and organizational principles close to theirs, to join the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party or become an active supporter.

Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party's Communist Faction Leader Interviewed

91UN0849D Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
15 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Mindaugas Stakvilevicius, head of the communist faction of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, by Petras Imbrasas, TIESA correspondent: "Everything in It's Own Time"]

[Text] As we advised earlier, the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party includes a communist faction. The head of

this faction is Mindaugas STAKVILEVICIUS, member of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party Presidium and Deputy to the Lithuanian Supreme Council. As soon as this faction was established, a TIESA correspondent asked M. Stakvilevicius to answer a few questions. The interview follows.

[Correspondent] Every office door has a nameplate. Let us symbolically read what this one says: communist faction. That word, communist, is interpreted in various ways. What meaning does it have for you?

[Stakvilevicius] One finds many slippery words (and, unfortunately, slippery characters) these days. It is unavoidable. Of course, the word "communist" is disrespected by most, but not by all. In my opinion, this word is related to a sense of the collective, to that ideal which was never realized and which now, apparently, is unrealizable. It is dear to me for the reason that I am more a creation of the collective rather than an individual. Collective matters are very important to me. To think of the people who put so much good, hard work into creating these rooms, shoddy and disparaged as they may be, in the name of communism, to leave them [these rooms] nameless would be very unpleasant. That is why, obviously, the name is still necessary.

[Correspondent] Let us not dwell on the name. Calling it one name or another does not change the substance. Let us look at the content.

[Stakvilevicius] Of course, it is important what we will actually be creating, and how we do it.

[Correspondent] It is simplest and easiest to trample an opponent. What is difficult is to try to have constructive discussion, keeping in mind the elementary fact that truth unfolds in argumentation. From what I have heard discussed with members of your faction who are closer to the rural population in Lithuania's border regions, the people in the countryside were not always enthusiastically in favor of changing the name of the Communist Party. Are we to understand that creating a communist faction within the Democratic Labor Party was some sort of a compromise?

[Stakvilevicius] Perhaps it was a compromise, but more likely a psychological, pedagogical step. Just as among schoolchildren, some students learn a new discipline quickly, others slowly, we had to reckon with those who believe in not changing the name. Otherwise, they would just leave the Party. We wanted to save those people for the common fight for a new democratic Lithuania, to keep them in this party.

[Correspondent] And let them draw their own conclusions little by little?

[Stakvilevicius] Of course. Or maybe things will turn out differently in the future. Maybe this is the nucleus that will prove the strongest, the most unyielding to however the wind blows. Maybe this faction will not dissipate but

will strengthen. I think that this faction, with its communist name, may attract those who had earlier lain down their party cards, or those people whose positions were not very close to supporters of the USSR. There will be a certain dynamic that will lead ... it is hard to say where right now.

[Correspondent] It is very hard to predict the future these days ...

[Stakvilevicius] It will depend on how we live, how we behave, and how flexible we will be.

[Correspondent] How was the faction viewed by the congress?

[Stakvilevicius] Congressional delegates were somewhat suspicious in the beginning. I am used to sensing a response from an audience. I feel like a teacher. It was very curious for the delegates what M. Stakvilevicius, the quarrel-monger as many believed, would have to say. And it seems that a minority endorsed my first speech about the faction. At the end the congress itself accepted it rather well, although at the Council meeting a damper was cast on it.

[Correspondent] So perhaps this was not an attempt to be divisive but just the opposite?

[Stakvilevicius] It was maintaining strength in the face of totalitarian (both internal and external) danger.

[Correspondent] What would you recommend, from an organizational standpoint, to those who doubt whether they would want to belong to the communist faction?

[Stakvilevicius] In re-registering, people will have to decide whether to stay in the Democratic Labor Party or not. We, the initiators of the faction, are also members of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party. We recognize its Program and its Statute. That is why we would like those who have decided to remain communists not to break away from A. Brazauskas's party. It would be worse if some sort of friction or pressure would appear from one side or another. I think that in re-registering the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (at least until the new year) the regional committees of the organization will also register members of our faction. Those who belong to the faction will not have to turn in their current cards of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. They will remain valid. Once they have registered we can plan more concretely.

[Correspondent] You have mentioned the word collective more than once. "Collectivization" sounds pejorative, calling to mind images of people being forced into communities.

[Stakvilevicius] This is not a principle of the herd. I have skied and bicycled a lot, taken pupils on trips to the mountains, and this feeling is very dear to me. If, heaven forbid, someone should decide to express his individuality during an outing, there could be an accident. I

remember the years after the war. We studied holding onto each other. And we were the better for it.

[Correspondent] What sort of Lithuania do you envision?

[Stakvilevicius] I envision an independent Lithuania proceeding toward this independence little by little, winning one, another, a third, and fourth, a fifth position. And this is done not in one month or even one year. A fern bud releases a frond, but something had to release the bud, and so on. To each his own. Everything in its own time. As the poet Justinas Marcinkevicius wrote: "There is a time for the bloom to blossom, there is a time for the blossom to fade."

Lithuanian Economists' Appeal on Government Economic Reform Policy

91UN0849E Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
22 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Lithuanian Economists' Address the Supreme Council and Government of the Republic"]

[Text] The economic crisis in Lithuania is growing more acute. Apart from the political and economic reasons, exacerbated by the hardline negotiating policies of the Soviet Union, stability is hampered by contradictory internal economic policies. The economic reform which the deputies of the Supreme Council and the Government have discussed at great length has not only not begun but, on the contrary, has been shunted aside by a number of laws and decrees that have been adopted. The Supreme Council, often assuming executive power functions and micro-managing the activity of the Government, essentially paralyzes the work of this body. The latter, on the other hand, operating without a system of acceptable laws and decrees, cannot decide upon a real concept of economic reorganization and its practical implementation. A growing lack of information and confidence is evident among enterprises.

Many of these laws ignore economic reality and, not being linked to one another, do not provide the necessary preconditions for the transition to market relations. In this respect, the regulatory rules governing the activity of enterprises stand out in particular. It is hard to say whether the economic reform program, even were it to be properly prepared and adopted, could be implemented.

The intended re-registering of enterprises has overflowed into a self-serving campaign costing businesses and institutions of local administration hundreds of thousands of rubles. Enterprise collectives, instead of solving real problems, have withdrawn to form observer councils. These, in the absence of even the most elementary preconditions on how to run collective production and of sufficient responsibility for the results of enterprise activities, only widen the discord and differ hardly at all from the former councils of work collectives. This situation occurred because regulations governing the activity

of businesses were drawn up ignoring not only the observations and suggestions of manufacturers but also the conclusions of the Economic Commission of the Supreme Council. This commission, in which the opinions of one or several deputies became predominant, was essentially bypassed in the examination and discussion of the prepared legislation.

The continuation of property rights is not the most important sign of the country's rebirth. The Government of a reborn Lithuania is not obliged to heal the injury inflicted by the intervention of a foreign power. In other words, Lithuania's current domestic economic condition is such that we cannot assume this burden. People are concerned that the Supreme Council's passing this sort of legislation would induce internal strife and dissension. In this respect, those are correct who say that you cannot heal old injuries by creating new ones.

Even greater disorder in the economy will come from the privatization of state resources by partition. In this case, the very process of privatization becomes self-serving, whereas it should be a means to more effectively use property from the state. The use of investment checks to implement privatization may be a fatal mistake.

Running directly contrary to more effective economic functioning is the new salary system for legal and manual laborers. Here we pay attention only to the interests of the state's treasury and do not encourage the enterprisingness of businesses and citizens.

The policies enacted in the area of banking contradict the principles of creating a market economy. Instead of broadening the independence of individual banks and strengthening the basis for their commercial activity, we have taken the bank monopoly route.

We have no argument with the fact that market relations have to be based on free pricing. However, we are convinced that their "freeing", when the means for safeguarding social welfare (through salary indexing, compensation mechanisms, an accounting of citizens' deposits) have not been prepared and where the producer's and the purchaser's monopoly reigns, would be a thoughtless and irresponsible step. Without quick inflation, which would harm many of Lithuania's citizens, it is hard to fathom how much more such enterprises could contribute.

Understandably, it is not easy to create and economic and political system for independent Lithuania. Opposing political forces are operating internally and externally. The economic breakdown of the USSR has repercussions on the Lithuanian economy. Moreover, it is obvious that we lack experience. This explains the adoption of many contradictory laws and decrees, and the strengthening of self-government of many institutions of local government. That is why through this address we are seeking a businesslike dialogue with the Supreme Council and the Government. In the interest of trying to help correct past mistakes and, as much as possible, avoid them in the future, we propose:

1. To delineate as quickly and as strictly as possible the functions of the Republic's Supreme Council and leadership. So as not to impede economic reform, let us place most of the levers of domestic regulation in the competence of the Government and only after a certain period of approbation consolidate them through legal acts of the Supreme Council. It is up to the Supreme Council to weigh and adopt the activity program of the leadership, but the preparation and adoption of programs of economic reform, as a tool for implementing a common activity program, should be left to the discretion of the Government and its governing bodies.

2. Groups of consultant-experts should be formed for the Supreme Council and the Government to help evaluate and discuss the programs, legislation, and standard act projects presented to them by representatives of practical domestic teams and workers in scientific institutions. They would carry out examinations on laws and decrees that have already been adopted and assess their appropriateness to the domestic economy model planned for the Republic.

Authorized forum for Lithuania's future:

A. Bitlerius, G. Caplikas, J. Cicinskas, A. Giniotis, S. Girijotiene, J. Grebliunas, L. Jankauskas, K. Jaskelevicius, K. Juknevičius, J. Karciauskas, V. Kasakaitis, P. Kravtas, A. Matulevicius, P. Mickus, A. Moleska, R. Petrikis, A. Ratkevicius, V. Ruksenas, S. Skripkauskas, E. Saltis, J. Sarkus, R. Seputis, A. Ulbis, R. Vaitkeviciene, R. Visakavicius, H. Vitkus.

Future of Lithuania's Port City of Klaipeda Viewed

91UN0713B Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 7 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Nikolaj Bereznoj, port chief of Klaipeda, by Gediminas Pilaitis: "Whose Port Will Klaipeda Be?"]

[Text] The commercial seaport of Klaipeda is Lithuania's gateway to the world. In the years before the war, conditions were thrust upon it that granted extensive rights to foreign countries. Contradictory ruling principles limited Lithuania's sovereignty and economic interests. Currently the port actually belongs to Soviet authorities. But what will be its future? We discussed this with Nikolaj Bereznoj, the port chief of Klaipeda.

[Pilaitis] Sooner or later the Port of Klaipeda will become an issue of great importance. What problems do you envision?

[Bereznoj] During the period of independence, the Port of Klaipeda accommodated local import and export needs. Now the situation has changed significantly. Products just shipped to and from Lithuania make up a small portion of cargo. The port is mainly used for Soviet trade with other countries. Were we to work just for ourselves, approximately two-thirds of the dock workers would probably have to be laid off. We could curtail ties with traditional freight shippers, but the stream of trade

would just flow to other ports. We have to remain aware of this possibility lest we be left with nothing. The status of a transit port would uncover many attractive possibilities.

[Pilaitis] How are you operating these days?

[Bereznoj] There is nothing to be happy about. We have essentially stood idle since the summer. The customary amount of freight dropped by 2.5 million tons this year. We used to rotate a hundred dock workers to the ports of Tiks and Arkhangelsk during Arctic navigation season. In this way we were able to offset some of our financial shortfall. What the future holds no one knows.

[Pilaitis] The people of Klaipeda are out of work while Novorosisk cannot handle all the shipments of grain. Has an economic blockade already been imposed on Klaipeda?

[Bereznoj] Where did you get such information? I do not think that anyone intends to discriminate against us specifically. The same problem afflicts the entire Baltic region and beyond. It is easier to ship grain purchased in the Balkans through the southern ports of the USSR. But we are not getting the more profitable freight. A unified Germany no longer requires Soviet metal, and about three million tons of steel rolls and sheets used to be shipped from Klaipeda to Rostock.

Foreign trade was destabilized by the economic collapse and political changes in Eastern Europe. One has to accommodate! We have yet to learn how to function under increasingly competitive conditions, and often we suffer. For example, Leningrad seamen lowered transport rates and garnered a share of the freight that used to flow to Lithuanian navigation. Once again, our port suffered a loss.

[Pilaitis] What is the future of the international "floating bridge" between Klaipeda and Mukran?

[Bereznoj] There have been dramatic changes in the political situations both here and in Germany. Two out of the five ferries are permanently docked at shore. Navigational profits fell by 34 million rubles. We are trying to negotiate with our partners. The ferries transport autofurges. For a while they will carry coal and frozen food products. There is still hope that this costly bridge will become a necessity.

[Pilaitis] Let us say that, apart from Lithuanian navigation, you become independent. The status of the port remains unclear. To whom does the port belong—to Lithuania or to the USSR?

[Bereznoj] The politicians should be the first to respond to this question. It should become clear when relations between Republic and Soviet Union property are legally regulated. The competence of a mere Port Chief is insufficient to answer this question.

[Pilaitis] What would be the most acceptable type of economic activity?

[Bereznoj] It is best when everyone answers for himself. A normal port needs about 12 million tons of freight annually. How to get it? The USSR Ministries of Economic Relations and of Ocean Transport monopolize freight distribution. So long as Lithuania fails to establish stable economic relations with foreign countries, it will be very difficult for dockers to try to break into the world market.

We have explored numerous possibilities. The port could be both a Lithuanian and a Soviet joint venture or joint stock company whereby part of the dividends would belong to the USSR Ministry of Ocean Transport. This would be one way of assuring freight traffic. The Port of Rostock operates in this manner.

[Pilaitis] Dockers have always contributed to a city's treasury. How do you view the status of the port city?

[Bereznoj] In fact, magistrates have direct control over the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Antwerp. But we must keep in mind that these are world-renowned port cities that have managed to attract the wealthier foreign firms, banks, and consulates. Not every port city enjoys a seductive draw, but we should not dismiss this possibility. We could discuss this concretely were Klaipeda to become a free economic zone for foreign capital.

[Pilaitis] Foreigners drop some of that capital here even now. You service ships that arrive in this port for hard currency. This used to end up in the pockets of USSR ministries. Has anything changed?

[Bereznoj] Approximately one-third of our profits go directly to the Republic's budget. Unfortunately, things remain as before with hard currency. Payments for navigational, everyday, and cultural services, even for fresh water for foreign ships, as before, flows directly to the USSR Ministry of Ocean Transport. We trust that this very real question will not be overlooked in negotiating with Moscow.

[Pilaitis] You mentioned various joint-stock companies. To some this would be associated with a union treaty. What, in your opinion, would have to be done in order to neutralize the ambitions of monopoly partners?

[Bereznoj] I believe that an antitrust law regulating economic activity is being prepared in the Soviet Union. But a good manager is inclined to trust only that which he devises himself. One trusted method is direct ties with freight shippers. Products from the "Azotas" cooperative in Jonava, the metallurgical enterprise in Cherepovets, and cotton from Central Asia all reach the port without any brokering by union authorities. It is more difficult to cooperate with foreign firms. Taking advantage of this situation, the USSR Ministry of Ocean Transport seems to believe that it will continue to dictate its will.

[Pilaitis] Nevertheless, foreign entrepreneurs are eyeing the Baltic ports. The Greek multimillionaire Aluluzo's visit to the Lithuanian coast has had wide repercussions...

[Bereznoj] Unfortunately, this was another visit that resulted in no concrete commercial commitments. And this should come as no surprise. Foreigners see that the Port of Klaipeda does not live up to international standards—it is narrow, suited only for a few types of cargo. We will be able to compete with others only after we have expanded warehouses and the waterfront and reconstructed docks for oil filling. We must deepen the channel at least to accommodate tankers carrying 30 tons. All this requires great capital investment.

[Pilaitis] A final question—How does the multiethnic population of the port get along? Have you not started to divide up the docks, the cranes, the waterfront aquatory?

[Bereznoj] We deal with representatives of many countries and races on a daily basis. Perhaps that explains why port inhabitants are more tolerant, they do not jump into fruitless discussions. We live normally. In general dockers are solid people! They are not so concerned about whose ship they are loading. If only there would be more of them...

[Pilaitis] Thank you for speaking with us.

RSFSR

Karpychev Previews RSFSR Congress

PM2703154091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Anatoliy Karpychev commentary under the "My View" rubric: "Will History Find the Sinners?"]

[Text] And so we've had a "taste" of the nationwide referendum. Today displayed all the signs of a celebration in the form of red banners with white letters, but nobody was celebrating in their hearts. It was not the desire to be together which came to the fore but the habitual "you must" which always divides people from authorities—both good and bad. Indeed, what is there to celebrate when the stores are empty and passions are running high? Cheese was on sale at the stalls—terrific. But you had to be quick: Those who set out at 10 AM to vote found that nothing was left.

Of course, it is a pity that in most people's subconscious the point behind the main referendum question "Should there or should there not be a Union?" boiled down to the slogan "Gorbachev or Yeltsin?"

Passions seethed right up to 17 March. One and the same group of people held rallies, defended B.N. Yeltsin (against whom, we don't know), called for the USSR president's resignation, slandered the CPSU, the regime, and the system, and glorified strikes and disobedience. Public opinion, as one well-known journalist put it, is

rabid. Nobody trusts anybody: Someone merely has to suspect another, swear at him, or express hatred, and the opponents are straining at the leash.

I remember, 16 March I lingered near a banner bearing a color portrait of Yeltsin and anti-Gorbachev slogans. Nowadays, such propaganda can often be found on the squares and in the streets. Anyway, a young man was standing quietly with a banner, alongside three or four guys chatting, and don't ask what possessed me but I approached them and asked something about Boris Nikolayevich, reflecting certain doubts. The usual kind of thing: Why is it that Yeltsin as head of the Russian parliament is not answerable to the people for empty shelves in the stores? Does he really not have the power to restore order in Russia?

"What are you saying?" my sidewalk interviewees exclaimed. "Gorbachev must answer. Yeltsin has no power. They hinder him. Who? Give over. The center hinders him. He will become president and then take decisions alone. Without hindrances."

Such conversation creates a tiresome impression. It is clear that the "opponents" know nothing, have no information, and don't want to listen to anybody but themselves. Their logic is primitive: Anything Yeltsin says is good, and anything Gorbachev says is bad. And that's all there is to it. Moreover, newspapers which claim to be independent and reputable nevertheless repeat the simplistic formula—Yeltsin "yes," Gorbachev "no." I do not think it is accidental. One reason for it is to boost the Russian leader's diminished prestige. Yeltsin is vital to the political opposition. They have no other leader yet. And time passes quickly. Life gets no easier, and in this situation the opposition can work more smoothly.

We know that Yeltsin's prestige increases when he is brawling with Gorbachev. If Boris Nikolayevich works peacefully, without appealing to the United Nations, his prestige falls. Yeltsin's team knows this. His team knows how to calculate. Unlike the USSR president's team. I am drawing conclusions from my own observations: The opposition is quite often an hour, a day, or a step ahead in its actions. Add to this information leaks about government circles' plans and intentions—and the political initiative is lost.

The opposition is trying hard to keep the initiative in the struggle with the president. We don't talk of this aloud. In the West they do.

"In actual fact, Yeltsin is no more a democrat than Gorbachev," I read in an English newspaper. "In the end, both were born of the same system... It is possible that on an intellectual level Yeltsin is way behind the Soviet president, but his 'team' is far smarter than Gorbachev's."

"Boris Yeltsin uses his position as chairman of the Russian parliament to challenge Gorbachev, and this fact is fraught with serious consequences. Yeltsin's popularity is founded more on the dissatisfaction of the

masses than his proposed solutions. To attack Gorbachev, Yeltsin was forced to seek an alliance with republics which may turn against him tomorrow. Gorbachev is right in saying that the preservation of the USSR serves the interests of Europe and the whole world. Now the question is whether it is possible to hold the country together without resorting to violence."

These words are from a Spanish newspaper. I am not saying that they are the definitive truth. They are in keeping with my own feelings, but you must judge for yourselves. What I can say is this: In its appraisal of the referendum the Western press has resorted to extremes, as indeed we have here, in the endeavor to find an answer to the question of who won: Gorbachev or Yeltsin.

The West has the time to continue this search, but all this chaos could cost us dear. To reduce the Union's destiny merely to the USSR president's personality and a plebiscite on his policy and to bring the introduction of the post of Russian president down to Yeltsin's personality is a naive political exercise.

Today we have many presidents, but there is another more important question: Will our children live in a solid Union or flounder in poverty and tears on the fringes of civilization? The fate of the people is not a question of ambitions, sympathies, or antipathies. This is our choice and our future. I will never concede that my future is solely dependent upon choosing between Gorbachev or Yeltsin. The people choose the future. If, of course, any notice is taken of them.

The Russian leader makes no secret of wanting to become president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. He mentioned his aspirations in a speech on Radio Rossii. "If the referendum says 'yes' I will stand as candidate for the post of president. But whether it is I or somebody else who is elected, the issue will be decided by the voters."

By and large, there is nothing unusual about a soldier wanting to become a marshal. But often in our country it is still the aging field marshals who make a claim to the "star" places while all the time being manipulated by their entourage.

I have no doubt that the Gorbachev-Yeltsin "duel" did not end with the referendum outcome and is all set to begin a new round. However, we can only guess at where and in what way this new "explosion," which is sure to rekindle the flames of passion and malice, will take place. But it will. The logic of the political struggle dictates it. You don't give up the fight halfway through.

And the opposition has already issued a warning... I quote B.N. Yeltsin: "Maybe March, maybe these very months will be decisive, and then History will reveal all the sinners, as they say, and make them answer for the last six years, for this year, and for what may happen."

So what exactly may happen? Dictatorship triumphant? Civil war? When there is such an ardent desire to blow up the legitimate power from within, anything can be expected, including recklessness. Look for the sinners after...

It is clear that in these "decisive months" political life will grow increasingly unpredictable. Besides, in two days' time, 28 March, the Congress of Russian Deputies is due to open. Not a regular congress—an extraordinary congress.

In my opinion, people from the opposition are not particularly excited about it. In one of his speeches, B.N. Yeltsin recognizes that "the congress will be complicated, difficult" and that in truth "it was foisted upon us." He goes on: "Nevertheless, democratic forces, and many Communists and Russian Federation people's deputies are in the mood to—well, to criticize the Supreme Soviet, its leadership, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet... for what they could have done but did not, and for the mistakes they made, and this is right..."

You have to be very brave to "criticize"... If you remember, some Russian deputies condemned B.N. Yeltsin's TV speech and promoted the idea of convening an extraordinary congress. What followed was subtle terrorism. The worst form of persecution. Straight away they slandered Svetlana Goryacheva, who was once elected Yeltsin's deputy in the Supreme Soviet. "Snake in the grass," they hissed. And the chairman, B.N. Yeltsin, did not say "Stop persecuting this woman." While she stayed silent, she was fine. Then all of a sudden "initiative groups" were set up and the challenge was voiced for Goryacheva to be recalled from the deputies. This is democracy for you..... But I wonder at something else: an individual's lack of protection.

For all that, the congress will take place. It will be a difficult congress, as there is nothing in particular to boast about. Everything is systematically collapsing. Apart from learning the art of criticism and how to escape responsibility, the team at the helm of the Russian authorities no longer succeeds at anything. And what is more, former Bolsheviks have won fame through anticommunist propaganda. But you can't eat criticism or put it on after your bath instead of briefs or socks, which you will not find anywhere no matter how hard you search. And the people are beginning to understand this, although it is hard. And not via the television screen, where politicians continue to spout reassurance, but via the shortage.... of briefs. So like Hamlet, the congress must confront the question: To be or not to be? All the more so as the chairman was elected by a majority of four votes.

Yes indeed, Hamlet. I think the team of Gorbachev "critics" have already "rehearsed" several versions on the theme of how it may be. For example, without waiting for the extraordinary congress, and without giving himself up to be "torn apart" by political enemies, Yeltsin could resign. Resign today, and tomorrow stand

as a candidate for Russian president in a nationwide ballot and win. He could resign in fine Yeltsin style, leaving public opinion not with new words but with angry words: "The party, the apparatus, the system all stood in my way. I had no power." Remember, even my sidewalk "opponents" confirmed this.

However, in my opinion not everything in this version is clear cut. It is possible to misjudge events here. Suddenly, things could get out of hand, the results of the Russian referendum may not become the constitutional norm, the election of the Russian president will not take place, and alas it is possible that one would be left floundering outside the "white house" [Russian government building in Moscow] on the embankment. Obviously, "Yeltsin's team" will not opt for voluntary resignation, and besides there is not enough time before the congress.

Of course there are other versions of the power struggle. The explosion may take place at the congress itself. Why do I suggest this? Today already there are strikes, hunger strikes, protest movements. Calls have sprung up for individual and collective appeals to be sent to the extraordinary congress demanding that the agenda include the question of no confidence in the USSR president, the Union government, and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the transfer of power to the Federation Council.

What in plain terms does this mean?

First, the Russian leader has already voiced these demands. In the language of politics and combat, this signifies not pluralism of opinion or criticism of the USSR president, but a most sincere call by putschists to liquidate constitutional power.

Second, the extraordinary congress was devised so as to hear the Russian leader. But they want to twist matters so as to place the question of no confidence in the USSR president on the agenda. And in addition—to place demonstrators frequently seen at Manezh Square rallies strategically near the Kremlin walls. To bring in those who slash portraits of Gorbachev and inscribe in unfaltering hand "Murder." Can this really be passed off as the will of the people?

Gentlemen, when will we learn to call things by their names? When will we realize that on many streets, especially in the capital, the air of contemporary democracy is steeped not in freedom and glasnost but in demagoguery, blackmail, and deceit?

Preparations for the final "storming" of the Kremlin have obviously begun. Fierce attacks on the CPSU have become more frequent, and this is the first sign. Today, you can quite safely gamble on the name of the CPSU. The opposition understands this. They also understand that hatred for the party is a good way of maintaining a following of "likeminded people" thirsty for glory, popularity, and revenge.

It puts me in mind of lines from George Orwell's book "1984." Those were he writes about the two minutes' hatred for the "enemy of the people" over the television screen. "Hatred began about thirty seconds ago, and half of the viewers could no longer contain the violent exclamations... By the second minute the hatred became a frenzy.. People leapt out of their seats and shouted at the top of their voice." For us today it seems that the word hatred is inflaming an already difficult situation further complicated by shortages, and is provoking evil and hatred in response.

We have a lot to deal with. We must rid ourselves of illusions. Including the one which insists that our people understand and know all. No, not all. Many are fooled by cheap demagoguery. They promised to show them the road to the Temple. They had faith. Alas, they are being shown the road to Nowhere.

RSFSR Foreign Ministry Official Interviewed

91UF0571A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 16 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Dmitriy Ryurikov, chief of the treaty and legal department of the RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by L. Turpakova; in Tallinn; date not given: "Joint Efforts Will Produce Results"]

[Text] As is known, an international conference on human rights ended in Tallinn recently. Dmitriy Ryurikov, chief of the legal and treaty department of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], participated in the conference. He has been with the ministry for a short period of time. Previously, he worked at the International Law Administration of the USSR MFA. He is 43 years old, and a graduate of MGIMO [Moscow State Institute of International Relations].

[Turpakova] The Union MFA—the RSFSR MFA... Can this switch be viewed as a demotion?

[Ryurikov] I would not call this a promotion or a demotion; it is just switching from one job to another job, which is similar to the previous one on some scores, but at the same time is very different from it, because the functions of the RSFSR MFA differ substantially from those of the Union ministry.

In my new capacity, I happen to attend to very interesting matters associated with relations between Union republics. For example, Russia and Estonia have recognized each other as subjects of international law.

[Turpakova] Is this to say that your operations do not transcend "the framework" of the republics?

[Ryurikov] Our ministry does "transcend" the framework of the republics. The RSFSR is entitled under the law to establish diplomatic relations with other states and sign agreements. This right, which was proclaimed

by the latest constitution, as well as the previous one (I mean the "Stalin" constitution) was not actually exercised.

[Turpakova] Why?

[Ryurikov] It was a strictly declarative right. The center itself was the only one to perform all functions. Now that the republics are acquiring a new status, it is natural for them to exercise their legitimate rights. The task of the treaty and legal department is to facilitate the introduction of a new basis for practical relations between the RSFSR and other states (in particular, Estonia with which we have relations as with a state, and the Ukraine, Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia), as well as other republics which are yet to go their own way.

[Turpakova] Why does a MGIMO graduate engage in legal, in essence, juridical activities?

[Ryurikov] International law is one of the most important fields of diplomacy. This means codifying in the form of treaties, so to speak, fundamental relations between states, as well as relations affecting some individual fields. Treaties are a significant part of diplomacy.

[Turpakova] Why did you turn up at a conference on human rights specifically in Tallinn?

[Ryurikov] Why is the conference being held in Estonia? Apparently, the Estonian state and the Estonian Government considered it necessary to enlist experts on human rights and international law in general with an international standing (I will note that human rights are an important segment of international law), to seek their advice, and, perhaps, to clear up some problems for itself. Striving to enlist experienced experts in order to review one's problems is very favorable.

The RSFSR MFA and the Supreme Soviet of Russia received an invitation. It was resolved that I should go because one of the areas of international law is at issue.

[Turpakova] As you see it, can issues concerning human rights arise in Estonia? Your view as, let us put it this way, a detached observer?

[Ryurikov] In all honesty, it is difficult and hard to respond... I may discuss what we saw in these days, but only taking into account the fact that the experts who have come together in Tallinn are not an official delegation of some kind. We have come in order to familiarize ourselves and attempt to understand how the government of Estonia sees these problems. We do not at all claim the role of some commission for finding and studying facts. The experts will merely state their considerations regarding the data and legislative acts submitted by the government of Estonia, and will share their impressions.

I would like to hope that Estonia will not have to encounter serious problems with either civil or political human rights, and that the rights of all citizens of Estonia

without exception, as well as those of the citizens of other states, including the RSFSR, will be respected and observed.

[Turpakova] Specifically how did you participate in the conference?

[Ryurikov] I spoke several times. We had an opportunity to ask questions in Kohtla-Jarve, at a meeting with representatives of various political movements in this city. This was an interesting meeting which representatives of the city authorities also attended.

We got the impression that there are no problems with human rights. They say that Yeltsin has taken incorrect steps regarding the Russians in the Baltics... However, we did not perceive this. We should also say that those who participated in this meeting likewise confirmed that there have been no petitions of any kind regarding ethnic discrimination, discrimination in a variety of fields. No such petitions to either city or judicial authorities have been registered.

In all honesty, the accusations voiced did not appear convincing and adequately well-grounded to our colleagues from the Scandinavian countries either.

This is why I believe that the problems will disappear all by themselves if the local authorities and the government make some further efforts to ensure, shall we say, confidence in the future on the part of the segment of the Russian-speaking populace which, based on all criteria, may receive citizenship in the not-so-distant future (pursuant to the Law on Citizenship).

[Turpakova] On one occasion, the recent USSR Deputy Prime Minister S. Sitaryan said this: "I view human rights as a notion which fits state interests rather than as an abstract end unto itself." How do you interpret human rights?

[Ryurikov] Human rights are definitely in the interest of the state, and it is the task of the state to enforce them. However, the state should also be prepared to see the actions of its organs or officials investigated, and in this case the state will have to pay damages to an individual whose rights were affected or encroached upon.

Unfortunately, such practices are very uncommon indeed in our country. I believe that this is an issue for the future; to be sure, it is hard to say how distant this future is. Perhaps, the substantive development of a system of human rights is a matter of more than three or five years, if it is to attain some kind of standard, an international standard. However, the sooner it happens the better it is, of course. All the people will undoubtedly feel safer and more confident. This confidence may only be instilled through a perception of firm guarantees against arbitrariness and incorrect actions by the state organs.

[Turpakova] In your opinion, what human rights referred to in the Universal Declaration adopted by the

UN General Assembly in 1948 have been and are being violated in our country? If you do not believe so, why?

[Ryurikov] Specific cases filed with the courts and various superior echelons are needed in order to discuss the topic of human rights violations. We have very few such cases in the Soviet Union. However, this is not to say that the situation with human rights is favorable because the system itself has not developed and worked out. The population is not aware of its rights which, in principle, everybody should be familiar with, because we have joined the main international acts concerning human rights, and it is the duty of the state to disseminate these acts.

This is why I believe that it is difficult to discuss this topic.

[Turpakova] To your mind, what does the notion "violation of human rights" include?

[Ryurikov] For example, this is where ethnic discrimination may belong. However, proving the existence of such discrimination is, once again, quite complex. Discrimination may be expressed in various forms, such as housing and employment...

[Turpakova] Insults?

[Ryurikov] ...Insults as well.

[Turpakova] What can you say by way of summing up the results of your visit to Estonia?

[Ryurikov] I would like to note the genuine effort of the government of Estonia to build a rule-of-law state in which human rights are respected. I would like to repeat that we have not seen current violations of human rights. However, we have felt the concern of the Russian-speaking populace about their future. Of course, our Estonian friends will have to allay these concerns in order for the Russian residents to have confidence in the future which will not bring some kind of discrimination. Perhaps, certain steps in this direction, aimed at explaining the acts and laws adopted, have turned out to be inadequate. Additional efforts and major work are required in this sphere.

[Turpakova] You have mentioned concern about the future. Were apprehensions and specific facts brought up?

[Ryurikov] Yes, they were. Not that they were substantiated reproaches, they were rather emotional statements. On the whole, there is concern.

[Turpakova] Do you personally have confidence in the future?

[Ryurikov] I am hopeful about the future as a resident of the RSFSR and Moscow. However, there is no absolute guarantee that everything will happen the way I and many others want it. Actually, everything depends on our efforts.

[Turpakova] How is this hope expressed?

[Ryurikov] Hope is in ourselves; it is hope that our joint efforts may bear fruit and produce perceptible results. This is my opinion.

[Turpakova] The conference is over, and that is it. Or is it?

[Ryurikov] I think that the conference will have a continuation. Despite the fact that nothing has been said about this, it appears that this is what the attitude of the conference sponsors is, because they have stated their desire to use the experience of experts and to tap the experience of international law for building a rule-of-law state in Estonia. Consequently, regular contacts and continuous purposeful actions will become necessary, which may only be ensured if mechanisms operating on a regular basis are successfully created. I believe that regular international communications are going to be very useful for Estonia.

Western Republics

Political Profile of Belorussian CP First Secretary Malofeyev

91UN1171A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 19 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Corresponding Member of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences V. Bobkov: "At the Congress, Concerning the Congress, and After the Congress. (On the Results of the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress)"]

[Excerpt] Lines on the Political Portrait of A.A. Malofeyev.

On the eve of the 31st Belorussian CP Congress I conducted a sample, verbal poll of a number of the congress delegates and party workers about who they would like to see in the role of first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. Most of those polled expressed a preference for V.M. Semenov (first place), A.A. Malofeyev (second place), and V.V. Grigoryev (third place). Almost all of those polled were strongly inclined toward a complete change of Central Committee secretaries.

After I published the results of an analysis of preconference internal party life in ZVYAZDZE (25 October 1990), and especially after the publication in NARODNAYA GAZETA (No 9, 1990) of the appeal issued by me and other Communists to the congress delegates and the members of the Central Committee, I was asked many questions about the election of political leaders. They asked this:

"Who specifically do the authors of the appeal have in mind for the post of Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary?"

I answered: "A.A. Malofeyev."

A number of my interlocutors were bewildered: "How so? A year or 18 months ago you were criticizing him publicly for his lack of qualities such as straightforwardness and accessibility..."

"Yes, we were. But take note that today's Malofeyev is not the same as the earlier Malofeyev. Perhaps like no other political figure in the republic Anatoliy Aleksandrovich has managed to change himself for the better. He has become more straightforward, more accessible. He responds correctly to criticism. And of no less importance is the fact that he was not offended by this author when I entered into direct dialogue and candid debate with him."

That is about how I explained it to the delegates. And in fact, under conditions in which V.M. Semenov withdrew and V.V. Grigoryev was blocked, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich was probably the most suitable candidate for the post of first secretary. He was supported not only by the delegates from Minsk Oblast but also those from other oblast party organizations.

I am aware that Anatoliy Aleksandrovich is mistrustful of most of the creative intelligentsia who represented the ideological institutions at the congress. But following his brief program statement at the congress, which clearly signified a desire for dialogue with all political forces in the republic, some people warmed to A.A. Malofeyev.

Yes, the present political leader, like the earlier one, has very weak support in the milieu of the scientific, writing, theatrical, and journalistic communities, in the milieu of the creative intelligentsia in general. But we do note that Ye.Ye. Sokolov both came and went with this same kind of weakness. For the present leader, everything lies ahead. Both his election program and his concluding words at the congress indicate that Anatoliy Aleksandrovich has both a certain understanding of the worries and concerns of the intelligentsia and a desire to get to know its causes and its specific representatives. And if this comes about, Malofeyev's social support will be significantly strengthened. But if it does not, the leader will simply fail.

And who in the republic did not welcome the mature and wise step taken by the new political leader in the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet? I have in mind the step taken with respect to the Belorussian People's Front [BNF] and Z.S. Poznyak personally. The photographs of their peace talks published in the newspapers was met with extreme approval by the broadest strata of the population in the republic. But in this connection someone did say that here Malofeyev is already frightened by the BNF. No, he was not frightened but rather showed himself to be a man of common sense who is looking for consensus and is concerned to consolidate political forces. And how can this not please people?

In general I am also pleased by the position of common sense assumed by the new leader in PRAVDA on 14

February this year. In particular, the concern to stabilize the situation in the republic and the country. He set forth this thought as follows: "Without dialogue, no matter how complex and difficult it may be, with all strata of the population and with the various political movements, we communists will be unable to restore trust in us. And in no circumstances must we move toward confrontation. That is just impasse." Very sensible.

February, however, also brought bitterness to the activity of the first secretary. In my opinion the report that he presented at the latest Belorussian CP Central Committee plenum was unsuccessful. (I heard that he did not impress as a speaker either, even though he has been working on that). The report contained sharp accusations against NARODNAYA GAZETA. I think that the content and the form and the tone of the polemic with the newspaper could have been more honest, kept within the framework of pluralism of opinion, if that kind of polemic was even necessary with a publication that offers it pages for the presentation of varying viewpoints. It is pleasing that journalists "have not taken the bit between their teeth" but have invited the first secretary to a meeting, hoping that both sides will gain some advantage from this.

Analyzing the weak and the strong aspects of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich as leader of the Minsk Oblast party organization, let me remind you of a fact that says a great deal. Two years ago, when it became clear that the party leaders at the center had already shaken loose in a major way from the CPSU and its theoretical foundations, in a report to a plenum of the oblast committee the first secretary of the Minsk party obkom raised the question of the need to expand and strengthen the undermanned party building section at the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History. His motivation here was that the party builders had to work in complex conditions to provide more serious theoretical help and practical assistance to party committees at the local level.

We note that this was done not by a Central Committee secretary but an obkom secretary. I think that these are the ideas born of a man who is trying to rely on scientific conclusions. Unfortunately, in both the oblast and the republic wings no one followed the first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Minsk Obkom at that time.

True, we are put on our guard by the incomprehensible lack of consistency in and the contradictory nature of some of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich's steps. In his role as obkom secretary he was concerned with strengthening party building, but when he became Central Committee first secretary he agreed to a virtual killing of this scientific subdivision. By what was he guided here? Or rather, by whom?

This contradictoriness is also being reinforced by the reassuring statement made by the first secretary in PRAVDA on 14 February: "It is essentially to include

fully the intellectual potential of the CPSU for the purpose of the creative enrichment and development of its activity."

Profound words, and apropos. If the CPSU had been as concerned as it should have been about preserving and augmenting its intellectual potential it would not have found itself in such major crisis. But the position is still not changing for the better.

And here I recall the wise and instructive thought of CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary V.A. Ivashko expressed at the February 1991 Belorussian CP Central Committee Plenum. He said approximately this: "There are people who think that if the economic situation changes for the better then that in and of itself will solve all sociopolitical problems. No, this will not happen. And so priority must be given to humanitarian matters." God grant we may all come to that viewpoint.

But let us return to the 31st Belorussian CP Congress. Many of those who spoke from its tribune were looking with concern for candidates for the leadership among the delegates. Thus, party committee secretary at the Minsk Automobile Plant, A.V. Maksimovich, stated that the communists want to see "as the leader of the republic communist party a competent, honest, and decisive man who is consistent in his actions and capable of engaging in dialogue as equals with the leaders of other political parties and movements."

Many delegates of a solid age made no secret of the fact that for them, Petr Mironovich Masherov was their unique yardstick for choice of leader. (Fortunately, we do have political leaders with whom to make a comparison). Thus, the standard was set very high.

A.A. Malofeyev won. It is still too early to evaluate the new leader from his specific deeds. Life suggests that under present-day conditions a leader will make it if he manages to consolidate all the national patriotic forces of Belorussia not in words but in deeds, and to exert the correct influence on the resolution of cadre and economic questions, and if he has a good mastery of the Leninist style of work...

These "if's" are adding up. But among them a priority place must be given to the feature of the Leninist style of work known as **modesty**. What can be said on this score with respect to A.A. Malofeyev? Well, something can. Having become Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary and a CPSU Central Committee Politburo member he refused the bodyguards, cars, escorts, and dachas. The people of Minsk also noticed that the family of the new leader is not cruising about in service limousines but travels by public transport or walks. They have noticed this, and they have said: "Well done, Mr. Secretary."

From the arsenal of the Leninist style of work it is also useful for our leader to try out the **ability to listen to an opponent, hear the objections, and desire to have objectors**

in his own entourage. These are great human qualities that testify to an elevated spiritual wealth and strength of personality. It is common knowledge how well V.I. Lenin mastered them. Some of Vladimir Ilich's contemporaries emphasized that it was largely thanks to these qualities that Lenin was Lenin, and that his desire to have strong people around him capable of raising objections and if necessary correcting and offering merciless criticism, made Ilich himself stronger. At the same time it forestalled conceit and belief in any sense of omniscience.

So, are the qualities of our leader consonant with these? Before answering this question I talked with a number of officials in Minsk and Minsk Oblast who know Anatoliy Aleksandrovich well in various situations. Most of them concluded that it is possible to raise objections with him without fearing the consequences. Nevertheless, a considerable number of those who deal with him were fearful of the consequences in the case of serious objections or criticism of him. Almost everyone mentioned Malofeyev's robust, strong-willed, and very stubborn character.

From personal experience and observation I can agree with the fact that it is possible to raise objections with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. Yes, it is sometimes possible, but difficult, to change his conviction. And I would like that as many as possible of our leader's subordinates would be capable of raising objections and criticizing him for incorrect actions, and not fear to displease him, and to prove their own case. And that the situation be such that it is not only necessary to have personalities in the entourage, but also to create the conditions for that. The last one in the first line depends on the leader: like a sleigh team.

[Passages omitted].

Moldovan Legislation on Police Force Published

Decree on Implementing Law

91UN1142A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 3

[Text of Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet decree: "On the Procedure for the Entry Into Force of the Moldovan SSR Law 'On the Police'"; signed by A. Moshanu, chairman, Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, Kishinev, 18 Dec 1990]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic resolves:

1. To bring into force the Moldovan SSR law "On the Police" starting 1 January 1991.
2. In light of the entry into force of the Moldovan SSR law "On the Police," to complete the formation of police organs before 1 July 1991. During the period indicated, the militia organs continue to execute the tasks entrusted to them to the extent that the execution of these tasks has not yet been taken up by the newly-formed police organs.

3. Until the adoption by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet of laws regulating the activity of staffers of other organs of republic internal affairs who are not police associates, the effect of the Moldovan SSR law "On the Police" is extended to them.

4. The Moldovan SSR government is to:

1) before 1 January 1991

—develop and confirm the Statute of Service for rank and file and supervisory police personnel and other subunits of the Moldovan SSR internal affairs organs;

—to confirm the designation of positions and the job pay scales of police associates in accordance with the Moldovan SSR law "On the Police," and to provide for the financing of the activity of the police organs from the appropriate budgets, starting 1 January 1991;

2) to develop and confirm before 31 March 1991 the Statute on police departments, the Security Service and the Personnel Service;

3) to prepare and present by 31 March 1991 to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet the draft laws "On Internal Troops" and "On the Investigation Department";

4) to develop by 1 July 1991 a single form of clothing, to manufacture uniforms and provide them to associates of the Moldovan SSR police;

5) to prepare and present by 31 March 1991 to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet draft laws on making the changes and amendments in the current legislation which stem from Moldovan SSR law "On the Police";

5. To determine that until the adoption of the Moldovan SSR law on pension provision to military servicemen and Moldovan SSR internal affairs associates the Union of SSR's Law "On Pension Provision to Military Servicemen" extends to them.

6. This decree enters into force at the moment of adoption.

Introduction Summarizes Law

91UN1142B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 2

[Excerpt from Moldovan SSR: "Law on the Police"]

[Excerpt] The Moldovan SSR Law on the Police defines the place, role, and principles of activity of the police in the system of state organs and organs of local self-government, and establishes the fundamental tasks of the police, the obligations and rights, responsibility and procedure of oversight for its activity. [passages omitted]

Moldovan Party By-Laws Published

91UN0961A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 2 Feb 91 pp 2-3

["Statutes of the Communist Party of Moldova"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Moldova is a political organization, a voluntary union of Communists, which has as its goal the creation of a society of democratic socialism.

The Communist Party of Moldova expresses and defends the basic interests of the working people, it speaks in support of the priority of the values that are common to all mankind, social justice, and the guarantee of the rights and freedoms of the individual. It develops and conducts a policy aimed at the strengthening of the sovereignty of the Moldovan SSR, the achievement of civic agreement, and the economic, social and spiritual progress of the republic.

Being an independent organization in the CPSU, the Communist Party of Moldova acts on the principles of self-government in conformity with the constitution of the Moldovan SSR and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It constructs its internal life and activity on the basis of its own Program and Statutes, as well as other normative documents.

In its activity, the Communist Party of Moldova bases itself on the creative development of the ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, on the achievements of world civilization, and on the national, international and humanistic traditions of the people.

As an integral part of the political system of the republic, the Moldovan Communist Party cooperates with other parties, social movements and organizations acting within the limitations of the law and standing for democracy and social progress.

I. Membership in the Communist Party of Moldova

1. Any citizen who has attained the age of 18, who recognizes its Program and carries out the requirements of its Statute, who works in one of the primary party organizations and supports the party materially, may become a member of the Communist Party of Moldova. A member of the Moldovan Communist Party is simultaneously a member of the CPSU.

Members of the Moldovan Communist Party may not be in other political parties.

2. All members of the Moldovan Communist Party are equal. A member of the Moldovan Communist Party has the right: To advance and to freely discuss questions of the domestic and foreign policy of the party and of intra-party life, to take part in the elaboration of decisions, to elect and be elected to party organs, to receive information about their work, to enjoy the political support and the protection of the party organization, to make an assessment and to criticize any party organ and

any Communist, to turn with requests and suggestions to any party level and to receive from it an answer on the substance, to take part in the work of the party organ, when his suggestion or question is discussed or the question of his activity or conduct.

The Moldovan Communist Party does not restrict the civil rights and freedom of its members. It is tolerant of their observation of religious ceremonies, traditions, and customs that do not contradict the values which are common to all mankind.

3. The Moldovan Communist Party is obliged to take an active part in the activity of the party and to fight for the attainment of the goals set by it: To protect the interests of the workers, to defend social justice, to carry out the party line in the labor collectives, among the population, among the population, in state and public amateur organizations, to promote the ideological and organizational unity of the party, to strengthen the friendship of peoples, to maintain harmonious international relations, to carry out party decisions and assignments, to constantly increase the store of their knowledge, to pay their membership dues regularly, to observe legality and the norms of public morality.

4. Admission into membership of the Moldovan Communist Party is conducted on an individual basis on application of the person joining. At the discretion of the party organization, a trial period, as well as the guarantee of some Communists may be established for persons joining. The decision concerning admission into membership of the party is taken by the meeting of the primary party organization and is final.

In case there is no party organization at the place of work or residence, the decision concerning admission into the party is taken by the higher party committee.

A party member is on the party books in the primary party organization on the basis of the place of work, study, or residence. The procedure for the registration of communists is determined by the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee.

A party member who has actively worked in it for not less than 30 years and who deserves authority and the respect of the party organization is awarded the title of veteran of the party.

5. For violation of party discipline and the norms of public morality, such measures of party education and influence as comradely criticism, the giving of a reprimand or dressing-down, and exclusion from the party, can be applied to party members.

Membership in the Moldovan Communist Party is terminated by the primary party organization for action and conduct that are irreconcilable with the requirements of the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party, or in connection with voluntary withdrawal from the ranks of the party. The higher party organs also have the right of exclusion from the party.

A Communist found guilty of the perpetration of a crime by a court is excluded from the Moldovan Communist Party after the sentence has become effective.

A person who has been excluded from the Moldovan Communist Party has the right to appeal to its control organs. The appeal is examined within a term not exceeding two months from the date of its receipt. The results of the examination are reported to the primary party organization and to the person who submitted the petition.

For admission to membership of the Moldovan Communist Party, and for exclusion from the party, the decision is regarded as effective if at least two-thirds of those present at the meeting voted for it.

People who were excluded from the Moldovan Communist Party and people who withdrew from its ranks voluntarily may be admitted to the party without special preferences.

6. Citizens who support the activity of the Moldovan Communist Party are supporters of the party. They can participate in the work of the party with the right of a consultative vote and support it materially.

II. Intra-Party Democracy

7. The intra-party life in the Moldovan Communist Party is carried out on the basis of democratic centralism, which guarantees the priority of the power of the party masses, collective leadership and glasnost in work, party comradeship, the self-government of all party organization, the combination of the interests of the party as a whole and every communist taken separately, and broad pluralism of opinions with conscientious discipline.

Discussions and referenda on the most fundamental questions of public and party life may be conducted for the comprehensive comparison of various views and platforms, for the development of criticism and self-criticism within the framework of individual party organizations, as well as the Moldovan Communist Party as a whole.

8. The Moldovan Communist Party guarantees:

- the equality of rights of all party members;
- moral and material support;
- the right to participation in the development of the party's policy;
- the accountability of party organs and their leaders to the communists;
- glasnost in the work of all party organizations and their leading organs;
- collegiality in the adoption of decisions; and
- freedom of criticism and the expression of opinions.

9. In the development of decisions, the party organizations and their organs are obligated to examine all positions and points of view. The minority has the right to propagate and defend their views within the limits of the program and statute provisions.

The decisions of the congress, conferences, elected organs, and meetings are obligatory for party organizations.

10. The general meeting, the conference, and the congress are the leading organs in the Moldovan Communist Party. They are authorized, if more than half, and in the case of reports and elections not less than two-thirds, of the elected delegates, are present at them, or more than half of the members of the party organization. The leading party organs elect the executive organs (buro, committee) and the control organs and may form permanent or temporary commissions and study groups for the basic directions of work.

The executive and control organs are elected by secret vote if no other procedure for their formation is stipulated.

Elections of the secretaries of the party organizations and committees, as well as the chairmen of the control (auditing) commissions are carried out at the appropriate meetings, conferences, and congresses with the simultaneous election of the members of these organs or, at the discretion of the delegates, at the plenums of party committees and control (auditing) commissions.

11. A party member cannot be simultaneously a member of more than two elective party organs. The membership of the elective organs may be renewed or reelected completely before expiration of their term of office upon a declaration of voluntary retirement or upon the demand of not less than one-third of the communists of the corresponding party organization.

12. Elected party organs are established for the duration of their authority. The administrative machine, created from the recommendations of primary party organizations and in accordance with existing labor legislation, is subordinate to it. It (the administrative machine) administers the current operational work, the analytic, sociological forecasting, and consultative operation of their activity.

13. Party organizations and committees may, independently or together with other organizations, establish the mass media they need, which are the organs and committees of these party organizations and committees. Their directors are confirmed at the appropriate meetings, conferences, congresses, and plenums of party committees.

III. Organizational Structure of the Party

14. The Moldovan Communist Party is built on the territorial-production basis. The primary party organizations, in accordance with the will of the Communists, are

created at the place of work or residence, creative and other activity of the party members and are united on the basis of territory. Proceeding from the administrative-territorial division of the republic, rayon and city party organizations also enter into the structure of the Moldovan Communist Party. On the initiative of the Communists, councils of the secretaries of party organizations, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, councils of party veterans, and other associations of Communists on the basis of interests, problems, and platforms, may be created and operated. The creation of factions with their own internal discipline and structure is not permitted in the Moldovan Communist Party.

Primary Organizations of the Moldovan Communist Party

15. The primary organizations are the foundation of the Moldovan Communist Party. They are created on the initiative of the Communists in the presence of at least three party members by decision of their meeting and are registered by the higher party organ. The frequency of the convocation of the meetings is determined by the party organization itself.

For the conduct of current work, a party committee (buro), the secretary of the party organization, his deputy, and treasurer are elected for two to three years.

16. At their own discretion, primary organizations may establish the organizational structure and it [as published] determines the range of responsibilities of its basic links. They are autonomous in the decision of questions, in the choice of the forms and methods of work. Their decisions, which do not contradict the program goals of the party and are taken within the limits of the authority granted by the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party, cannot be abolished by higher party organs, with the exception of decisions relating to personnel matters.

In its activity, the primary organization:

- implements the Program of the Moldovan Communist Party;
- attracts new members to its ranks;
- independently takes and executes decisions connected with its activity, comes forward with political initiatives; takes part in the preparation, discussion, and implementation of the resolutions of the higher organs; determines its positions in regard to the urgent problems of public life;
- through the democratic mechanism of public self-government influences the activity of cadres and takes part in their selection and placement;
- is concerned with the political culture of Communists, has the right to obtain information from them about the implementation, by them, of their responsibilities

stipulated by the Statute, defends their dignity and legal interests, and extends necessary assistance to them;

- extends assistance to Communists and the people's elected representatives in the fulfillment of their deputy responsibilities and in the work with voters;
- may be a juridical person;
- informs the labor collective, the population, and the higher party organs about its activity;
- may be engaged in publishing activity and have its own organs of information; and
- cooperates with the organizations of other parties and public formations within the framework of the legislation of the republic.

Rayon and City Party Organizations

17. The primary organizations based on the territorial division of the republic are united in the city, rayon (territorial) party organizations. Their status is determined by the Central Committee of the Moldovan Communist Party.

18. The rayon or city party conference elects a corresponding party committee and control (auditing) commission for five years. At its plenum, the party committee, taking into account the views of the primary party organizations, elects the party raykom or gorkom buro. Periodically, the buros of the party committees give an account of their work.

At the decision of the party committee, the suggestion of the control (auditing) commission or at the request of the party organizations, bringing together at least one-third of the members of a given organization, an extraordinary party conferences is convened.

19. Party raykoms and gorkoms independently adopt various resolutions in regard to the internal activity of the organizations, elect and recall members of the Central Committee of the territorial organization, confirm the editors of their publications, consult the primary party organizations, coordinate with them the promotion of candidates into the organs of party, state and public organizations, conduct the registration of Communists, direct the activity of the primary organizations, together with them organize work in regard to the implementation of the policy and decisions of the party among the population, submit for examination of the public and the organs of power concrete socio-economic, cultural, and other questions, and promote their realization.

20. The control (auditing) commission of the rayon or city party organization elects the presidium of the commission, it is accountable to the organ which elected it, it organizes the work in accordance with the provision being confirmed by the rayon or city party conference.

Higher Organs of the Moldovan Communist Party

21. The highest organ of the Moldovan Communist Party is the congress, which is convened at least once every five years. The date on which the congress is held and the agenda are announced not later than three months prior to the beginning of the congress. An extraordinary congress is convened by the Central Committee at its own initiative, at the suggestion of the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party, at the request of one-third of the rayon and city party organizations, or at the demand of primary party organizations combining at least one-third of the total number of Communists. An extraordinary congress is convened within a two-month term and is considered competent if the delegates taking part in its work represent more than one-half of the membership of the Moldovan Communist Party.

In case of the failure to convene an extraordinary congress on the part of the Central Committee, the organizations which requested it may form an organizational committee which has the rights of the Moldovan CP Central Committee with respect to the convening of an extraordinary congress.

22. Congress of the Moldovan Communist Party:

- adopts the Program and Statute of the party, examines them, and introduces changes;
- hears accounts and reports of the Central Committee and the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party, adopts a decision and resolution with respect to them;
- determines the party line in the sphere of party construction, ideological activity, and socio-economic policy, outlines directions of cooperation with other parties, public organizations and movements;
- forms the composition of the Central Committee and the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party;
- elects the first secretary of the Central Committee with his simultaneous election as a member of the Central Committee and the Buro of the Moldavian CP Central Committee; and
- defines the functions and competence of the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party.

23. During the period between congresses, the Moldovan CP Central Committee convenes, as necessary, republic party conferences for the discussion of urgent questions of the policy and practical activity of the party.

The conference is authorized to hear reports of the Central Committee and the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party, to renew

partially, up to one-third, its membership, to undertake and introduce changes in the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party.

24. The Moldovan CP Central Committee:

- convenes the Moldovan CP Congress;
- organizes the implementation of the decisions of the party congresses and conferences;
- forms the commissions of the Central Committee for the main directions of work;
- elects the Buro and Secretariat of the Central Committee;
- creates and liquidates institutions, enterprises, newspapers, journals, television and radio studios of the party, and controls their activity;
- develops and submits to the highest organs of state power of the republic, by way of legislative initiative, proposals in regard to the basic directions of domestic and foreign policy;
- directs the activity of the faction of Communists (party groups) in the republic representative and other directive organs;
- carries out the political line in the sphere of state construction, socio-economic and cultural development of the republic;
- develops and implements the personnel policy of the Moldovan Communist Party, coordinates proposals of the party gorkoms and raykoms in regard to the nomination of candidates to republic organs of party, state, economic and public organizations;
- confirms and dismisses the editors-in-chief of party publications;
- confirms the budget of the Moldovan Communist Party and defines the functions and numerical size of the apparatus of the Moldovan CP Central Committee; and
- represents the Moldovan Communist Party in its mutual relations with other parties, public organizations and movements, and state organs.

25. The Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party is guided in its activity by the Statute and the Regulations being confirmed by the congress (conference) of the Moldovan Communist Party. At its plenum it elects the Presidium.

A party member cannot simultaneously be in the Moldovan CP Central Committee and in the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party.

26. In its activity, the Moldovan Communist Party is guided by the program and normative documents of the CPSU and by the decisions of its higher organs. It builds

its mutual relations with the communist parties of the union republics on the basis of ideological unity, equality, mutual consent, and with regard to the principles of the state system of the country.

IV. Communists in the Organs of Democracy, Public Organizations and Movements

27. The Moldovan Communist Party is fighting for the political leadership in society in democratic elections to the organs of democracy and through other forms of expression of the citizens' will. The party committees and organizations recommend Communists for nomination to people's deputies and help them in the organization of the election campaign. The party organizations may enter into pre-election agreements with other public and political organizations and movements, acting on the basis and in accordance with the Moldovan SSR Constitution, and support the candidates for deputies nominated by them.

Communist deputies unite for the period of the authority of the Soviets in party groups (factions) for the coordination of its activity, the realization of the will of the voters and the political line in the solution of national goals. They coordinate with the appropriate party committees, take into account their decisions and recommendations, and receive support and assistance from them.

28. The party committees and organizations, respecting the organizational and political independence of the youth unions standing on the platform of socialist choice, extend to them comprehensive support and assistance, regard them as the most immediate reserve for the replenishment of their ranks, and actively attract them to the formation and realization of the party's youth policy.

The Moldovan Communist Party builds its mutual relations with the trade unions, veteran, women's, other mass public organizations, and unions standing for democratic for democratic reforms, social justice, and the achievement of national consent, on the basis of political cooperation and partnership.

Communists may take part in various public organizations and movements functioning within the framework of legality, whose activity is not aimed at undermining the authority and integrity of the Moldovan Communist Party.

The Moldovan Communist Party opposes anti-communist, extremist, separatist, nationalist, chauvinist, and anti-Semitic formations.

At the congresses and conferences that are convened by the public organizations, party groups may be created which are called upon to carry out and defend the political line of the Moldovan Communist Party.

V. Funds and Property of the Party

29. The entire activity of the Moldovan Communist Party and its organizations is secured through financial

and material means at the expense of party income. The funds are formed from party membership dues, income from publishing and production and economic activity, voluntary payments of Communists and citizens, and other receipts not contradicting existing legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members are established in the following dimensions:

with income up to 70 rubles—10 kopecks

71 rubles-100 rubles—20 kopecks

101 rubles-150 rubles—30 kopecks

151 rubles-250 rubles—1 percent

over 250 rubles—2 percent

The primary party organizations may attract additional revenues for the solution of the social needs of the Communists of their primary party organization, may differentially determine the dimensions of membership dues for unemployed Communists and retired Communists, members who are unable to work, as well as women who are on maternity leave and caring for a child.

Retired Communists who are working pay party membership dues separately from their pension and wages. Membership dues from a pension due to disability are paid if the Communist so desires.

30. The formation of the budget of the Moldavian Communist Party is effected on the basis of upward norms, on the basis of the budgets of primary, rayon, and city party organizations. The budgets and reports on their implementation are confirmed at joint plenums of the corresponding party committees and control (auditing) commissions, general meetings (conferences) of primary party organizations and are brought to the attention of the Communists.

Economic activity of party committees which does not run counter to the interests of political work is encouraged. With a view of self-financing, they may create economic and commercial organizations.

31. The Moldovan Communist Party is a joint owner of the property of the CPSU. Buildings, installations, housing, equipment, means of transportation, inventory, cultural, educational, and health improvement related property, cash funds, shares, securities, enterprises, party publishing houses and the periodical publications belonging to them, printing presses, income from the mass media, as well as other property necessary to provide for the activity of the party, are objects of the right of ownership of the Moldovan Communist Party.

The party committees and organizations have operational control (ownership, use, disposition) of the property entrusted to them. The question of the sale or other transfer of party property may be decided only by a higher organ provided with the appropriate competence,

or by a congress, conference, and also on the basis of a referendum of the Communists. The Moldovan CP Central Committee, the Administration of Affairs Department of the Central Committee, party committees at the local level, as well as enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the Moldovan Communist Party have the rights of a juridical person and may delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions.

Up to 50 percent of the funds from the total membership dues received are directed toward the financing of the activity of the primary party organizations.

To solve the questions of financing the activity of party organizations, the distribution and redistribution of cash funds in the raykoms and gorkoms of the party, financial commissions are created, with participation of the secretaries of the primary party organizations.

32. The termination of the activity of the Moldovan Communist Party is carried out at the decision of the congress (conference) of the Moldovan Communist Party or for the reasons envisaged by existing legislation.

Appendix

On the basis of the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party, the following documents on standards and rules are being developed and confirmed at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Control and Auditing Commission:

Instruction on the Procedure for Elections in the Moldovan Communist Party and Recall from the Membership of Elective Organs;

Instruction on the Registration of Members of the Moldovan Communist Party, Party Statistics, and Business Correspondence in the Party Organizations;

Instruction on the Registration of Party Membership Dues and the Financial and Economic Activity of Party Organizations;

Rules on the Status of the Secretary of the Primary Party Organization;

Rules on the Party Veteran; and

Rules on the Referendum in the Moldovan Communist Party.

Lvov Obkom Denounces Seizure of CP Building

91UN1118A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 5 Mar 91 p 1

[Appeal of the Lvov Obkom of the Communist Party of Ukraine to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR]

[Text] The leaders of the Lvov oblast council of people's deputies of the first democratic assembly, as they constantly refer to themselves, emphasize at every opportunity the exceptional role of the Lvov region and Galicia in the social-political life of the Ukraine in consolidating the furthest-reaching democratization, most widespread glasnost and most complete pluralism. There is no end to the metaphorical comparisons used to characterize these regions: the Ukrainian Piedmont, an island of freedom, a proving ground for the newest ideas, the last stronghold of the Ukrainian nation, the region best prepared for integration into Europe.

Particularly grandiose has been the treatment afforded the work of the joint session of the Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol and Lvov oblasts, which recently took place in Lvov. The so-called "independent" press immediately characterized the session the Galician assembly and attributed to it an exceptional historical role in forging Galician unity.

This has been the situation in words. But in reality, the picture is quite different. Much evidence of this can be cited, including transgression of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR, moral pressure and persecution applied to Communists and economic leaders, attempts to remove Ukrainian Communist Party organizations from enterprises and state institutions, threats of strikes and acts of civil disobedience, vandalism of monuments dedicated to eminent state activists and important historical events.

While doing these things, the leaders of the "most democratic" council have been attempting at every turn to accuse the Communists of all possible sins, discredit the Ukrainian Communist Party and its local organs and keep Communists from having a say in deciding important social questions which concern the people. The idea is constantly drummed into people's heads that the Ukrainian Communist Party is waging an unrestrained campaign against Galicia and trying to kindle political passions.

A recent example of the rude and disrespectful attitude of the leaders of the oblast government to the Constitution and the valid laws of Soviet Ukraine is the events related to the premises of the community-political center (former building of political education) of the party obkom. Fifty-one years ago the building had been given over as the party propaganda premises.

And now, on a wave of anti-Communist Party hysteria, the pseudo-democrats have decided to correct this, as they consider it, historical injustice. By a one-sided decision of the oblast authorities, the premises are being handed over to the regional Rukh organization. The justification is that the building was not constructed at party cost. Given these developments, the party was obliged to seek legal protection from the appropriate state legal institutions. At present, the matter is being

considered by the State Arbitration Court of the Ukrainian SSR and, in accord with the law, the Center cannot be evicted from the premises before a decision is reached by the state arbitrator.

In spite of this fact, on February 21 of this year, before the start of the work day, a large group of Rukh members headed by the chairman of the regional council, L. Sennyk, resorted to illegal action and seized the premises of the community-political center, arbitrarily taking away from the custodial staff the keys to the service rooms. The bust of V.I. Lenin was carried out of the building onto the balcony, a documentary photo exhibit entitled "People, be vigilant" and a plaque honoring the best propagandists of the oblast were taken down, thematic exhibits of books were vandalized and a real pogrom was carried out in the building's classrooms and work areas. All these actions were accompanied by insolent and insulting remarks about the Communist Party. The director of the oblast executive committee, P. Gural, who arrived while these events were taking place, not only failed to stop the arbitrary actions, but supported the lawless behavior of the Rukh representatives.

The Rukh leaders rudely ignored the appeal of the court executive of the Lenin rayon people's court that they stop this crude, arbitrary action and wait for the resolution of the question in the manner established by law.

Very eloquent in this affair has been the following fact: taking active part in this act of lawlessness were some deputies of the Lvov oblast and the city councils of people's deputies belonging to the so-called "democratic bloc." To what kind of legal state are the Lvov pseudo-democracies heading?

The Communists of the Lvov region are indignant about the unceremonious actions of the leaders of the oblast council and the regional Rukh council; they regard it as crude discrimination against party organs and an attempt to find any possible excuse for firing political passions.

We ask: where is objectivity? Why are the interests of one party being put down, while preference is given to another—the regional council of Rukh? Where, finally, is the law?

Let us mention, incidentally, that up to this time, the doors of the community-political center had been wide open, with no fee, to many community organizations. For almost a year, the women of the Union of Ukrainian Women had been carrying on their activities there, as had the Sholom Aleichem Jewish Culture Association, the oblast peace committee, veterans' and union organizations, the artistic group "Karpatski zori" of the T. H. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Association; the community editors of the oblast memorial book had been working there, as well as the staff of the oblast Afghan veterans group "Salang." Access to the premises had never been denied to activists of Rukh, SNUM [Ukrainian Independent Youth Association] and certain other recently established community organizations.

We expect that the people's deputies of the Ukraine will accept this appeal with understanding and assess appropriately the facts set out in it. For our part, we declare again that the party obkom was and is in favor of close co-operation with the newly elected councils and all parties and community organizations which stand on the platform of restructuring and favor the socialist option and the preservation of a renewed Union of equal, sovereign republics.

Caucasus

Armenian Premier Cited on Independence

NC2702124091 Yerevan International Service
in Turkish 1845 GMT 25 Feb 91

[Text] Our listeners both here in the motherland and abroad are very much interested in knowing what serious steps the new administration has taken during its seven months in power to secure the independence of Armenia. Let us answer this with the words of Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan. In reply to reporters' questions at a recent news conference, Prime Minister Manukyan said the following: Before everything else, we have to define what real independence means. One of the first conditions for a country's independence is its recognition by other countries. For the time being, no Soviet republic has attained this.

At the time of the news conference, Iceland had not yet declared its de jure recognition of Lithuania.

As is known, the West's position on this issue is to defend the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union, not to challenge Gorbachev. As long as the center and Gorbachev do not recognize the independence of our republic there can be no hope from the other countries. Therefore, while taking numerous small steps in this direction, the moment will arrive when we will take a decisive step. Only then can Armenia's independence be recognized. Whenever the opportunity arises I always reiterate that holding a referendum in Armenia would be the only way to achieve this.

To tell the truth, there is an observable change in West's stance toward the Soviet Union. With certain issues, the West regards the Soviet Union as a conglomerate, a union of republics. The Lithuanian developments played an important role in bringing about this change. What changes have taken place in Armenia so far? We are almost independent in our domestic affairs. Of course we have to wittingly or unwittingly comply with some economic decisions passed by the center, for we are part of a common economic system where the correlation between the weak and the strong still persists. Some time ago they showed me a document specifying rules of appointments in Armenia. The rules stipulated that Moscow's approval should be obtained for appointments for over 100 posts. Now, we are fully independent regarding the appointments of the cadres, and what is

more, we have the right of choice. In addition, we are suspending the Soviet laws whenever they are incompatible with our interests.

Ter-Petrosyan on Union Treaty, Lithuania

91US0342A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
29 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by N. Manucharova: "Levon Ter-Petrosyan's Press Conference"]

[Text] The interest in this meeting of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia [VS RA] with representatives of the news media was understandable: His two trips, to Lithuania and Italy, immediately attracted the attention of the public.

The journalists' questions followed L. Ter-Petrosyan's account of his trip to Lithuania and Italy. He went to Lithuania (as the reader is aware) as a member of the delegation of the Council of the Federation whose purpose was to help to overcome opposition between the parties and to avoid further and still more serious complications.

L. Ter-Petrosyan described the situation in Lithuania and the conditions that aggravated it, and he discussed the delegation's effort.

"There were numerous meetings," he said, "in work collectives of enterprises, in the Vilnius garrison, and with the public.... There is no question that the delegation's presence relieved the tension to some degree, and thanks to its effort the possibility arose for dialogue between the hostile parties. What essentially took place in Lithuania? An attempted coup d'etat initiated by the national salvation committee, an anonymous and mythical body of government to which the armed forces subordinated themselves. These political forces are the remnants of the Lithuanian Communist Party which wanted by force of arms to overthrow the legal government and resuscitate their own previous one."

The chairman of the VS RA went on to confirm the illegal acts of the armed forces in Vilnius, and he also noted that there are serious problems in Lithuania related to the policy being conducted toward ethnic minorities. But all political issues, he said, can be solved through political dialogue. That is the only way. Following that road, our delegation achieved definite results in its effort.

The mission of the delegation of the Council of the Federation in Lithuania has been favorably appraised at all levels, including the opposing parties. The reader surely recalls the television interview with the Lithuanian representative in which mention was made of the immense role played in relieving the situation by the head of our republic's supreme body of government.

So that certain judgments and conjectures related to this trip, to the effect that L. Ter-Petrosyan "was representing the empire," seem all the more out of place. One response to these attacks might be the words of Levon Ter-Petrosyan: "The moment has come when democrats do not have the right to be indifferent when something like that occurs anywhere in the country."

This is yet another confirmation of what has been constantly said since the tragic events in Lithuania. Consolidation of the democratic forces is the only thing that can oppose dictatorship and totalitarianism.

Could the Vilnius tragedy be repeated in Armenia? was a question from a journalist. The answer: I do not preclude such possibility if the center strives to preserve the totalitarian system. The scenario, to be sure, might be different, since here there is no social base for creation of salvation committees. The forms and methods of suppression might be different here.

Incidentally, Ashot Manucharyan accompanied the chairman of the VS RA in Lithuania. You surely remember that during the AOD Congress the question was put of why one of the active participants in the movement had vanished from the political arena? The response was approximately this: Ashot Manucharyan, it was said, had left politics and was teaching. L. Ter-Petrosyan said exactly the opposite—that Ashot had been engaged in vigorous political activity during the entire six months.

For that matter, in our country nothing escapes the sphere of politics, including teaching, so that there is nothing particularly surprising here.

Questions were asked concerning problems both within Lithuania and at the union level. L. Ter-Petrosyan expressed regret at Pruskene's resignation and the instability of "Sayudis" itself. At this point, one cannot help but recall the question which a well-known political scientist put to an equally well-known Lithuanian scholar: "When was Lithuania closer to democracy, under the Communists or under 'Sayudis'?" And the response: "During the transition from the Communists to 'Sayudis.'"

The signing of the Union Treaty was touched upon during the press conference.

"None of the republics," L. Ter-Petrosyan said, "is ready to sign the Union Treaty, especially in its present form. This, after all, is essentially the 1922 treaty hidden behind camouflage. I am convinced that the issue of the Union Treaty will become urgent in a year or two."

The journalists were interested in the attitude of the VS RA chairman to the order of the union ministers of internal affairs and defense to organize joint patrols of police and military personnel in the large cities of the country beginning on 1 February.

L. Ter-Petrosyan said in his response to that that we have no need to carry out that order, we are monitoring the situation and able to maintain control of it ourselves.

The questions of the journalists were, of course, extremely diverse, but their scope had to be limited and related only to the trips to Lithuania and Italy. But even within the limits of that topic areas were exposed which had proven impossible to touch for an hour and a half.

Take this question as an example:

"It is clear that the center will not give up its positions voluntarily (I am quoting L. Ter-Petrosyan). Everything already depends on the strength of the republics. The best laws can be adopted, but even they will not help protection. But at the same time it is a fact that the decisions of the Union no longer have the influence they once had, yet our republic laws still do not have the necessary strength. Which side will win out?"

And, of course, the problem of Karabakh could not be evaded. As it was put by the VS chairman, the pope in Rome has expressed solidarity with our movement, and in Lithuania L. Ter-Petrosyan talked about Artsakh with Foteyev, who headed the delegation of the Council of the Federation. One of the results was that Yanayev received the former leaders of the oblast's party and public organizations.

The main purpose of the trip to Italy was accomplished, L. Ter-Petrosyan said. "An agreement was signed on the intention to cooperate in various areas. Up to now, no republic has signed agreements at the governmental level with foreign countries, not even at the oblast level. I was in Italy, after all, in response to an official invitation from the leader of Venezia Province. The interest in my visit to Italy was accentuated by the news of the mission to Lithuania. The result was three press conferences and an equal number of interviews in Italian newspapers and on television.

"I would give an important place to the meeting with Carlo Bernini, Italy's transportation minister, which resulted in a decision to think over the possibility of establishing air service between Venice and Yerevan."

L. Ter-Petrosyan actually had many impressions from his trip. There was the audience with the pope, and, of course, the meeting in Milan's Armenian community, and the visit to the Mekhitarist congregation. Relations with our fellow countrymen in Italy will develop and become stronger. L. Ter-Petrosyan told about all this in detail.

In spite of the difference in purposes pursued by his two trips, in my view they had a common desire—the search for paths of mutual understanding. In the one case, indirectly, in the other, directly. And that is their main significance and particular impact in the context of the times and the situation today.

In concluding the press conference, L. Ter-Petrosyan promised to meet journalists once again in the near

future in order to answer questions concerning the republic's internal life. Although I think it will be difficult to define the boundary, draw the line, between internal and external matters.

Armenian Autonomy, Union Treaty Viewed

91US0342B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
29 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by S. Stepanyan, professor: "Autonomy and the Union Treaty"]

[Text] World experience in resolving ethnic problems shows that the fair settlement of ethnic problems in a constitution is a vital necessity to achievement of peace and concord. Taking that truth as a point of departure, the greatest thinkers in the history of humanity have attributed great importance to just resolution of the nationality question. Reality has fully confirmed that ethnic conflicts of all kinds have to be corrected to establish interethnic peace, and that means that every people must become independent and be master in its own house. And the most correct way is to adopt and implement the principle of free self-determination of peoples. The right of nations to self-determination is one of the greatest achievements of our civilization.

The essence of the right of nations to self-determination is that every nationality must decide and determine its own destiny on its own. Unfortunately, the basic principles of the right of nations to self-determination have not been brought about in the country of Soviets. We should mention that it was in the initial period of the evolution of the Soviet state that unprecedented transgressions were committed concerning the nationality question.

The small nationalities continued to be subordinated to the large nationalities, which is a flagrant violation of human rights, a flouting of them. Stalin was the principal author of the actual inequality of nationalities—of what was called "autonomization." The inequality of the union republics and autonomous structures has been persistently preserved for seven decades now, since formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922.

Is it not paradoxical that in the multinational country of Soviets there is a structure for ethnic subordination at several levels: the union state, the autonomous republic, the autonomous oblast, the autonomous okrug? Finally, has the time not come to reassess and correct this inequality and create an equal union of all large and small nationalities?

There is no doubt that interethnic conflicts will be eliminated when this issue is resolved and peace and concord will prevail among all the country's nationalities. Yes, it is only on the basis of effective equality of all ethnic structures that ethnic issues can be resolved. When the national structures become equal components of the

federation or confederation, then the foundation will have been laid for actual social, economic, and political equality of nationalities.

At the present time, in order to resolve the ethnic issues facing the country, **we need to carry out a restructuring of the union-level federation.** This can be done as follows. In the makeup of the federation, along with the 15 union republics, absolutely equal rights should also be given to the other nation-state structures—the 20 autonomous republics, the eight autonomous oblasts, and the 20 autonomous okrugs. The Soviet federation would thus consist of 53 absolutely equal nation-state structures.

All these nation-state structures will be called republics (without the word "union"). It is they who would sign the new treaty on union or commonwealth. This would lay down the principle for the first stage of restructuring ethnic relations, under whose conditions the next tasks would be performed of implementing the right of nations to self-determination and of radical restructuring of the union federation. The development of ethnic relations would then enter the next stage, in which the relevant issues of cooperation of nations and creation of a confederation would be resolved.

I say confederation advisedly. A federation can bring together state structures to form a unified federal state, but a confederation is a union of sovereign self-governing states, a commonwealth.

It needs to be noted that under present-day conditions it is **extremely unfair that the union republic has the right to withdraw from the USSR (that right exists in the Constitution, but is not in the draft treaty), while autonomous structures are deprived not only of that right, but even of the right to withdraw from the union republic.** The actual inequality of nationalities has been vividly manifested in this respect, and until the problems are solved concerning absolute equality of all nationalities living in the USSR, none of the laws and decisions in the area of ethnic relations, neither those already adopted, nor those of the future, can have real force. This is clearly proven by the laws adopted concerning ethnic issues such as the documents on procedure for settling issues related to cessation of a union republic from the USSR, tightening accountability for encroachment on the ethnic equality of citizens and for forcible violation of the unity of the territory of the USSR, and on division of powers between the USSR and the members of the federation.

It is of interest (in the first law of one of the documents enumerated) that the autonomous structures remain unfairly subordinated to the union republic in economic, social, and political matters. The Law on Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Members of the Federation, adopted 26 April 1990, reiterates the old fundamental principles of Stalinist times which contradict the right of peoples to self-determination and human rights in general.

Under that law, the union republics are considered sovereign states, while the oblasts and okrugs are not.

Under the law's second article, every union republic has the right to freely secede from the USSR, but not a single article contains a single word about secession of an autonomous republic, oblast, or okrug not only from the USSR, but even from the union republic, nor is there a word about the right to decide their destiny independently.

Another example of inequality. The union and autonomous republics have the right to decide the juridical status of the languages of the nationalities, to establish official languages, but the autonomous oblasts and okrugs are deprived of that right. Unfortunately, we must note that with respect to ethnic relations the laws adopted recently are essentially old and do not conform to the new political thinking and cannot help to improve interethnic relations.

If the nationality question is to be decided fairly, it is very important to omit from the Constitution Article 78, which is extremely prejudicial to the principle of self-determination of nationalities. This ill-fated article actually puts a veto on self-determination of nationalities, precludes the possibility of correcting the borders of the various republics that were arbitrarily drawn in the past and the restoration of territory taken unlawfully to its actual owners. Unfortunately, this odious article has been copied verbatim in Article 3 of the draft treaty.

The fifth principle in the draft treaty is still more vulnerable; it states that the union republics themselves decide matters of administrative division. This is fair for those union republics in which there are no autonomous structures. But those union republics in which they do exist could retain or abolish the autonomous structures however they see fit, or redraw the lines of their historic territories.

Article 19 of the draft treaty is still more surprising. For the first time in Soviet history, it recognizes the Russian language as the official language of the USSR. Can the authors of the draft have forgotten that the founder of the Soviet state resolutely objected to the Russian language becoming the official language for the entire country? What is more, it is well-known that before adopting the declaration of independence or sovereignty every republic proclaimed the national language of that republic to be the official language. It is, of course, a quite different matter to adopt the Russian language as the language for interethnic communication.

The draft treaty should be fundamentally reworked and the right of nationalities to self-determination should be adopted as the fundamental principle.

The Karabakh problem should be considered one of the most important lessons in the drafting and adoption of the treaty. It needs to be settled fairly by adopting as the point of departure the will to self-determination of the indigenous inhabitants of that oblast, its legal owners—the Armenians, and their natural aspiration to join their motherland, Armenia. And let this stand as an example of fair resolution of the nationality question.

Yes, on the question of Nagorny Karabakh nationality policy scandalously trampled on the right of nations to self-determination. The right to self-determination has actually only been used by a portion of Eastern Armenia. The other part—the oblast of Nagorny Karabakh—has been deprived of that right. It should be mentioned that on 4 July 1921, in a plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a decision was made by majority vote: A portion of Artsakh Oblast—Nagorny Karabakh, which is the ancient cradle of the Armenian people, was to become part of Armenia.

From both the historic and economic, political, and ethnic points of view, that decision was completely fair. But that decision did not remain in force even one day. On 5 July, under Stalin's pressure and dictate, the unfair and erroneous decision was made to redraw the ethnic boundaries of Armenia, and Nagorny Karabakh was arbitrarily turned over to Azerbaijan. This was not the only distortion that occurred concerning the nationality question and ethnic boundaries. Not only were the historic boundaries of the Armenian people redrawn, but a cordon was also created—an artificially created five-seven km buffer zone, it was declared Azerbaijani territory, and that divided the Armenian people of Eastern Armenia into two parts.

The tragic fate of Nakhichevan is a shocking and unlawful example of redrawing the historical territories of the Armenian people. This ancient Armenian area, on the demand of the Kemalists and under the treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey on 16 March 1921, was turned over to Azerbaijan; the time has come to declare that unjust treaty invalid and to restore Nakhichevan to its lawful owner—Armenia.

The position of the autonomous structures of the country of Soviets should be taken into account for purposes of concluding a new treaty and creation of a new union. That position was clearly manifested at the extraordinary session of the Founding Council of Commonwealths of Soviet Autonomous Structures held recently in Moscow and attended by representatives of 43 nationalities. The thrust of the document drafted in the session was to finally eliminate the inequality that exists between the large and small nationalities, entire peoples, the ethnic discrimination that is alien to the spirit of our times, and to abolish such terms as union structures and autonomous structures.

The resolution which the session adopted on Nagorny Karabakh is something new in our time and is deserving of every praise. That important document resolutely condemns the policy of the Government of Azerbaijan, which is aimed at using military force to suppress the national liberation movement of the Armenian population of the autonomous oblast. The session of the Founding Council of Commonwealths of Autonomous Structures takes the position that events in the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] is the result of the racial discrimination practiced on the territory of the

Soviet Union, it condemned the union government for its connivance in conduct of the policy of annihilation of a people that has chosen the road of democratization.

The Commonwealth of Autonomous Structures deems it essential that Azerbaijan withdraw its special armed forces from the oblast, reinstate the authorities of Soviet power in the NKAO, and allow the Armenian population of Nagorny Karabakh to exercise its right to self-determination.

There is no other way to describe what has happened in Nagorny Karabakh under the aegis of Azerbaijani authorities than genocide and barbarism. The blockade of Nagorny Karabakh, the acts of violence, murders, plunder are a shame of our century and a logical extension of that cruel policy and the actions taken by the previous rulers.

Unfortunately, the leadership of the Soviet Union is not only closing its eyes to what is happening, but is actually sponsoring it, and the righteous anger, grievances, and declarations of the Armenian people and of the peaceful progressive community remain a voice crying in the wilderness.

Aside from the issues of Nagorny Karabakh and Nakhichevan, there are a number of unresolved issues in the area of nationality policy in the Soviet Union. If they are to be settled fairly, guidance must be taken from the normative acts on human rights which have long ago been recognized in world civilization. It can be said without a doubt that the economic, social, and political progress of our multinational country depend to a great degree on the just solution of nationality problems in the Soviet Union.

New Political Organization Splits From Armenian Communist Party

91US0392A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 9,
28 Feb 91 pp 3-4

[Interview with Akop Akopyan, member of the provisional board of the Party of National and Social Justice, by Em. Mkrtchyan; place and date not given: "A Political Presentation: Against Secession, in Favor of a Confederation"]

[Text] During the proceedings of the 29th Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia, a group of supporters of an independent platform left the auditorium as a sign of disagreement with the course of the congress. On the same day, they convened their own conference, at which a new political organization was set up—the Party of National and Social Justice of Armenia [Partiya Natsionalnoy i Sotsialnoy Spravedlivosti].

We have prepared an interview with Akop Akopyan, a member of the provisional board of the new party, by way of a political presentation.

[Mkrtchyan] To what was your departure from the Communist Party of Armenia due, and why did you leave the 29th Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia?

[Akopyan] Our motives were as follows. First, all our hopes that it would be possible to transform the Communist Party of Armenia into a social democratic party were not justified. To remain in the ranks of the Communist Party of Armenia meant to give up serving national interests. We cannot fail to recall that in the last three years the central apparatus and its leadership have turned a deaf ear to our national demands and problems.

Second, attempts to overcome the crisis in the country, such as privatization and the introduction of market relations, will only bring about a deterioration of the crisis. It will be very tough for the low-income populace. It is impossible to ensure social protection within the framework of communist approaches in the environment of market relations, because for 70 years now we have had to deal with a complete absence of social protection guarantees, instead of such protection. Proceeding from the experience of the developed capitalist countries of the world, social democratic approaches to the low-income strata of the population are required in order to ensure social protection.

We stated at the congress that the Communist Party of Armenia would not be able to become independent if it remained within the structure of the CPSU.

All of this provided the pretext for our leaving the 29th Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia and convening our own congress on the same day. We proclaimed ourselves to be a founding congress, based on the fact that the mandate given to us by the Communists in favor of our platform gave us an absolute legal and moral right to this. We opened the congress as the Independent Communist Party of Armenia, and closed it as the Congress of the Party of National and Socialist Justice of Armenia.

[Mkrtchyan] What is the orientation of your party going to be?

[Akopyan] It will be a parliamentary party. So far, we do not have representatives in the parliament, but we do intend to take part in a campaign for vacant seats which has been postponed for six months.

Ours is a party with a socio-democratic orientation, and there is a point in the party statute to the effect that the party operates within the framework of the constitution and laws adopted by the parliament of the republic.

[Mkrtchyan] What is your position on the issue of independence for Armenia?

[Akopyan] We are in favor of a union confederation, not of the 15 republics now in existence, but of all the 53 units, from union republics on down to national okrugs. This is necessary from the point of view of social justice and the socialist idea. This is the only way to preserve a

union of republics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs. It is necessary to enhance the status of autonomies because as of now they have virtually no rights. The draft Union treaty says that the USSR will be a voluntary association of sovereign republics. This is why many autonomous entities, including okrugs, with no hope of having their status enhanced from the top, proclaim themselves republics in order to gain an opportunity to become sovereign, independent subjects of the future union of a confederative type under the law. This process cannot bypass the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. I would like to note that a confederation brings about the resolution of the Karabakh issue in the most painless manner. This will be a solution, albeit gradual. At present, the main task of various parties of Armenia and the existing official authorities, which mainly represent the AOD [Armenian Pannational Movement], is to fight for implementing this variant of a confederation. It is much too premature to discuss independence.

The type of confederation we are proposing has the support of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union.

It is impossible to maintain the Soviet Union by using the Army, as the central leadership is now trying to do.

[Mkrtchyan] What is the social program of your party?

[Akopyan] To defend the interests of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia—of the middle strata of the population which will become considerably more numerous after the introduction of market relations.

[Mkrtchyan] Consequently, you have a position on the issue of land.

[Akopyan] Yes, and it is somewhat different from the solution envisioned by the parliament. We are categorically against the alienation of land by means of purchasing and selling. Land should be given to those who are able and willing to farm it, as their private property, with the right to bequeath it, but without the right to sell it or give it away as a gift. Our draft is close to what has been done in Belorussia. It is necessary to take measures in order to ensure that all land suitable for farming is used solely for agricultural purposes.

[Mkrtchyan] Would you please outline your decisions on the issue of privatization.

[Akopyan] As far as privatization is concerned, we believe that enterprises should be, for the most part, given to the working people, with a view to defending their interests, by forming joint-stock companies, that is, the operation of private capital should be restricted to small enterprises.

We believe that the people whose labor has created all of these enterprises should be the ones to benefit from privatization. The state should sell shares on credit because the working people may be financially incapable of becoming shareholders in their own enterprises (especially after the exchange of money).

Parties which refer to democracy in a way other than declarative cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the money accumulated in our society, which should be legalized by means of privatization, has been acquired to a considerable degree through dishonest endeavors. The legalization of all of this at the expense of the workers is too far from socialism.

As far as the intelligentsia is concerned, this is the most impoverished stratum of the population because it is the hardest for this stratum to adjust to a market economy. For five or six years, we will not have competition—the main lever of the market economy. Competition is out of the question where universal shortages exist, and in the absence of competition, it is absurd to refer to a genuine market economy. Of course, everybody will suffer because of this, but it will be the toughest for the intelligentsia.

Our program has certain points devoted to the organization of social protection. We make specific suggestions, for example, adopting certain measures in the event of unemployment, such as benefits and so on; measures to impose temporary price freezes, including market prices; partial regulation of the state market economy, for example, interference by the state in market relations when this is required from the point of view of social justice, and so on.

Armenian City Soviet Elects Chairman

NC2702170991 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0600 GMT 26 Feb 91

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] Radik Sarukhanyan worked at the "Astro" scientific-production association after (?graduating from the mathematics faculty) of Yerevan State University. In 1975 he returned to Kapan to work at [words indistinct]. In September 1990 he became the chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet's Standing Commission for Education, Science, Language and Culture. In December he was appointed the government's plenipotentiary representative in Kapan City. He has now been elected chairman of the Kapan city soviet by an absolute majority of votes at the first session of the city soviet.

On its front and second pages the paper has published (?Gagik Arusyan's) interview with Radik Sarukhanyan.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Reports on South Ossetia Violence

PM2802124791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 6

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka report under the general heading "Army in the Conflict Zone. What It Was Like in Tskhinvali": "Our Special Correspondent Reported Yesterday"]

[Text] Confrontation between Ossetian and Georgian armed groups in Tskhinvalskiy and Znaurskiy Rayons has reached the limit. Intensive exchanges of fire have begun between them. A reinforced group of internal troops has left for the scene. It was accompanied by personnel from the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] operations and investigation department. They found people killed and injured in the village of Avnevi, which has a mixed population. They were all Georgian nationals. Later in another village more bodies were found in a "Zhiguli." The forces of law and order immediately seized seven firearms, five grenades, two unguided missiles, and a large quantity of ammunition.

The village of Avnevi is one of the seats of the tension. In the last three days alone troop details have regularly driven out there to stop illegal actions on both sides, but the clashes are continuing. At roughly 1000 hours a group of armed Georgian nationals headed by a senior militia lieutenant burst into the house of Ossetian Z. Kabisov. They opened fire indiscriminately with submachine guns. They went on the rampage in the house: They smashed furniture and threw things about. The owner was murdered solely because his son was not at home. This is not the only "trial" of its kind. The same thing can also be seen in villages with a mixed population. The chief of the Georgian militia post near the victim's home gave no intelligible answer when asked why this is happening. He just repeated several times that he was constantly on duty. But when internal troops arrested Georgian nationals carrying rifles without the relevant permits right in front of him there was nothing to say. The people who should be restoring public order in the region are obviously incapable of doing so.

People have grown tired of the lawlessness being perpetrated outside the area governed by the state of emergency. The last hope for Ossetians, Georgians, Russians, and Azerbaijanis living in South Ossetia is that a state of emergency will be introduced throughout the territory and compliance with it monitored by USSR MVD internal troops.

Power Blockade on South Ossetia Lifted

LD2702230391 Moscow TASS in English 2125 GMT
27 Feb 91

[Text] Vladikavkaz February 27 TASS—The power blockade of South Ossetia by Georgia has been lifted. Electricity to Tskhinvali has been supplied from the Gruzglavenergo power grid.

Electricity to Dzhava district is again being supplied from North Ossetia through a makeshift circuit, a spokesman at the press centre of the emergency committee under the authority of the president of the parliament of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] told TASS today.

It was relatively calm in Tskhinvali last night. There were no shoot-outs. However, there is no bread in the city and other foodstuffs are scarce. Schools, institutions,

industrial plants and shops have not been functioning for the third month and public utilities are out of operation.

The population of South Ossetia and the North Ossetian SSR have taken a positive view of the letter sent by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, president of the Georgian parliament, to USSR Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov in reply to the Soviet parliament resolution "On the Situation in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and Measures to Stabilise the Situation in the Region."

The letter conveys the readiness of the presidium of the Georgian parliament to negotiate with representatives of the Ossetian population of South Ossetia.

Refugees from Ossetian villages of Georgia continue to arrive in North Ossetia. According to official data, there are now more than 10,000 of them, including 6,000 children.

Humanitarian aid to the population of South Ossetia is coming to Vladikavkaz from all over the country. Multi-ethnic work collectives send food, medicines, winter clothes, fuel and building materials to the state-of-emergency area.

More on Continuing 'Tense' Situation in Ossetia

PM0403155091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 91
Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the rubric "More on the Situation in South Ossetia": "Still No Peace"]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 1 Mar—A TASS correspondent was informed in the North Ossetian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet emergency committee press center that in Tskhinvali and in the whole of the oblast there is still a tense situation.

There was intensive fire in the environs of the city last night. The Georgian side fired on a subunit of USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops from a wood. Several members of the armed Georgian formations were wounded when fire was returned.

As before we know nothing about the outlying Ossetian villages in the oblast, just as the fate of the eight automobile drivers whom the Georgians seized as hostages is unknown.

Although the energy blockade of the oblast has been completely removed, South Ossetia remains in complete economic isolation. Industrial enterprises, schools, stores, and communal services are for the third month in succession not working in the area under the state of emergency.

According to North Ossetian MVD reports there is a food shortage in the city and the bakery is not working—flour stocks have been used up. Vehicles sent here with flour are at a standstill in Dzhava—and cannot proceed further.

Humanitarian aid for the South Ossetian population is still reaching Vladikavkaz. Today refrigerated vehicles and heavy trucks arrived here from Lipetsk and Kursk Oblasts, Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Kray, Moldova, Moscow, and Leningrad.

A. Galazov, chairman of the North Ossetian SSR Supreme Soviet, told a TASS correspondent: Georgian Supreme Soviet Chairman Z. Gamsakhurdia's letter to USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov was received positively in the North Ossetian SSR and also, I know, in South Ossetia, and in the country's other regions. It expresses the Georgian side's readiness to conduct talks with representatives of South Ossetia's Ossetian population. "But time marches on, the economic blockade of the oblast and the opposition continues, people are dying, the flow of refugees is getting greater, but still there is no solution."

You get the impression that the Georgian leadership is in no hurry to normalize the situation in South Ossetia. Moreover, we are hearing claims from Tbilisi that the center is fighting against Georgia, "using its troops and the Ossetian extremists." There is also a statement to the effect that Moscow is preparing to organize with the help of this conflict "an intervention in Georgia and to introduce presidential rule and a state of emergency throughout the republic."

"Such groundless claims are hardly conducive to political and economic stabilization in South Ossetia," A. Galazov said.

Firsthand Report on Ossetian Situation

91US0385A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Mar 91 p 4

[TRUD special correspondent V. Belykh report: "Fighting of More Than Just Local Significance"]

[Text] Tskhinvali—It is up to the politicians, having investigated all the nuances, to make a correct evaluation of what is happening today in South Ossetia and, most importantly, to seek an end to the tragedy. These notes are the live, direct impressions of a reporter just returned from an unusual assignment. Who had been where it may be said that the "fighting is of more than just local significance"....

The armored transport vehicle stopped ahead of us for a while, then drove off across the woodland belt. We rushed to hide behind the apple trees of an orchard dusted with a fine cover of snow. Uneasy minutes of waiting. Then bearded men with assault rifles in sport coats climbed out of the hatches of the transport vehicle onto the armor. Georgian was heard. The woman, our chance companion, set up a plaintive wail....

"There you are, informals," one of those accompanying me summed up.

We were returning from the Ossetian villages of Didmukha and Muguti, where one of the latest armed

clashes in South Ossetia were taking place at that time. Although these are small settlements, people had lived well enough here until recently. They worked the fields, kept livestock, raised their children.... The end of the tranquil life and prosperity arrived here with the first shots heard in the oblast. Situated near to the Georgian village of Avnevi—a mustering point for militants—Didmukha and Muguti had been stripped almost bare. Tons of beans, as much cheese, and all kinds of simple chattels were removed from the collective farm storehouse. Then it was the turn of private homes. People in militia uniform and civilian clothes with assault rifles and carbines broke into the defenseless residences, took away money, clothing and dishware, dragged out furniture and food stocks and drove away livestock and personal automobiles.

"This is my home," the doctor Igor Bestayev opened the gate to me. "It has been robbed seven times. They have taken away everything, including underwear...."

Broken glass crunched underfoot. Scattered around the floor were some pieces of finery, fragments of family photographs, broken Christmas-tree toys....

"I am now," Igor sighed, "living with relatives meanwhile."

Subsequently, having returned to Moscow, I met him once again at a crossing. And, nodding toward a small bag, he said, grinning:

"This is all that is left of my home...."

The inhabitants of the two villages stood it for a time, but when things became unbearable, they sent messengers to the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and requested assistance. And the next time a convoy of marauders had only just driven into the village when they were ambushed.... The appearance of interior forces put an end to the engagement. When it was all over, the local inhabitants did the rounds of the streets, collecting the corpses of their recent enemies, put them in the vehicles in which the latter had arrived and bore them out of the settlements.... As the Ossetians maintained, the losses in the ambush constituted 14 killed; and the "other" side reported that it had lost seven persons killed and called the bloody incident itself a villainous attack by Ossetian extremists on the peaceful population of the Georgian village of Avnevi....

...At last, the transport vehicle with Georgian "informals" started up and, not having dared come any closer, drove off the way it had come. This evidently reflected a fear of the grenade launchers and rockets with which the Ossetian "self-defense squads" had come to be armed.

And we plodded on across the impassable mud beneath the melting snow. Yes, many villages of South Ossetia can only be reached today by foot, along hunters' trails, avoiding the numerous armed pickets and in constant expectation of gunfire. Nor is Tskhinvali any exception. For the majority of those wishing to get to the city there

is just one way: by vehicle across the Rokskiy Pass, which contains the danger of avalanches, to Dzhava, and then... on the 20-km section of highway to Tskhinvali a "cluster" of four Georgian villages: Kekhvi, Kurta, Achabeti, and Tamrasheni—a kind of "barrier" in the blockade of the capital of South Ossetia letting through to it neither vehicles carrying provisions and medicines nor people.... The headquarters of the armed informal groups is here also. The possibility of slipping through together with the military or by passing helicopter is rare, and the majority make their way by detour, on foot, along the mountain track. It is difficult here even for a practiced man, but quite recently women leading their children by the hand were making their way along this same path from Tskhinvali in the opposite direction.

I walked again and again the streets of Tskhinvali, which I had visited exactly a year ago. Little remained of the peaceful, comfortable small-town character: the walls of familiar houses were riddled with bullet holes, in the streets were the scars of barricades and the skeletons of trolley buses which had been shot up, and in the air was the smell of burning.... Much has already been written about how at daybreak on 6 January several thousand Georgian militia officers armed with assault rifles intruded into the sleeping city by deception. Many of them were of strange appearance: uniforms of the wrong size, civilian jeans showing from beneath a regular overcoat, dissimilar boards on the shoulders of the same individual.... It was these "strange militia officers" who opened fire without any excuse and it was they who subsequently committed all the atrocities. Exchanging phrases in prison jargon, they drove away vehicles, robbed stores, warehouses, and apartments, and shot and shot.... And it was no accident, evidently, that their first casualty was Grigoriy Kochiyev, leader of the local militia. He rushed to help his children and received a round from a machine gun in his back.

But something occurred which those who had planned this inhuman action were not expecting. The townspeople did not take flight and did not hide in their apartments, they decided to resist. They were intimidated neither by the marksmen who had taken up position on roofs nor by the armored transport vehicles (two of them were blown up). And ultimately the forces that had seized Tskhinvali had to retreat—they left the city, carting away with them what they had pillaged, R4 million from the local bank, local seals, official forms.... The people who had come to the city "to restore order" smashed up the oblast party committee and oblast soviet executive committee buildings, leaving behind them broken furniture, shredded papers, blood-stained syringes, and empty vials of an unknown drug. They committed outrages upon monuments to Patriotic War heroes in the local park, desecrated the premises of the local theater.... But the tragedy did not end here, the blockade followed....

"As of the present the oblast has already sustained damage to the extent of more than R200 million," R. Khugayev, first deputy chairman of the oblast soviet

executive committee, believes. It will take years of strenuous work to restore everything. Three of our rayons: Znaurskiy, Tskhinvalskiy, and Leningorskiy, have practically been cut off."

I arrived in Tskhinvali when the city had finally been provided with power. Prior to this, its streets had at night spent long winter weeks in darkness. It was now possible to get the mill going and grind into flour the grain prepared for formula food. The gray, tasteless bread made from it would be sufficient, it was hoped, for several days. Everyone was awaiting the convoy of more than 30 large-capacity motor vehicles carrying humanitarian assistance from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. But, while having left Dzhava, it failed to reach its destination....

Vehicles carrying food and medicine were stopped, it is said, by those same Georgian militia officers and "informants." Ignoring the armored transport vehicles of the interior forces, they began a general search. It soon produced results—two shotguns, carbine cartridges, cans of powder.... Then the military drove off (as they later explained, their assignment had been to accompany merely the diesel power plant, and the convoy moved after them at its own risk, having grown tired of waiting in Dzhava), and the vehicles carrying the freight were ransacked completely, and the drivers were simply beaten up, and some were taken hostage.... Subsequently an eye-witness—an employee of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Service—would in conversation with me speak in admiration of the precise actions of the Georgian militia. Only it is not entirely clear of what they consisted. Of the fact that, on account of the absurd incident involving the shotguns, the medicines did not get through to the patients, and the food to the starving? Or of the fact that the freight was pilfered, the representatives of the USSR MVD having considerably been allowed to drive on?

However, one can only sympathize with the soldiers of the interior forces who found themselves in South Ossetia. The state of emergency has been imposed merely in Tskhinvali itself and in Dzhavskiy Rayon (it does not extend, for example, to the road on which the convoy was robbed), and what they should have done in this situation is absolutely incomprehensible. Another factor also was the fact that this interior forces unit was permanently stationed in Tbilisi, where the officers' families remained behind. What kind of "strategic thinking" does a person need to have in order, having dispatched fathers to maintain order at a "flash point," to leave their wives and children as a kind of hostage to one of the "parties." One has the impression, meanwhile, that the main preoccupation of the interior forces in Tskhinvali is defense of the "Osetiya" tourist center, where their main forces are deployed and which is bombarded nightly practically by "unknown extremists" from a quarter in which Ossetians have not been for many weeks now.

Of course, the nighttime shelling is now a customary feature of the life of besieged Tskhinvali. Not everyone dares venture onto the streets after midnight. And not because of the curfew; people are quietly beginning to forget about its existence. Stray bullets continually whistle overhead. The Ossetian pickets at the exit routes respond less frequently—they are saving their cartridges. Some shots crackle in Tskhinvali itself—militants from informal armed detachments force their way into the city in vehicles and fire indiscriminately. As a result, new wounded, new casualties. As of the present the dead on the Ossetian side, according to local figures, are of the order of 40—this excludes those missing without trace. The city cemetery comes under fire also. The dead have to be buried where they may. Some in villages to which there is still access, others at their own homes and in the grounds of School No. 5.

...I walk from grave to grave in this appalling necropolis. Here lies Alim Margiyev, 15 years of age, and his 16-year-old friend Leonid Tekhov. They were playing hockey, when they heard a shot. They started to run and were killed by militia officers. Eight bullets, it is said, were removed from Tekhov's body. Vyacheslav Bagiyev. He was waiting in line for cigarettes. He was shot point-blank from a vehicle. Sergey Dzhiyev. A Leningrader. He had brought medicines. He was seriously wounded near the Pioneers Park. His life could have been saved, but the ambulance was not allowed through to him.

Dmitriy Kochiyev. A teacher at the Kurta children's home. He was beaten up in front of his son in his own home in the village of Kurta. When Kochiyev was being taken by ambulance to Tskhinvali Hospital, the vehicle was stopped in Tamarasheni village by Georgian militants. One of them (nicknamed Viro) opened the door and shot the stretchered teacher in the head....

There is another funeral also—in the grounds of the home for old persons and invalids. At the time of the tragic events more than 20 persons died here from cold, malnutrition, and nervous tension. They are being buried near an inoperative boiler house, compactly, close to one another, unprepossessing plaques with Ossetian, Georgian, Russian, Armenian, and Jewish names being placed on top of the snow-covered mounds. And feeble old people of various nationalities—from all of Georgia—are living out their last days in the deserted building.

The unfortunate old men and women describe the confusion at the start of the events. How on some days without heat and lighting they would receive 300 grams of bread a day and hot tea. How they were helped, as best they could, by a regiment of military helicopter pilots and local inhabitants. How young men in the picket close by would share with them the last they had and how parcels would get through to them from North Ossetia, Stavropol, and Abkhazia. But the republic Ministry of Social Security, which runs the home, has forgotten about its wards, as it were, since the start of the blockade.

The degree of civilization of a society is largely determined by its attitude toward its old folk. This has always been emphasized particularly in the south, in Georgia. But it is for these people, as also for the children, that things in South Ossetia are getting worse and worse. And even the respect for one's elders which is traditional in the Caucasus is no longer protection for them. Nor did it save the 135-year-old Ossetian Iosif Kaziyeu from the village of Kurkula, who had gone to the village of Kere to call on his daughter. As coincidence would have it, militants suddenly appeared at the home immediately after him. They began to take everything that came to hand. The old man tried to intervene. He was then stripped of his clothes and thrown out into the frost.... He died an agonizing death....

But no one knows precisely what is being done in the districts of South Ossetia today. Information also has been blocked to a large extent. There are no communications, and getting by the pickets into many Ossetian villages is impossible. But the information which is being received is fantastic. Militants have taken seven Ossetians from that same village of Kurkula hostage and have demanded R30,000 ransom. Otherwise they have threatened to kill the captives. All the livestock has been rustled from the village of Tselisi.

"Ask in Moscow what we fought for, what we shed our blood for," gray-haired old men with combat decorations on their old jackets shouted in my face. They were refugees from the Ossetian villages of Velebi and Katetri whom we met while making our way toward the rayon center of Znauri. Their homes, they said, had been burned down, and many of their nearest and dearest were missing. How could it be explained to them why the state, to which they had given their health and for which they had fought, was now incapable of protecting them?

Eighteen villages, we were informed, have now ceased to exist in the oblast's Znaurskiy Rayon. Balta, Kaleti, Velebi, Ioncha... these are now merely names on the map, but behind them, deserted torched homes. A state of emergency has not been declared here, and, consequently, from the official viewpoint, all is normal. Despite the fact that the rayon center of Znauri, for example, had by the time I arrived been stormed three times. The first time armed groups attacked it from three sides. The attackers were supported by two "BelAZ," on which machine guns had been mounted. Behind the militants came looters with sacks, emptying the captured homes. The exchange of fire lasted, eye-witnesses say, about three hours. Ultimately the attackers were pushed out.

The second time the militants tried to make their way into the community on two armored transport vehicles disguised as Soviet Army transport vehicles, but were unable to negotiate the ditches which had been dug by the besieged. They fired at the fortifications point-blank and left. Two tanks without turrets but with machine

guns took part in the last large-scale attack. They managed to slip across the central street, but were unable to dig in....

And so this rebellious community. Homes with holes from bullets and fragments, spent cartridge cases underfoot. At the entrance to a barricade of those same captured "BelAZ," above it, on the fifth floor, where no one any longer lives, a sandbagged observation post and weapon emplacement. There are virtually no women and children left in the rayon center—they were gotten out. Only the men, with guns, remain. Real power is in the hands of the defense headquarters. The rayon interior department exists, it is true, but in considerably truncated form: some people are on the other side of the barricades, some are living in another rayon, some are missing, and some have been killed, like Vasiliiy Guzitov, inspector of the children's department, when he went to Tskhinvali to call on his wife in the maternity home.

Znauri is living in the expectation of new attacks—like dozens of settlements, large and small, like the little village of Zivleti, to which I went from the rayon center. An appalling tragedy struck here, at the home of the Goginashvili Georgians. The youngest son, Valeriy, was captured by Georgian militants. He and his elder brother, Shota, had grown up among Ossetians and liked them, evidently, and the extremists did not forgive the brothers for this. Valeriy's corpse had been mutilated to such an extent that his own father failed to identify his son in the mortuary. Only his mother recognized him by an old scar on his hand.

"We have nothing against Georgians, of course," Znaur Gassiyev, first secretary of the Communist Party's South Ossetian Oblast Committee, told me. "It is a question of something else, some people would like to secede together with the Republic of Georgia from the Union, but South Ossetia does not...."

And, indeed, the conflict in the oblast obviously cannot, as elsewhere, be reduced merely to national discord. At the pickets defending the approaches to Tskhinvali I saw together with Ossetians both Russians and Georgians. Georgians are participating actively in the defense of Znauri. And it is no longer a question of what this place is called henceforth—South Ossetia or, Georgian-style, Samochablo—but of the difference of views on the self-determination of the small autonomy and its future. There is also a dispute of philosophies here, in which weapons have been, unfortunately, chosen as the decisive arguments. So might it, perhaps, be easier to achieve reconciliation also if there are no acute national contradictions?

It was with this question that I climbed to the State Automobile Inspection post at the entrance to Tskhinvali for an interview with Givi Kvantaliani, who was still commandant of the city at that time. It was not fortuitous that so exotic a venue for the meeting was chosen. The general preferred not to show himself in the capital of South Ossetia, which had been put in his charge,

choosing for his duty residence a small house at the State Automobile Inspection post fortified by sandbags and bristling with assault rifle and machine gun barrels, directly above the graves, where people of Tskhinvali have for decades buried their dead (it was for this that he acquired the sobriquet "cemetery commandant"). Givi Kvantaliani saw as the way out of the current situation people showing up for work immediately and the surrender of weapons to a man—not asking whether such an outcome was, following the January events and those that followed them, realistic....

So is there a way out? Unfortunately, the crisis of authority which has set in, the incomprehensible political games, personal ambitions, and indecisiveness have led to the flames of a real civil war rising up in South Ossetia. How else to call all that is going on involving the use of assault rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, rockets, armored equipment, mines, and mortars which has lasted without a break for three months now? And, I believe, it is no use looking for individual Ossetian militants and extremists. It is a question of considerable numbers of the male population, regardless of social situation, office, position, and education. Very many people are participating in this tragic struggle to some extent or other.... After all, they are having as yet to rely mainly on themselves. No one is rushing to defend them.

In Tskhinvali, like the world over, young boys play at war. But it is a long time since there were "our side" and "enemies" here; they now usually—and this is what is most disturbing—split up into "Georgians" and "Ossetians." And they dash across the waste land in a mood of self-forgetfulness, brandishing wooden assault rifles and pistols....

Georgian Law on Recalling Deputies

91US0383A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
6 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[Text "Law of the Republic of Georgia: 'On Procedure for Recalling a Member of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet'"]

[Text]

I. General Provisions

The legal relationship of a member of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet (a deputy elected to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet) with the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet and the political parties (political organizations, alliances, and movements and their political and electoral blocs), and also with the electorate, is built on the principle of the reversibility of powers, or the possibility of early suspension of those powers under the same procedure by which the powers are voluntarily given, inasmuch as the powers of a deputy may be suspended early only by the Supreme Soviet, which has recognized the powers of that deputy. The basis of early suspension of the powers of a deputy may be those cases as defined by the law of the Republic

of Georgia on the status of a member of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, and likewise enactments of recall of deputies by the electorate or by political parties. Proceeding from this:

- the right of raising the question of the recall of a deputy elected under the majority system rests with those who nominated him as a candidate for the post of deputy, namely, the group of electors in the appropriate electoral district or party (or bloc);
- the right of recall of a deputy elected under the majority system rest with those who elected him deputy, namely, the electors in the appropriate electoral district, under the same procedure by which he was elected as a deputy;
- the Supreme Soviet may suspend early the powers of a deputy elected under the majority system, on the basis of an enactment of recall of that deputy;
- the question of early suspension of powers of a deputy elected under the proportional system rests with the political party or bloc that nominated him for the post of deputy;
- the question of early suspension of powers of a deputy elected under the proportional system is decided by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

Article 1. Terminological Matters.

1) In this law a type "A" party is a party that participated in the election of deputies to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet in accordance with an independent party list, if as a result of the elections at least one candidate from that party list became a member of the Supreme Soviet.

2) A type "B" party is a party that participated in the elections in accordance with the party list of an electoral bloc.

3) A bloc is an association of parties that was an electoral bloc before the elections, regardless of whether or not its organizational integrity was preserved after the elections were held.

Article 2. Like all citizens of the Republic of Georgia, a member of the Supreme Soviet has the right to resign at any time from the party of which he was a member before elections were held, and become or not become a member of another party.

In this case, types "A" and "B" parties retain with respect to that deputy the right of raising the question of his recall from the Supreme Soviet.

II. Procedure for Recalling a Deputy Elected to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Under the Proportional System, and Suspending His Powers, and Procedure for Filling the Vacant Seat

Article 3. In order to raise the question of the recall of a deputy, the following holds:

- 1) On the basis of a decision taken by its highest republic organ (conference, congress, and so forth) as established

by its Charter, a type "A" or type "B" party appeals to the Supreme Soviet. When such decision is reached the party insures that at least two members of the Supreme Soviet Standing Credentials and Ethics Commission for Deputies are present at the meeting of its highest republic organ as established by its Charter.

2) With the support of a majority of the parties united within it (in accordance with Clause 1 of Article 3 of this Law), a bloc appeals to the Supreme Soviet.

Article 4. A type "A" party has the right to raise the question of the recall of any Supreme Soviet deputy who has been included on its party list since the day of the elections.

Article 5. A type "B" party has the right to raise the question of the recall from the Supreme Soviet of a deputy who before the elections was a member of a type "B" party and took part in the elections on the party ticket of the corresponding electoral bloc. After a type "B" party has reached such a decision, it appeals to the other parties united in the bloc for support.

Article 6. In the case of self-dissolution of a type "A" party or bloc, the question of the recall of a deputy elected to the Supreme Soviet on the party ticket is raised by the Supreme Soviet Standing Credentials and Ethics Commission for Deputies.

Article 7. In the case of the self-dissolution of a type "B" party, in accordance with Article 5 of this law the right of raising the question of the recall of a Supreme Soviet deputy who before the elections was a member of a type "B" party is exercised by the other parties united in the corresponding bloc.

Article 8. After the question of the recall of a deputy elected to the Supreme Soviet under the proportional system has been raised, the matter is reviewed by the Supreme Soviet on an individual basis for each such deputy. The deputy is deemed to have been recalled if the decision to do so is supported by at least three-fourths of the total number of members of the Supreme Soviet.

Article 9. In the event of the removal of a deputy elected to the Supreme Soviet under the proportional system, his seat in the Supreme Soviet is taken by a nominee for the post of deputy chosen from the party list of a type "A" party or bloc, to which end the leading figure of a type "A" party or the leading figure of a majority of type "B" parties united in a bloc submits a written application to the Supreme Soviet. The agreement of the nominee for the post of deputy is appended to the application.

III. Procedure for Recalling From the Supreme Soviet a Deputy Elected to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Under the Majority System and Early Suspension of His Powers, and Procedure for Filling the Vacant Seat

Chapter I. General Provisions.

Article 10. Following the recall of a deputy elected to the Supreme Soviet under the majority system, the Supreme Soviet issues a resolution suspending the powers of the deputy if it is established that the results of a vote in the corresponding electoral district to recall the deputy from the Supreme Soviet was not falsified.

Article 11. In the event of the recall of a deputy elected under the majority system, repeat elections are held in the corresponding electoral district in accordance with established procedure.

Article 12. With the agreement of a majority of voters in the corresponding electoral district, a member of the Supreme Soviet may be recalled at any time if his activity is at variance with the main theses of his election program.

Article 13. The recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is done by the voters of the corresponding electoral district on the basis of the direct universal election law, by secret ballot.

Article 14. The right of recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is defined by clauses 1, 3, and 4 of Articles 2 of the Law on Elections to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

Article 15. Voting for the recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is equal: Each voter has one vote. Citizens of the Republic of Georgia participate in the voting on equal terms.

Article 16. Voting for the recall of a deputy is direct: Voters recall a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet directly.

Article 17. Recall of a deputy is done by secret ballot. Monitoring of the will of the people is not permitted.

Article 18. Recall of a deputy is handled by electoral commissions chosen from among the representatives of political parties, public organizations and movements, labor collectives, the collectives in secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, and groups of voters in the Republic of Georgia.

Article 19. Citizens of the Republic of Georgia participate in the preparations for and carrying out of the recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet both through the political parties, public organizations and movements, and collectives at secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, and directly.

Article 20. A group of voters in the corresponding electoral district or the corresponding party has the right to raise the question of the recall of a deputy from the Supreme Soviet.

The question of recalling a member of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is raised when there is proper justification for so doing.

Article 21. Expenses connected with the preparations for and carrying out the recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet are borne by the state.

The approximate size of such expenses is first determined by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the actual size of expenses is established by the Central Electoral Commission handling elections to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

Article 22. Glasnost in the preparations for and carrying out of a recall, and also responsibility for violation of the law on recall are established by Article 11 and Part 1 of Article 12 of the Law on Elections to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

Article 23. A deputy recalled from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is banned for one term from being nominated as a candidate for the post of deputy to the Supreme Soviet or any organ of the local authorities.

Chapter II. Specifying a Recall.

Article 24. With the agreement of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Standing Credentials and Ethics Commission for Deputies the recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is specified by the Central Electoral Commission within a two-month period and not later than six months before the expiration of the term of power in the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

A report providing information on the day of the recall is published in the republic and local newspapers not later than 2 days after a recall has been specified.

Chapter III. Electoral Commissions.

Article 25. Recall of a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is done by the electoral commissions formed to hold the elections for deputies to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet:

- a) by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Central Electoral Commission;
- b) by the district electoral commissions for the election of deputies to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet;
- c) by the electoral commissions for the wards.

Chapter IV. Raising the Question of Recalling a Deputy of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

Article 26. When the question of recalling a deputy from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is raised, an initiative group made up of at least 10 people from among the voters in the corresponding electoral district submits a statement to the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Central Electoral Commission. In addition to the reason for the recall, the statement, which is signed by the members of the initiative group, lists their names, place of work, and place of residence, and the date that the statement was signed.

The corresponding party also enjoys the right to form an initiative group.

Article 27. The initiative group is issued with a certificate of registration of its statement to the Central Electoral Commission, and is also given the right to collect signatures from voters in the district in connection with the issue. Each page of the signed document contains a text agreed by the initiative group with the Central Electoral Commission, and the handwritten names, addresses, and passport numbers of those who sign, the date of signing, and the signature of each voter. The pages are numbered. Each page is witnessed by the signatures of all members of the initiative group.

Article 28. Within a two-week period the initiative group collects signatures of supporting voters numbering at least 10 percent of the total number of voters in the district.

Article 29. On instructions from the Central Electoral Commission, the district electoral commission together with an assigned member of the Supreme Soviet has two weeks to check the validity of the supporting signatures on a random basis. In the event that 5 percent of the total number of signatures of supporting voters are not validated (an appropriate document is drawn up in each such case), the Central Electoral Commission suspends the activity of the initiative group on the basis of representation from the district electoral commission.

Article 30. A demand on the question of the recall of a deputy made by an initiative group in accordance with the requirements of this law is sent within a three-day period to the Central Electoral Commission, which within a two-day period passes all documents to the Supreme Soviet Standing Credentials and Ethics Commission for Deputies.

Article 31. The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Standing Credentials and Ethics Commission for Deputies has one week to review the materials relating to the recall of a Supreme Soviet deputy and assign the Central Electoral Commission the task of providing for a vote on the recall of the Supreme Soviet deputy for the given electoral district.

Chapter V. The Recall Ballot Paper.

Compilation and preparation of a recall ballot paper are done in accordance with Article 41 of the Law on Elections.

Chapter VI. Guarantees for the Activity of a Deputy Recalled from the Supreme Soviet. Guarantees for the Initiative Group.

Article 32. Until the results are determined with respect to a recall from the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, the deputy still exercises the powers established for the status of member of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

Guarantees for the deputy and for the initiative group are guaranteed by parts 2 and 3 of Article 42, parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 44, and Articles 48 and 49 of the Law on Elections.

Chapter VII. Procedure for Voting and Determining the Results of a Recall

Procedure for voting and determining the results of a recall is in accordance with Articles 50, 51, 52, and 53 of the Law on Elections.

Article 33. On the basis of the records obtained, electoral commissions for the wards, the district electoral commission determine the following: the number of unused ballot papers, the total number of voters for the electoral district, the number of those participating in the recall voting, the number of votes cast for each item, and the number of ballot papers deemed to have been spoiled.

A deputy is deemed to have been recalled if his recall is supported by more than half of those participating in the voting, and the recall is deemed to have been approved.

The recall is deemed to be approved if more than half of the total number of voters in the electoral district participated.

The district electoral commission may deem a recall vote invalid for electoral wards where there has been gross violation of this law. Complaints about such violation are submitted to the district electoral commission no later than the day after voting day.

In the event that a recall vote is not deemed approved, no repeat ballot is taken. In this case the candidate retains his status as a member of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

The district electoral commission confirms the results of the voting at its own meeting, and compiles the record.

Three copies of the record are made. Each copy of the record is signed by the commission chairman, his deputy, the secretary, and the members of the commission, and a seal is attached.

The first copy of the record and the unused ballot papers are sent no later than three days after the recall vote to the Central Electoral Commission in accordance with procedure established by it. The second copy is retained by the district electoral commission itself, and the third is sent to the agent of the recall candidate.

Article 34. On the basis of the record received from the district electoral commission, the Central Electoral Commission confirms the results of the recall vote carried out and within two days, in accordance with procedure established by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Standing Credentials and Ethics Commission for Deputies, provides that commission with the necessary information.

Within five days after the results have been determined, the Central Electoral Commission reports the results of the recall via the republic newspapers and television and radio.

Article 35. If the vote is deemed invalid in one or more of the electoral wards, a repeat ballot is conducted only for those wards.

A repeat ballot is done within one week of the recall vote and its results are determined under the procedure established for the first round of voting.

[Signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Tbilisi, 27 February 1991

Georgian Law Creates New Local Administration Organs

91US0336A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
9 Feb 91 p 2

["Law of the Republic of Georgia on Local Government During the Period of Transition"]

[Text]General Provisions

Article 1. Local government

Local government is an integral part of the Republic of Georgia's authority and government charged with resolving problems in existing administrative-territorial units in the period of transition.

Article 2. Principles of organization and activity of local government.

The principles of organization and activity of local government are:

- rule of law;
- protection of the rights and lawful interests of citizens;
- justice;
- glasnost and due regard for public opinion;
- efficiency and prevention of bureaucratism;
- unity of republic and local interests;
- due regard for ethnic traditions and customs;
- accountability to the highest organs of authority and government and to the population.

Chapter 1. Local Government Organs and Their Authority

Article 3. System of local government

Local government on the territory subordinate to it includes local organs of authority and government and social-territorial self-government.

1. The following are rural (settlement, volost [small administrative unit]) and urban (in the case of cities subordinate to rayons) organs of local government:

- the rural (settlement, volost) assembly and the urban assembly is the representative organ of power elected by the population;
- the council or the official—the manager—is the executive organ elected by the rural (settlement, volost) assembly;
- the council is the executive organ elected by the urban assembly;
- organs of social self-government.

The territory subordinate to rural local government includes the territory of one or several villages. This question is decided by the prefect at the behest of organs of social-territorial self-government.

2. The following are organs of local government of a rayon of republic subordination (the Republic of Georgia or an autonomous republic) or of a city (not divided into rayons and administratively subordinate to a rural rayon) of republic (the Republic of Georgia or an autonomous republic) subordination:

- the rayon assembly—the representative organ of authority;
- the prefecture headed by a prefect—the local organ of state government;
- organs of social self-government.

The following are members of the rayon assembly:

- secretaries of rural (settlement, volost) and urban (in cities of rayon subordination) assemblies;
- members—the number of which is specified in legislation of the Republic of Georgia—elected from rural (settlement, volost) and urban (in cities of rayon subordination) assemblies.

3. The following are organs of local government of city (in cities divided into rayons) and republic (Republic of Georgia, autonomous republic) subordination:

- the urban assembly—the representative organ of authority;
- the prefecture headed by a prefect—the local organ of authority;
- organs of social self-government.

The following are members of the urban assembly:

- secretaries of city rayon assemblies elected by the population;
- members—the number of which is specified in legislation of the Republic of Georgia—elected from city rayon assemblies.

The following are organs of local government of a city rayon of republic (Republic of Georgia, autonomous republic) subordination:

- the city rayon assembly—the representative organ of authority elected by the population;
- the council—the executive organ elected by the city rayon assembly;
- organs of social self-government.

4. The following are organs of local government of a city (not divided into rayons) of republic (Republic of Georgia, autonomous republic) subordination:

- the urban assembly—the representative organ of authority elected by the population;
- the council—the executive organ elected by the assembly;
- the prefecture headed by a prefect—the local organ of state government;
- organs of social self-government.

5. The following are organs of local government of a city (when the city is not divided into rayons and when there is a rayon that bears the same name as the city) of republic (Republic of Georgia, autonomous republic) subordination:

- the urban assembly—the representative organ of authority elected by the population;
- the council—the executive organ elected by the assembly;
- the prefecture headed by a prefect—the local organ of state government.

A single prefecture is created and a single prefect is appointed in such a city and in the corresponding rayon.

Article 4. Local representative organs of authority

1. The organization, procedure of activity, and jurisdiction of a rural (settlement, volost), urban (in the case of a city of rayon subordination), city (city of republic subordination), and city rayon assembly are specified in the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, in this law and other laws of the Republic of Georgia, and in the assembly's regulations which are ratified by the prefect.

2. Members of rural (settlement, volost), urban (in the case of a city of rayon subordination), city (city of republic subordination), and city rayon assemblies are elected to a 3-year term by the population of the respective administrative-territorial unit on the basis of general and direct suffrage and a secret ballot according to the procedure established by law.

Assemblies of rayon cities and of cities which are divided into rayons and which are of republic subordination are elected according to the procedure established by law by assemblies of subordinate territories.

3. Principal forms of the assembly's activity.

The principal forms of the assembly's activity are:

- the assembly session;
- the activity of assembly members in their electoral districts;
- the work of assembly commissions.

4. The organization of the assembly session.

The first session of a newly elected assembly is convened by the appropriate electoral commission no later than 10 days after the elections if at least two-thirds of the

assembly's membership have been elected by that time. The next session is convened by the secretary of the assembly at his own initiative, at the demand of the prefect, one-third of the assembly's total membership, or a number of voters of a given administrative unit defined in the regulations of a given assembly.

Pending the election of the assembly secretary, the first session of the newly elected assembly is conducted by the chairman of the corresponding electoral commission.

5. Questions addressed at an assembly session.

The following questions are addressed exclusively at an assembly session:

- adoption and amendment of assembly regulations;
- determination of basic directions of social and economic development of the administrative-territorial unit;
- ratification of the local budget and report of its execution;
- election and release of the assembly secretary and his deputy from office;
- election of the council, the approval of the council chairman and the manager;
- formation of the credentials commission, the auditing commission, and temporary commissions;
- measures related to the protection of nature and local taxes and fees.

6. The assembly secretary.

The assembly is directed by its secretary who is elected by secret ballot for a three-year term from the membership of the respective assembly. The same person may not be elected secretary to more than two consecutive terms.

The assembly secretary:

- convenes and conducts assembly sessions;
- coordinates the activity of assembly commissions;
- signs resolutions of assembly sessions.

At the behest of the assembly secretary, the assembly elects the assembly's deputy secretary to a 3-year term.

The deputy secretary may perform the functions of the assembly's secretary if the secretary is temporarily unable to perform his duties, if the secretary is absent, or at the direct behest of the secretary.

In the event of the resignation of the assembly's secretary or the existence of insurmountable obstacles to the performance of his functions as secretary, the deputy secretary will become the secretary of the assembly.

The deputy secretary of the assembly:

- prepares the necessary documents for assembly sessions;
- takes care of business correspondence;
- performs other obligations assigned to him by the assembly's regulations.

Article 5. Local state government organs

1. Prefect and prefecture

The prefecture headed by the prefect is a local organ of state authority in a rayon and city of republic subordination.

The structure and jurisdiction of the prefecture are defined in the appropriate law.

The prefect is the highest official in cities of rayon and republic subordination. The prefect protects republic interests and implements the decisions of higher organs of state authority and government.

The prefect is appointed with the consent of the Republic of Georgia's Council of Ministers at the behest of the Chairman of the Republic of Georgia's Supreme Soviet and is released from office by the Presidium of the Republic of Georgia's Supreme Soviet. The prefect is accountable to the Republic of Georgia's Supreme Soviet, to its Presidium, and to the Republic of Georgia's Council of Ministers. The prefect's term of office is four years. The same person may not be appointed prefect for more than two consecutive terms.

Prefects of rayons of autonomous republics and cities of republic (autonomous republic) subordination are appointed with the consent of the council of ministers of the autonomous republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia at the behest of the chairman of the supreme soviet of the autonomous republic and are released from office by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia.

2. The prefect's jurisdiction

In order to carry out his functions, the prefect:

- directs state, economic, and sociocultural development on the basis of the decisions of higher organs of authority and government and of the appropriate assembly;
- guides and directs the activity of the prefecture;
- forms the prefect's cabinet and departments, administrations and services of the prefecture; appoints officials;
- approves the assemblies' regulations;
- appoints and releases heads of locally owned enterprises, institutions and organizations;
- rescinds acts adopted by assemblies that do not conform with the legislation of the Republic of Georgia;
- generally supervises lower organs of local government and rescinds acts adopted by them which do not conform with the legislation of the Republic of Georgia;
- performs representative functions both within and outside an administrative-territorial unit on the basis of legislation of the Republic of Georgia;
- concludes contracts and agreements;
- exercises state control over the use of all land and mineral and natural resources situated on a given

territory and resolves problems related to the use of land and natural resources on the basis of legislation of the Republic of Georgia;

- halts corresponding work in the event that an enterprise, institution, organization or citizen violates legislation on the protection of nature, on land use and on the use of natural or labor resources, sanitation and financial legislation, and legislation on health care;
- organizes the compilation of the corresponding local budget and the execution of the approved budget;
- if necessary, raises the question before the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia of terminating the authority of the assembly and of holding new elections;
- directs subordinate internal affairs organs and ensures the preservation of public order;
- within the limits of his jurisdiction, promulgates orders that are binding on the entire territory of local government;
- orders of the prefect are suspended by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia and by the council of ministers of the autonomous republic;
- orders of the prefect are rescinded by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia at its initiative and on the basis of procuratorial supervisory materials regarding the prefect's activity and also by the court in cases specified by law.

3. The rural, settlement, volost; urban (with the exception of cities that are divided into rayons and that are of republic subordination), and city rayon council

The rural (settlement, volost, city, city rayon) council or manager is the executive and administrative organ of the rural (settlement, volost, city) assembly. The council includes the chairman and members of the council;

- the rural (settlement, volost, city, city rayon) assembly elects the chairman of a rural (settlement, volost, city, city rayon) council or manager at the behest of the prefect for its tenure from the membership of the assembly;
- a member of a rural (settlement, volost, city, city rayon) council, with the exception of the chairman (manager), may not be a deputy.

4. Principal areas in the activity of the council (manager)

The jurisdiction of the council (manager) is defined in the regulations of the corresponding assembly.

In the area of organizational support of the work of the assembly, the council (manager):

- supervises the implementation of the decisions of the prefect, the assembly, and the council;
- assists assembly members in the performance of their functions.

In order to carry out assembly functions, the council (manager):

- directs the activity of locally owned enterprises, institutions and organizations;
- coordinates and monitors the work of enterprises, institutions and organizations operating on subordinate territory, regardless of their departmental affiliation;
- secures the integrated socioeconomic development of subordinate territory;
- organizes the drafting of the budget and secures its execution;
- examines declarations by citizens, summarizes proposals that are received, and makes appropriate decisions regarding them;
- decides personnel matters within its jurisdiction;
- makes decisions and issues orders.

5. The credentials commission, auditing commission, and temporary commissions

At its first session, the assembly elects assembly members to the credentials and auditing commissions for the period of its tenure.

The auditing commission monitors the execution of the assembly's decisions and verifies the financial activity of the council and local government officials.

The assembly may form temporary commissions. They may include persons who are not members of the assembly.

Article 6. Socioterritorial self-government

The population of a village (settlement, volost) participates in self-government through general meetings and in other forms of direct and representative democracy.

Social councils of microrayons and residential complexes, housing committees and other social forms of self-organization of the population are organs of social self-government in cities.

The activity of organs of socioterritorial self-government is based on the regulations (statutes) registered by the appropriate assembly. The right of a juridical person may be assigned to organs of socio-territorial self-government under the established procedure.

Chapter 2. Economic Principles of Local Government

Article 7. The economic bases of local government

Natural resources of the subordinate territory (the land, its minerals, water, forests, the vegetable and animal world); local property and other types of property that constitute a source of income for local government and a means of satisfying the socioeconomic needs of the population of a given territory are the economic foundations of local government.

The right of local government to natural resources and objects not related to local property is defined in this law and the legislation of the Republic of Georgia and the autonomous republics.

Article 8. Local property

Local property is the basis of the local economy. The right to possess, use, and dispose of it in the name of the population of the subordinate territory is exercised by the appropriate organ of management or by the juridical and physical persons having this right.

The following may be local property: the communal housing fund and public utilities; transport, trade and consumer services enterprises; public education, culture and health institutions; production complexes and enterprises in industry, construction and agriculture; local budget funds; securities (stocks, bonds, etc.); scientific and technical, technological, and other types of information; miscellaneous real estate and movable property required for the solution of problems confronting the corresponding government.

The activity of privately owned enterprises, institutions and organizations is defined in the legislation of the Republic of Georgia and the autonomous republics.

Article 9. Foundations of local property

Local property right originates:

- through the transfer of state property to local government, under the procedure established by law;
- through the acquisition or creation of new objects by organs of local government;
- in the event of transactions concluded by an organ of local government under the procedure established by law and also on the basis of transactions that are not provided for in law but that do not contradict the law;
- in cases that are classified among civil legal consequences by legislation of the Republic of Georgia (in the event of the death of a citizen and the transfer of escheated property to organs of government, etc.).

Article 10. Local economy

The aggregate of enterprises, institutions and organizations situated on subordinate territory for the purpose of satisfying production needs and the social needs of the local population comprises the local economy; local property is its basis; other types of property may also be part of the local economy on a voluntary basis; municipal economy, industrial, agricultural, construction, communications, health care, education, cultural, consumer services, transportation, nature conservation, social security, repair-construction, sports, recreational, and other enterprises, organizations and institutions may be part of the local economy.

Article 11. The government's economic jurisdiction

Government organs have the appropriate rights and obligations, the sum of which constitutes their economic jurisdiction, for the purpose of ensuring the efficient management of the local economy.

1. An organ of government is entitled:

- to create enterprises, organizations and institutions;
- to condemn, lease out, and transfer locally owned entities for total economic or operational management; to reprivatize;
- to establish benefits for enterprises, organizations and institutions encouraging them to create new jobs on subordinate territory, and to develop the social and production infrastructure;
- to establish additional requirements in the area of environmental protection on the subordinate territory, to stop the operation or construction of projects that are ecologically unsafe and endanger the life and health of the population;
- to give priority to enterprises, organizations and institutions which are locally owned and are part of the local economy in concluding contracts for local government orders;
- to monitor and rectify sales prices of goods and services on the subordinate territory within the limits established by the law; to carry out antimonopolistic measures;
- to conclude contracts and agreements on economic cooperation with other local governments, enterprises, organizations and citizens;
- to participate in foreign economic relations in accordance with legislative procedures.

2) An organ of local government has the obligation:

- to concern itself with the development of the economic and social infrastructure, and with improving the population's living conditions. Accordingly it:
- creates favorable conditions for protecting the population's health and for developing medical institutions;
- establishes a favorable system of service to the population by trade, public catering, consumer and transport enterprises, cultural institutions, physical culture and sports organizations, and childcare institutions;
- keeps cadastral records on natural resources on subordinate territory, and takes economic-ecological inventory of production-economic and other objects;
- creates favorable conditions enabling citizens to develop traditional entrepreneurship and enabling local government enterprises, institutions and organizations to carry out the tasks confronting them and to satisfy the population's needs.

Losses sustained by citizens, enterprises, institutions, and organizations as a result of the fulfillment of the instructions of a local organ of government or government official or as a result of a local government organ's improper performance of its duties are compensated by that organ of government or by the government official responsible for the losses. Disputes concerning the compensation of losses are decided by the court or arbitration organs in accordance with legislation.

Article 12. Relations of organs of local government with enterprises, organizations and institutions that are not locally owned

Relations of organs of local government with enterprises, organizations and institutions that are not locally owned are regulated by contracts concluded with them or are carried out on a legislatively defined tax basis.

Article 13. The financial base of local government

The finances of local government comprise the financial base of the activity of local government; within the limits of their jurisdiction, organs of local government carry out measures on the basis of local finances in order to solve socioeconomic and political problems in a given territory.

Article 14. The local financial system

The local financial system consists of: the local budget, nonbudget resources, special local funds, finances of local government enterprises and organizations, and voluntary contributions of enterprises, organizations and private persons, used in solving socioeconomic problems of a given territory.

Article 15. Local budget revenues

Local budget revenues form from taxes on enterprises, organizations, institutions, and the population of a given territory that are paid in accordance with the tax law of the Republic of Georgia and from other receipts and contributions that are collected (paid) in accordance with decisions of local government organs from loans, subsidies, subventions, and bank loans obtained from superior budgets;

- withholdings from state taxes to the local budget are based on fixed rates set by the appropriate legislation;
- local budget revenues include taxes and fines from enterprises, institutions, associations, and organizations belonging to the local economy; income from the sale or leasing of the property of local organs of government; income taxes from collective farms; taxes from the sale or leasing of property belonging to organs of local government; tax on industry and trade, on health resorts, and on agriculture; tax on means of transport and self-propelled mechanisms; tax on building owners; land tax; tax on timber income; state duties; and other income in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia;
- in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia, local budget revenues include part of the withholdings from state payments and revenues; from turnover tax, personal income tax, tax on the profits of enterprises and organizations that are situated on subordinate territory and which do not belong to the local economy; other income.

Organs of city and rayon local government may form nonbudget funds: from voluntary contributions of enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, cooperatives, and voluntary contributions from the population; from the sale

of local loan bonds; from income obtained from economic and social measures carried out on subordinate territory, from various taxes established by them, and from charitable donations.

Article 16. Local budget expenditures

The local budget is used to develop education, culture, health, social security, physical culture and sport, and the local economy; for ecological improvements and for financing other measures; for maintaining local organs of government; for covering bank and other loans; for budget credits, subsidies, subventions and subsidies to local organs of self-government; and for other measures which, in accordance with existing legislation, are subject to financing from the local budget.

Article 17. The local government foreign currency fund

In accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Georgia, organs of local government form foreign currency funds from the currency income of enterprises and organizations situated on their territory.

Article 18. Taxation rights of organs of local government

In accordance with legislation of the Republic of Georgia, organs of local government may approve or rescind local taxes and contributions.

Article 19. Relations between republic and local budgets

Relations between republic and local budgets are regulated by the Law of the Republic of Georgia on budget rights and taxes.

Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman, Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia

Tbilisi, 29 January 1991

Georgian Local Poll Preparations Completed

PM1203150791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from IZVESTIYA, TASS, POSTFACTUM, REUTERS, UPI roundup: "Assemblies Instead of Soviets"]

[Text] The first stage in the preparations for elections of the local organs of power—assemblies [sobraniye]—which will replace the former soviets of people's deputies came to an end 7 March in Georgia.

The elections will be held under the majority proportional system. Some 28 parties have put forward their candidates for the deputies' mandates.

The Central Electoral Commission has announced that no elections are planned in South Ossetia, TASS reports.

Central Asia

Kirghiz President Charts New Political, Economic Course

91US0343A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 29 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Report by the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan A Akayev at the Third Session of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Economic Policy and Political Situation of the Republic"]

[Text] Before discussing the economic program of the Cabinet of Ministers, I should like to focus upon one very important aspect of it.

Virtually all the basic decisions of a legal nature that have been made over the past two months, either by me or at the initiative of the republic Supreme Soviet, have been designed largely to upgrade the activities of state government agencies and to extend the rights and responsibilities of local self-government bodies. The further strengthening of state power, together with the pertinent laws and decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet, have formed the legal foundation for the passage of powerful economic programs and for implementing a social policy directed to these ends. I want to take note of one fact. Without the presence of a powerful state, any decisions with regard to economic or social affairs would have hung suspended in air; for they would have lacked the legal sanctions and mechanisms to carry them out. Only after the passage of appropriate legislation has it become possible to draft the fundamental guidelines for the Cabinet of Ministers in the areas of economics, social policy, science, and cultural affairs.

We have all witnessed the tense situation that has developed in the republic economy. There has been a total reduction in the rate of economic growth with the increased instability of the national economy; a disruption of the money flow; a lower volume of production of agricultural products; and an overall reduction in productivity. The republic substantially lags behind in terms of Union indicators for the per capita consumption of meat, milk, eggs, and potatoes. There are disproportions in capital construction that are yet to be overcome. The value of unfinished construction during the period since 1985 has risen from R850 million to R1.3 billion. During the preceding Five-Year Plan there was a decline of R346 million in the republic economy—this is four times the planned amount. During the same period, the level of nonproductive expenditures and losses amounted to R1.2 billion, 80 percent is attributable to the results of economic activity. Meanwhile, the subsistence minimum increased in just the past year by more than five percent, while the purchasing power of the ruble for consumers fell more than six percent. This loss of purchasing power had a substantial impact upon people with total incomes of less than R75 per month, who form a third of the total population in the republic.

Matters pertaining to the development of the social infrastructure remain largely unresolved. The index of infant mortality remains high; it exceeds by a factor of 1.4 the Union average. At present the number of unemployed in the republic economy is 140,000, a figure that has remained stable for the past five years. As you can see, the situation is indeed fraught with tension, and if we take into consideration qualitative characteristics, it is becoming critical. This crisis manifests itself in the following ways:

- a chronic lag in economic growth rates behind those of demographic growth, which has the effect of increasing the shortage of resources available for the purposes of development, while aggravating the state of financial dependence upon the center, reducing social services, and lowering the standard of living.
- a republic economic structure that is obsolescent, representing essentially a pattern of backwardness, a pattern of dependence—and pattern of inequality.
- a substantial weakening of national, inter-republic economic ties.

We must take into consideration the powerful potential for precipitating a crisis inherent in the state of social separation and alienation that exists between urban and rural areas. At the present time they differ primarily in terms of their forms and standards of living, their predominant values and economic incentives, and the extent of their willingness to undergo the transformation to market conditions.

It is scarcely legitimate simply to label all negative economic and social factors. It is necessary to reveal and to analyze the causal factors giving rise to this situation, some of which are of external origin. I should like to focus upon just two of these factors.

First, there are peculiarities of our psychology. Unfortunately, the vast majority of us have lost that vitally important trait of knowing how to work. An absence of personal enterprise, irresponsibility, and a lack of commitment, coupled with a parasitical sense of social dependence, is becoming increasingly characteristic of us.

Second, there is an absence of economic strategy which we have worked out for ourselves. In effect, the republic has emulated what has been going on elsewhere in the Union, adopting economic practices for negative reasons, without working out or adopting any economic policy of its own. The mistakes of the Union government have thus been reproduced in the republic, and every new economic reform has been implemented without regard for national or regional peculiarities.

A consequence of all this has been the political and economic apathy of the population and a low level of trust in political and economic institutions.

In view of the above-mentioned circumstances and causal factors, we must become fully aware of the complex and contradictory character of the prospective

changes, and we must determine not only the path of future development but the very mechanism of economic and social renewal.

It has already be noted that a weakness of previous economic decisions lay in inadequately evaluating the distinctive features of our economic and social development. Actually, the economic patterns that have been formed in the republic as a result of industrialization are paradoxical. Large-scale enterprises of processing industries, for example, were constructed in centers of industrial development. They operated basically with imported raw materials, completing semifinished goods, and they attracted specialists and a skilled work force from beyond the boundaries of the republic. Essentially, these enterprises amounted to islands of industry, virtually excluded from the local production process. On the other hand, agricultural raw materials were as a rule almost totally exported out of the republic for processing. All this had important economic and social consequences. Urban and rural areas became not only economically separated; they became socially alienated one from another.

A key aspect of our development is the existing discrepancy in the rates of economic growth and demographic growth. Whereas the former, economic growth, has been determined by the underlying dynamics of production, which is concentrated in the cities, democratic population growth originates primarily in local areas where the major part of the republic population is situated. This complex problem can only be resolved by a combination of things, including a well-conceived agrarian policy, the development of small-scale industries in rural areas, the use of new technology, and engaging the interests and incentives of people in the production process.

Another aspect of our situation is the so-called "hunger for investment." A lack of investment capital is already assuming critical proportions, and as experience as demonstrated, it is an inherent part of an economic pattern characterized by a high consumption of resources that are in short supply.

The inability to compete in industrial production, making it impossible to export to world markets, became the crucial characteristic of our attempts at scientific, technical, and technological progress. This absence of a developmental base and isolation from world markets serves as the underlying cause of a low degree of social, economic, and technological integration of our society.

In connection with the transition to market relations, I should like to dwell on certain matters which, although economic and social in nature, nevertheless are also of vital political significance.

First, there is the problem of attracting investment. In view of the existing level of backwardness and and the acuteness of social problems, it is quite impossible to plan on making any major achievements without investments. In a closed economy that is burdened with domestic problems, the market mechanism as a rule is of

little effectiveness and tends to wind down. The lack of resources provides no opportunity to develop technologically up-to-date enterprises capable of competing, and economic activity is further constrained by small-scale cottage industries and by commercial middlemen.

A second problem arises in a mixed economy from the persistence of forms of economic activity based wholly or in part upon the principle of barter exchange.

Such forms of economic activity have as a rule an agrarian base, characterized by little market activity and rather low productivity. It is clear that we must devise a system of state support for these small-scale agrarian patterns; for a significant section of the rural population is engaged in them. Such people are still not prepared to employ modern methods of production since no other opportunities for the use of their labor exist owing to the shortage of accumulated capital resources. In this situation, the persistence of farming on auxiliary private plots, mostly for barter exchange or personal subsistence, plays the role of a social shock-absorber, inasmuch as it preserves a means of self-sufficiency for hundreds of thousands of people living in rural areas. Obviously, these forms of farming activity must be strengthened and broadened.

A third problem arises in connection with the migration of youth to the cities. The underlying reason for this exodus is a lack of public service construction at the village level and the absence of employment opportunity. Those who leave the villages are unable to find permanent employment in the cities because of the practice of required registration as well as because of a shortage of housing. It is this lack of opportunity that is creating a ring of tension around our major cities. And it is from the ranks of displaced youth that the basis of the populist movements is recruited. These factors in their entirety exert a destabilizing influence upon the political scene and tend to grow into a chronic social malaise.

In my judgment it will be an unforgivable mistake on our part if in the economic program of the government we do not establish a mechanism for resolving these economic, social, and political problems.

I will now take up the basic directions of the economic program of the Cabinet of Ministers.

First. In regard to rural areas, it is necessary to institute a policy of preferential economic treatment in order to achieve as soon as possible the following goals:

- resolution of the problem of providing for the public food supply;
- establishment of the social infrastructure in rural localities;
- development of small-scale industrial enterprise in rural areas;
- stabilization of the economic situation among segments of the rural population least adaptable to market conditions. Here, in rural areas, of course, there are many more such people than in the cities.

The means of achieving these goals are primarily economic in character (credit at favorable terms, tax privileges, formation of the infrastructure of economic support services, etc.).

To achieve these goals in the foreseeable future, a program should be worked out for the accelerated development of small and mid-sized cities as centers of attraction for the excess rural population and as structural counterweights to the major cities.

The proposed policy of giving maximum preferential treatment to rural areas will, from the standpoint of the cities, probably result in a certain outflow of resources to rural areas. The reverse side of this process, however, will be a letup in rural migration and a strengthening of economic ties between cities and villages. This undoubtedly will be contributory factor in the growth of market processes in urban as well as in rural areas.

Village enterprise, the development of which is an essential element of the government program, should include the creation of a large number of small enterprises and the encouragement of small-scale private enterprise in the villages (in services, the building industry, the processing of agricultural products, and other industries).

A key integral part of this policy should be the establishment in rural areas of "zones of industrial development" as the sites of industrial construction by the state on a priority basis, in which preferential treatment will be given to local enterprise in terms of taxation, credit, equipment, the allocation of land parcels, etc.

All the measures enumerated above will be directed at achieving the important goal of providing full employment for the population. Of course, full employment of everyone capable of working is a task that is not only economic but political. In touching upon the employment problem I should like to point out an entirely new function to be performed by the State Committee on Labor and Social Protection in the transition to market conditions. This is working out the social policy and the means of providing social support; identifying those segments of the population that are most in need of this support; and, ultimately, solving the problem of resource allocation for the many social programs.

It should be noted that it will be possible to carry out the agrarian policy only in the event that a new system of government is instituted in the agrarian sector. Economic support will yield insignificant economic results if it is rendered through the Ministry of Agriculture, as it exists at present, with its immense administrative apparatus and extremely inefficient system of economic management.

Second. Two or three branches are to be singled out for preferential economic treatment so that they may serve as a base for the development of fundamental structural changes in the future. Among them may be designated agriculture, light industry, electronics, handicrafts, and innovative forms of tourism.

To attract foreign investments, loans, credits, and the latest technology, it is incumbent upon us to review our legislative acts and other regulatory statutes and to create the proper economic, organizational, and legal conditions under which to attract foreign capital.

Third. To achieve competitive forms of property ownership, together with a partial saturation of the market in terms of goods and services, privatization is envisioned for small-scale or small-size enterprises in the fields of commerce, food services, domestic services, local industry, the building industries, and motor vehicle transport.

Four. An entirely new kind of political, economic, and human relations with developed countries of the East and West are needed. In this connection the Cabinet of Ministers must devise an integrated conceptual scheme for foreign economic and political affairs. Experience shows that self-isolation with respect to political ideas leads to isolation in terms of information, technology, and economics. We cannot permit this to happen.

Five. A review of all cadre policy up to the present is necessary. We face the task not only of replenishing the pool of key personnel but of reviewing the existing system of training specialists from secondary to higher schools. On a practical plane we must address the task of forming a stratum of nationally minded industrialists—that is, a social segment, well versed in the distinctive aspects of our national culture, who know the incentive system, who are familiar with our national and cultural traditions, and who can alleviate to some extent the tensions inherent in forming a system of market relations.

Six. We must develop financial lending institutions oriented to the sale of securities and to the formation of a market infrastructure, consisting of a network of commercial banks, commodity and stock exchanges, and accounting firms.

In summarizing the program as a whole, I should like to recognize one important distinguishing feature of the government's economic course. It is one designed to create a heterogeneous, multifaceted economy—that is, one in which will coexist not only various kinds of property ownership, and various forms of management, but built-in social safeguards for the weak and defenseless. The state will protect only the weak. It is the task of the strong to seek out the ways and means to economic growth.

Comrade deputies!

The republic government's economic program that I have set forth must be established on a firm legal foundation.

At the present session, as well as at subsequent sessions, of the KiSSR Supreme Soviet, it is incumbent upon this body to enact a number of important laws. Among them

is the Law on Peasant Agriculture; the Law on Enterprises; the Law on Entrepreneurial Activities; The Law on Investments and Investing Activities; the Law on Banks and Banking Activities; the Law on Agricultural Cooperatives; the Law on Consumer Cooperatives; the Law on the Taxation of Enterprises and Organizations; the Law on the Taxation of Citizens; and the Law on Foreign Economic Activities. It is also necessary to pass a new Code of Land Laws and revised versions of the Civil Code and the Code of Labor Laws.

In short, we are faced with a legislative task that is immense in its magnitude and formidable in its content.

It is my conviction that we must think through a strategy for carrying out this legislative activity now. We must determine its organizational forms and required complement of specialists. We must establish considerably more clear-cut and closer relations at the operational level between the staffs of the president and of the Supreme Soviet.

In addition to the legislation pending at its Spring 1991 session, the KiSSR Supreme Soviet should undertake a review of such legal matters as land reform, agreements between the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and other Union republics, and agreements between the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and foreign countries.

The ukases issued by the president are also called upon to play a key role in the system of providing legal protection for the economic program of the government.

As you know, two ukases were issued on 21 January. They are: "On the Indexation of Income and Social Assistance for Citizens of Insufficient Means"; and: "On Provisional Measures to Protect the Interests of Republic Consumers."

The first of these ukases was occasioned by the price rise in consumer goods and services, and, related to it, the necessity of increasing the legal protection of earned income and the savings of citizens. Among the contributing factors for the second ukase was a deterioration of conditions in the republic consumer market; an increase in the number of law violations in connection with the distribution of goods, including many in short supply; and a number of other negative tendencies pertaining to interference with consumer interests.

The overall purpose of these ukases is to soften the impact of market conditions on citizens, especially those who are in need of special assistance. I have in mind particularly citizens of insufficient means.

As is evident from the content of the ukases, they envision a number of legal safeguards, constraints, and prohibitions—that is, a broad range of legal resources to afford social protection.

I wish to inform the Supreme Soviet that in the very near future I intend to issue ukazes enlarging upon this aspect of state activity, expressing both the thought and content of the national legal policy of our republic in this regard.

Comrade deputies!

Economic reform—as has been emphasized more than once—is inseparably linked to political reform. To carry out in a successful and single-minded way political reform, the essentials of which are defined in a declaration of policy delivered at the 28th Party Congress as a transition from an authoritarian bureaucratic order to a democratic order, it is important to realize precisely what should be reformed and what should be repudiated.

First of all, what should be repudiated in the political life of the republic? Unlimited party power in the form of administrative monopoly.

In this matter I should like to be correctly understood. As a communist I am a staunch advocate of those democratic and humanistic values that the party is currently proclaiming. I believe that only a profound and thoroughgoing democratization of every phase of party life is capable of converting the party into a force that can make a worthy contribution to the process of bringing about wanted social change.

At the same time, I submit, the process is likewise socially necessary by which the party will turn over the functions of state public business which it has been administering (generally, by fiat) to state bodies and agencies of local self-government.

In this connection the importance of the draft Law on Local Self-Government, which has been submitted for your attention, comrade deputies, is difficult to overestimate.

With respect to the tenets and basic provisions of this law, I have already addressed this topic in a message to the Supreme Soviet. Let me take this opportunity to convey my sincere gratitude to the commissions of the Supreme Soviet for the fact that, in dealing with the work of the soviets and with matters of law and legality, they found it possible to take into consideration the key points of this message in preparing the final draft of the proposed legislation.

Without repeating what I stated in this message, I should like to express certain thoughts in presenting for your review the draft Law on Local Self-Government.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is the first republic of the Union to establish on the legislative level a genuine division between state administration and local self-government. It is extremely important to emphasize that what we have in mind is not the opposition of state and local government, but, on the contrary, the creation of conditions necessary to make maximum use of the opportunities afforded by both types of government. We have in mind a rational combining of state principles of administration with social practices of self-government, and of democratic principles of society with state practices of administration. We have in mind strengthening both the processes of centralization and

decentralization, and thereby extending the dimensions of both representative and direct democracy.

It is only natural that this reform represents a rather long process made up of many constituent elements.

Obviously, we would be well advised to think through the preparation and passage of legislation regulating the various levels of self-government, together with the jurisdiction and role of the various component parts within the system of soviets of people's deputies. It is necessary, it seems to me, to finish work on both the mechanism for performing these functions and at the same time the mechanism of responsibility by the local soviets and their executive authority in dealing with the people.

It is clear that local self-government can only turn into a genuine form of social power and a real social force when it has its own material and financial base to rely on, including communal property, local business and financial resources, and natural resources.

The economic base of local self-government is communal property and income-producing, locally owned businesses, consisting of enterprises capable of conversion into organizations and institutions performing paid services. The transfer of such facilities under the ministries and departments to the local soviets is a task that must be carried out swiftly and efficiently.

To expedite this process of transferring these enterprises to the care of the local soviets, lists of these enterprises should be compiled by the soviets and submitted for the consideration of the proper permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet. In this regard we would do well to avail ourselves of the experience of the other republics, where associations of city and rayon soviets have been formed to uphold territorial interests in forming communally owned property and in transferring industrial enterprises, building organizations, and so on, over to these associations.

In my view more detailed consideration should be given to the budgets of the local soviets and to the accumulation and expenditure of funds outside the budget.

In recent years, against the background of the marked politicalization of mass consciousness, a reexamination has been going on of conventional political opinion and of public stereotypes. In our republic as well as others the formation of a new political culture is in process. This process is long, difficult, and complex. On the whole the political awareness of the people in the republic continues to be insufficiently prepared to accept new and original political decisions. In this connection the difficulties in store for us when we attempt to interpret the provisions of the Law on Local Self-Government in terms of everyday practice cannot be overestimated. It is clearly incumbent on the Cabinet of Ministers to give special consideration to teaching those who work in the state administrative apparatus and on the professional staffs of local self-government in connection with the passage of this legislation. Thought should be given to

the question of how best to propagandize this law among the population. It is clear that qualified teachers of higher schools, scientific associates of Academy of Sciences, and experienced professionals should become involved in this task.

Comrade deputies!

In the context of my address on the economic program of the government, I consider it necessary to take up a problem which, at first glance, is unrelated to its theme. Actually, it is a problem that although in the realm of ideology is directly related in terms of both its economic and political implications. I am referring to the naming of the republic.

Recently, certain circles have been whipping up the contention that after having proclaimed the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, eliminating the words "Soviet Socialist," we have virtually defected from socialism, contrary to the interests of the the republic. Misgivings have arisen placing in doubt the legal sanction and authority of the Declaration of State Sovereignty made by the Supreme Soviet, particularly as it relates to the name of the republic. A chorus of voices is calling for a national referendum.

The new impulse to all of this comes from a resolution adopted by the most recent USSR Congress of People's Deputies "On the Name of the Soviet State." It is common knowledge that the congress endorsed a proposal to retain the name of the Soviet state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The situation that has arisen obliges me as president of the republic to declare my own position on this issue and to express my own political credo in this regard.

First of all, with regard to the name of the Union. In the first place, I do not think it is possible to redesignate automatically the names of constituent republics. In the second place, the name of the Union should be determined once and for all by the republics themselves when concluding the Treaty of the Union.

Furthermore, as we all well know, it is the practice of the world community in the overwhelming number of cases to designate states in accordance with two considerations: one characterizing the country in terms of geography, the other in terms of its form of government (as a republic or a monarchy, say).

We ourselves have employed a similar approach. Kyrgyzstan is our country, and the word "Republic" designates its form of government. The latter designation is extremely important to emphasize, since it connotes an elective office for the head of the state, democratic public and state institutions, and specifically developed forms of parliamentary activity and local self-government.

Generally, the word "republic," as derived from the Latin, refers to "public affairs" or to the "business of the populace." It is an apt word, at once comprehensive and precise.

Why did we reject the word "Soviet" in naming the republic?

Soviet power, as was justly emphasized at the Fourth USSR Conference of People's Deputies, is our historical property. But we should treat it with due regard for the values of civilization. One of these values is drawing a strict distinction between state government and local self-government. The soviets, as they exist today, are mainly and more than anything else organs of local self-government. They have power, but it is municipal rather than state power.

Thus in the Union, and in each of its republics, a unity of two types of power has evolved: state power and soviet power—that is, the social power of local self-government. What I am saying applies in particular to conditions in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan as a republic with a president.

Here, the question arises whether it is correct in the juridical as well as political sense to designate a term that is used to describe the state, and that does not correspond to either legal and political usage or to the reality of actual conditions. In my view, the answer is clearly no (notwithstanding my respect for the word "soviet" which we are so in the habit of using.)

I shall take the liberty of dwelling on the phrase "socialist republic" in more detail.

I believe that people are absolutely right in saying that we must refrain from making an absolute of the term "socialist." It is a recognized fact that this beautiful, shining word has been emblazoned on the banners of not a few of the most repressive and repugnant regimes.

It is a source of profound regret that this term has been discredited in our political experience as well. In attempting to save it we are compelled to keep refining the concept of "socialism" by adding such epithets as "developed," "democratic," "humane," and so on, and so on. Many political figures, scholars, and publicists have boiled down the substance of socialism—yes, and they continue to boil it down—to the point where it reflects a society in which, year after year, people live better and better, where with each passing year there are more clothes, more shoes, more food and housing, more culture and happiness, more freedom and democracy.

As a result, not a single stone has been left standing of these ideological constructions. Moreover, under cover of such semantic formulas a totalitarian regime was formed that had nothing in common with the ideals of socialism. Efforts to transform society which were based on principles taken out of context ended, I deeply regret to say, in utter failure.

What ideas have survived in our society that are of distinctively soviet socialist construction?

First of all, there is the institutionalization by the state of social change with the universal introduction of hired labor; there is the creation of equality by reducing the incentive to work, and of social justice as the equality of the poor.

The result a low standard of living, extreme forms of acute ecological crisis, and deep social conflicts.

And this is called socialism? That shining future of mankind?

I think you will agree with me that the formula "soviet socialist" has become a ritualistic incantation devoid of substance.

A future worthy of us lies elsewhere—in freedom, democracy, and a civilized society.

What are its basic characteristics? What goals lie ahead of us?

First, overcoming the alienation of private property. It is for us to institute collective property ownership in agriculture, in industry, and in other sectors of the economy, through which the laborer, in cooperation with other members of a collective, is in real possession of the means of production and enjoys the fruits of his labor.

In our view, at the present level of industrial development, private property ownership may occupy no more than a rather small segment of the republic economy.

Second, assuring individual freedom—economic, political, and personal freedom.

Third, the establishment of social justice, which we interpret to mean equality [of opportunity] in contributing to social production and in receiving its social benefits.

Fourth, the development of collectivism in its various forms and the affirmation of genuine solidarity among the peoples of all classes, all social groups, and all nationalities that together make up the people of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

These characteristics of the society to which we aspire will, in our view, provide an impulse unprecedented in force for the emancipation of labor and for a decisive uplift in its productivity.

In the society that we are striving to build, the market should serve as a means of measuring both the quantity and quality of socially useful labor, and thus exert a constructive influence on both the producers of goods and their consumers. I want to emphasize that commodity-market relations, as modified to serve the interests of socialism, must be integrated into an overall system of social, moral, and humanitarian relations.

The full range of property ownership and the conversion to market relations should bring about a high degree of self-regulation in our society; this, in turn, should foster a tendency to extend and strengthen self-government. At the same time, there should be a gradual limitation in the sphere of state power, the ultimate task of which is to perpetuate the system of market and property ownership and to assure stability by preventing any infringement of the rights and interests of the individual.

Such is my understanding of socialism as the successor to the capitalist stage of social development, and such is my political credo. On this, as they say, I stand. And wherein can be found any defection on our part from Marxism and Leninism or any repudiation of socialist ideals for the good of mankind?

Comrade deputies!

I would not have dwelt on ideological problems in such detail except for one circumstance of considerable import. It is apparent to me that zealous defenders of so-called "ideological purity" with respect to the name of our republic, in stirring up disputes that are remote from the real interests of the people of the republic at this most difficult and crucial of times, wish to lead us astray from our chosen path and so prevent the solution of pressing economic and social problems. These people want to substitute words for actions—words with which, after so many years, we are all fed up to the teeth.

I believe, fellow comrade deputies, you will agree with me when I say that that right now we must all close ranks to face our principal challenge—extricating ourselves, as expeditiously as possible, from this economic crisis. When all is said and done, we owe a debt that can never be paid to our marvelously long-suffering people.

New Kyrgyz Inspectorate To Oversee Enactment of Presidential Acts

91US0389A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 9 Feb 91 p 2

["Regulations on State Inspectorate Under the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan"]

[Text] A state inspectorate under the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is being set up to monitor compliance with ukazes and other legal enactments of the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan as the head of state and chief of the highest executive and administrative power of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Status of the State Inspectorate.

The state inspectorate is being formed under the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and is subordinate to him, and it operates under the direct leadership of the vice-president.

Article 2. Legislation on the State Inspectorate.

The state inspectorate operates on the basis of these Regulations and other legislative enactments of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Article 3. Relationship Between the State Inspectorate and Law Enforcement Agencies.

When necessary the state inspectorate interacts with the law enforcement agencies and it has the right to conduct checks as empowered by Article 8 of these Regulations, without interfering when so doing in their activity connected with carrying out procuracy inspections and conducting investigations and inquiries or the performance of court business.

Article 4. Funding for the Activity of the State Inspectorate.

The state inspectorate has estimates for its spending which when submitted by the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan are approved by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Supreme Soviet.

II. Makeup and Procedure for Forming the State Inspectorate

Article 5. The Makeup of the State Inspectorate.

The state inspectorate is made up of a chairman and his deputy, and state inspectors.

Article 6. Forming the State Inspectorate.

The chairman of the state inspectorate, his deputy, and the state inspectors are appointed to their posts by the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Article 7. Structure and Staff of the State Inspectorate.

The structure and staff of the state inspectorate are approved by the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

III. Functions and Competence of the State Inspectorate

Article 8. The state inspectorate does the following:

- monitors compliance with ukazes and other legal enactments of the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan by ministers, state committees and departments, and the presidiums of local soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees,

Monitoring the activity of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is not a function of the state inspectorate.

Article 9. Competence of the State Inspectorate.

In the exercise of its functions the state inspectorate enjoys the following rights:

- conducting checks in ministers, state committees and departments and their subdivisions, and the presidiums of local soviets of people's deputies and their

executive committees, and obtaining from leaders and other officials oral and written explanations and information and essential documents and materials on matters relating to the checks;

- recruiting skilled experts from various institutions and organizations and control and law enforcement agencies to conduct checks;
- pointing out to officials defects and violations connected with compliance with ukazes and other legal enactments of the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Depending on the results of checks carried out, the state inspectorate offers the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan recommendations on measures required to eliminate defects and violations and insure compliance with ukazes and other legal enactments of the president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and also its ideas on making liable officials who fail to insure compliance with such enactments.

Article 10. Obligations of Workers in the State Inspectorate.

In the exercise of their functions, workers in the state inspectorate are obligated to observe the law and not to create obstacles hampering the normal functioning of ministers and state committees and departments, and the presidiums of local soviets of people's deputies and their executive apparatuses.

The chairman of the state inspectorate and his deputy and the state inspectors are responsible to president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan for the proper discharge of their service duties.

Article 11. Obligations of the Organs of State Power and Management To Cooperate With the State Inspectorate in Exercising the Functions Entrusted to Them.

Republic and local organs of state power and management are obligated to cooperate with the state inspectorate in the exercise of the functions entrusted to them, and to provide necessary assistance to associates of the state inspectorate in conducting checks and in providing them with the necessary premises, transport, and communications facilities.

Officials who hamper any check or fail to present documents or hide them, or who present false information, are liable as provided for by the legislation regulating the legal status of those officials.

Kyrgyz 'We Shall Defend Scientific Socialism' Society Issues Appeal

91US0368A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 21 Feb 91 p 2

[Appeal of Initiative Group for the Organization of the Voluntary Society: "We Shall Defend Scientific Socialism" to Communists, the Intelligentsia, and the Whole Laboring Public of the Republic]

[Text] The Soviet society is in a severe state of crisis at this time. The present period might be called the most difficult in its history. A revolutionary program for the radical restructuring of all spheres of public life has been proposed as the solution.

Perestroyka has had many positive results. It also helped in revealing the individuals who had concealed their real intentions and motives for a long time.

Various political movements, societies, and parties have come into being. Some are uniting in political opposition groups. The so-called leftist forces are openly advocating changes in the social order and the division of the union under the cover of democracy. They are making vile attempts to denigrate all of our accomplishments and achievements of recent years.

The emergence of a political opposition and anticommunism in the country is one of the distinctive features of the present phase of our society's development. Their supporters are taking action in line with a carefully planned program. Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism are the focal point of the program. They have been particularly clever in creating confusion between the theory of scientific socialism and its deformed practice.

By distorting the actual state of affairs, these political intriguers are denigrating the theory of scientific socialism. They are concentrating on the news media and on youth. It is precisely through the press and the younger generation that they are trying to influence various types of societies, associations, and movements in order to turn them against perestroyka.

The sociopolitical situation in the country is quite grave. The fate of the Soviet people hangs in the balance. It is the sacred duty of each conscientious citizen of the Soviet society to make the appropriate contribution to the successful completion of the difficult tasks of perestroyka. The members of the initiative group are assuming the following specific commitments.

1. To defend scientific socialism against unjustified attacks; to preserve the purity of its theoretical premises and creative development in accordance with historical conditions, and to stop all distortions of ideological values.

2. To wage an uncompromising struggle against those who are undermining the renewal of socialism and against the political opposition associations erecting obstacles to prevent this.

3. To assist in the implementation of the ideas and principles (the right of all nationalities to decide their own future, the sovereignty of their states, etc.) of scientific socialism in the sphere of ethnic policy. To correct errors and shortcomings in the economic and cultural development of national republics. To be guided by the belief that "unification will guarantee triumph," to make every effort to ensure that members of all

nationalities and ethnic groups in the republic live in friendship and civic harmony, to educate them in the spirit of internationalism, and to display profound respect for the progressive customs and traditions constituting the national pride of each national group. To wage a struggle for the preservation of the USSR in the form of a renewed union (or federation) of equal sovereign republics.

4. To assess the past accomplishments of the Soviet people and the Communist Party objectively. To subject serious errors and shortcomings to principled criticism while appreciating great achievements, and to report only the truth to all strata of the population and the younger generation.

5. To respect and honor the older generation and its valiant labor for the sake of the motherland. To take pride in it and to use it as an example in educating the younger generation.

6. To appeal for conscientious, productive, and resourceful labor from each member of society. Labor is the main source of improvement in material living conditions.

7. To give local party and soviet organs constant assistance in their political and organizational work with the population and with labor collectives. To conduct an open dialogue with those who deny or reject scientific socialism and to change their minds with vivid and striking examples.

We are asking members of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the working intelligentsia in the republic to become members of the "We Shall Defend Scientific Socialism" volunteer society.

The telephone numbers for information in Bishkeke are 26-41-79 and 26-75-68.

Tajik Government Investigates Fugitive Flight of Foreign Trade Chief

91US0370A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian.
15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 7

[Article by A. Karpov, personal correspondent (Dushanbe): "Director Crosses the Line"]

[Text] The report of a commission of deputies investigating the activities of the Tadzhikvneshtorg Association was presented at a session of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan.

The parliamentary commission was formed because of the scandal that broke out last fall. Tadzhikvneshtorg General Director Yu. Gaytsgori had fled the country. In broad daylight, as the saying goes, he had made his way to Israel, where he had relatives, using his long-term overseas passport, without bothering to say his final "goodbyes" in Dushanbe.

The deputies learned that Gaytsgori's nomination as foreign trade chief had never been discussed by the presidium of the Council of Ministers, and his appointment was therefore legally invalid. The government order granting the general director the same status as republic ministers was also illegal.

According to commission members, the magnanimity of the Council of Ministers also affected Gaytsgori's subsequent actions. He became too self-assured, made decisions on matters outside his jurisdiction, and ignored the instructions on republic and union ministries and departments. In particular, the demands of the Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan for the reimbursement of the excess foreign currency spent in the last three years on Vneshtorg business trips have not been satisfied yet.

The commission report also said that the republic KGB had sent a letter marked "personal and confidential" to Chairman I. Khayeyev of the republic Council of Ministers in the middle of July last year. This document informed him of serious violations in Vneshtorg's work and of the general director's intention to leave the country. The reaction to the report was unique: The contents of the letter were made known to Gaytsgori. The commission did not find out how this happened.

The resolution the Supreme Soviet passed on the results of the parliamentary commission's work is a vague demand for the improvement of Tadzhikvneshtorg's activity and a slightly more specific demand to stop sending scarce goods abroad. Many questions have remained unanswered.

Official Views Tajik CP Role in Multiparty System

91US0344A Dushanbe KOMSOMOLETS
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 15 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by K. Nikolayev, advisor to the Tajikistan CP Central Committee Cooperation With Sociopolitical Organizations and National Relations Department: "The Multiparty System: Reality and Prospects"]

[Text] A significant step forward has been taken in the transition to political pluralism, which began with a change in formulation of certain articles of the Constitution. Union and republic laws on social associations have been adopted. Their primary goal is to implement legal regulation of this sphere of relations in society, and to facilitate the inclusion of various independent action organizations in civil self-government and in the political life of the country and the republic on the basis of legally substantiated principles of political culture in the interaction of organs of state power with parties, associations and movements based on all-human values, international and union documents on human rights.

These laws have embodied principles which are characteristic for building a legal state, and which open broad possibilities for truly independent activity of social formulations and realization of the rights of citizens to

unite into various parties and political movements. At the same time, that which contradicts the laws has also been clearly fixed—the creation of social organizations whose goal is the forcible overthrow or change in the constitutional order, the disruption of territorial unity of the union and autonomous republic, the propaganda of war, violence and cruelty, the sowing of social, national, and religious discord, and the performance of other criminal acts.

The recognition of equal rights and opportunities for any social associations and parties officially registered in accordance with the Law, and the affirmation of the principle of separation of state and party spheres of activity are the principally important and unusual instances which break many stereotypes in the organization and perception of political life. The latter principle [of separation of state and party spheres of activity] is realized through such statutes in the Law as the prohibition of state financing of parties and political movements, the inadmissibility of mutual intervention in each other's affairs (states and parties, political movements), and the prohibition of hiring based on party affiliation or admission of priority of professional motives over party motivations.

Thus, although not for all, nevertheless the desired multiparty system has become not only a fact, but also a legal reality.

It is true, as if casting doubt on this principle in the republic, references are made to the insignificant number of new parties and movements, and their weak territorial dispersion. What kind of party is this, they say—several thousand people who do not have any strong primary organizations in many cities and rayons, or in most of the labor collectives! However, the role of a party and its significance, as history has shown, is by far not always determined by the number of its members, but rather by the ideas and principles which they defend, by their appeals under which they unite their supporters, and by the real actions of the party as a whole as well as each of its members.

In 1917 there were not that many bolsheviks. However, having presented simple slogans which were understood by all and attractive to most of the people, having proven themselves to be defenders of the oppressed people, they raised up the masses to radical revolutionary changes.

Overestimation of one's own capacities as well as underestimation of the capacities of one's opponents are equally ruinous for any political force in society.

For the present day in our republic, the spectrum of social associations is not so variegated and multifaceted as it is in a number of other regions of the country. However here, along with the stabilized sociopolitical organizations, and primarily the Tajikistan Communist Party, the "Rastokhez" organization, the Democratic Party, the association of Democratic Forces and the Persian-Speaking Population of the USSR, the Tajik section of the All-Union "Memorial" Society, a number

of regional associations—"Oshkoro", "Migration", the Social-Democratic Association, and others have been working with varying degrees of activity for some time now. (The article does not speak of the Tajik section of the All-Union Islamic Resurrection Party because its formation is officially prohibited by the republic's Supreme Soviet, and also because by its program documents it is not so much a political association as a religious organization which may be used for political purposes).

There is a formulation of organizational structures of these associations, a growth of their significance in the republic's sociopolitical life. They are striving to win the real authority and trust of the workers, to gain support by their program goals and actions on the part of various social strata and groups of society. They, like the republic's communist party, are today faced with the task of their official registration, with the task of acting by legal principles to exert a real influence on the distribution of political forces in the organs of power and to fight for the affirmation of their understanding of the republic's qualitative renovation.

At the same time, we must admit that many communists—party and soviet workers, still believe, despite the resolutions of the congresses and the declarations by the leadership of the country and the CPSU, that the very emergence and activity of primary segments of new social associations, and primarily parties, is a sign of an unfavorable local situation. As a result, on one hand, it seems that the law proclaims and secures the right of citizens to unite into organizations which do not contradict the constitutional standards, and appeals for dialogue and cooperation are heard. Yet on the other hand, all local efforts are directed at hindering the practical realization of this right.

At the same time, we are closing our eyes to the fact that the continued implementation of democratization, and this is the cornerstone of perestroika and the reform of the society's political system, invariably leads to the development of direct forms of democracy, social self-organization and independent activity of the people. The new social associations have become a manifestation of this tendency, which on the whole is a positive and inevitable one. Already today, and especially tomorrow, it is their emergence and activity which will express the depth and effectiveness of democracy. This is conditioned by the fact that with differentiation of the economic, social and cultural interests, and this is inevitable in a transition to market relations and in affirmation of variation in forms of ownership, there is also an inherent differentiation in political interests and corresponding political structures. In this plane, the possibility of the communist party's retention of the status of the all-people's party, as stated in the CPSU program declaration, is rather doubtful. (We might add that for the republic this also contradicts the Declaration on State Sovereignty adopted by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet). The CPSU, like the other sociopolitical associations, must still resolve the question of its social base.

There is a prevailing opinion that new parties, political movements and social associations by the very fact of their existence, and especially by their action, threaten order, perestroika, and political stability.

Of course, among their members, as well as among the members of official political structures, we might add, there are forces who express marginal and sometimes even extremist positions of a right-wing as well as a left-wing nature. As reality shows, it is specifically these forces which today are often most politically active, elevated to the heights of political life on a wave of populism, criticism, and sometimes even faultfinding, and motivated, unfortunately, not so much by the interests of the people as by their own narrow ambitions which for one reason or another did not previously find full expression of their aspirations. The actions of these forces, which make most of the comrades in the organization, to some degree, hostages of their own policy, correspond to Lenin's accurate definition: "The slogans are magnificent, engrossing, intoxicating—but there is no ground under them..." (Lenin, V. I. Collected Works, Vol 35, p 343). However, we cannot reduce an entire party or movement to the words and deeds of their individual members, even leaders, when they are in a state of formulation or reformulation and in the absence of a stable social base with clearly realized basic interests which have nothing in common with the prevailing conditions.

As for democracy, this means equal opportunities for all to implement their rights and exercise their freedoms. Its only limitation may be the demand that personal or group self-expression must not be accompanied by physical, material, or moral violence in relation to other citizens, organizations, or the state. In turn, a democratic society cannot allow the state apparatus or other elements of the political system to suppress or demean the individual, to deny him the right to be himself, to have his own convictions and to act in accordance with them, provided they do not violate the laws of the legal state and the rights and freedoms of other people.

With such an approach to democracy, the interrelations between various sociopolitical associations, among them also state structures, must be built not on the principles of confrontation and head-to-head opposition, but rather on a search for mutual compromise leading to the consolidation of efforts of all social strata and forces for purposes of positive solution of the problems facing the republic. Already yesterday, civil accord was desirable for the republic. Today it is absolutely necessary, and tomorrow its absence, as events in the Baltic region have shown, may lead to the barricades.

A committee or council for civic cooperation should be formed under the Tajikistan president or the republic's Supreme Soviet, with participation of representatives of all political parties, movements and social organizations representing all strata of society. This may become a real step toward stabilization of the political situation in the republic.

Evidently, the main obstacles here are the following. Individual leaders of the new parties and movements are in no hurry to change over from oppositional criticism to constructive actions for which they will have to bear their share of the responsibility. The real state of affairs for the present day is such that we should not expect a rapid improvement in the life of the people, and so it is easier to earn political capital by means of purely oppositional activity.

Part of the CPSU members and party workers have not quite realized that the moment has already come when the communist party is juridically only one of a number of many other parties, and can no longer enjoy guaranteed privileges. The fact that for the present day it is the ruling party is another matter, and this imposes certain responsibilities upon it and formulates the principles of its activity. And this is fully justified! Any other political force which comes to power would enjoy the same thing. This is not a return to totalitarianism, since the status of the ruling party now is not given in perpetuity, but must be won under conditions of opposition from the other political forces. This opposition is directed not at destroying one's political opponents, but rather at winning the majority of electoral votes and the support of the republic's population.

This requires of the communist party that it in fact become a new party, not operating under secret conditions or under conditions of a totalitarian regime, not standing above the people and the state, but being a truly political, progressive force of a democratic legal state, called upon to defend the interests of all its citizens. It must become a power capable of defending the right to political leadership in a society which has free competition with other parties.

If we are able to overcome these obstacles, as well as others stemming from them, which stand in the way of consolidating society, if we are able to formulate a legal state in which the violation of laws is not permissible for anyone, and if we are able to develop a political culture among all the republic's citizens—then the multiparty system which is being formulated will be able to play a positive role.

Supreme Court Trial Set for Uzbekistan's Adylov

91US0366A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Mar 91 Union Edition p 8

[Article by Yu. Vasilyev: "Adylov Case Goes to Court Soon"]

[Text] This name is so well-known today that even its misspelling has become a convention. It is actually spelled Odilov. Akhmadzhon Odilov, general director of the Papskiy Production Agroindustrial Association imeni Lenin (Uzbek SSR), Hero of Socialist Labor, and deputy of the republic and union supreme soviets, also had many other titles, but only in the past. Today he is the accused.

At a preliminary hearing, the collegium on criminal affairs of the USSR Supreme Court decided that the charges brought against Odilov were sufficient to put him on trial. The trial should begin in the second half of April. Akhmadzhon will be sharing the defendant's bench with his brother Muminzhon, director of the association sovkhoz; Abdurakhman Khömrakulov, sovkhoz brigade leader; Ulmas Kholdarov, party raykom first secretary and later sovkhoz director; and Yuldash Turayev, director of the repair administration of the sovkhoz tekhnikum.

What are the charges against them, particularly A. Odilov? The embezzlement of over a million in all, the acceptance of 600,000 in bribes, and the payment of 22,000 in bribes. The most serious accusations, however, concern actions committed against individuals. The legal term for this is "exceeding official authority," but it actually consisted in beatings, the most barbaric forms of torture, whippings, and confinement in cellars.

Who will be testifying as the victims? A brigade leader, a chief bookkeeper, an auditor from the control and inspection administration, a department head, a laborer, and a shepherd. A seamstress, housewife, and 13-year-old schoolgirl who did not go out into the fields to pick cotton. And mere "nobodies"—innocent bystanders. One incident, for example, is described in the following terms in the indictment: They stopped a bus, pulled all of the passengers out, lined them up in a row, and began interrogating them: Who are you and where are you going? Then all of them were whipped.

Odilov has also been charged with crimes against justice, but these were also committed against people. False denunciations were composed against some people he did not like, and criminal cases were concocted and were pushed through the procuracy and the courts. One "enemy of the regime" was sentenced to seven years in prison, and another was sentenced to eight years.

We naturally wonder who these judges were. And who were the prosecutors who were responsible for overseeing legality? I realize that after seven years (Odilov was arrested in 1984) it is difficult to find all those implicated in the actions of today's defendants. We can only hope that many of the details will be cleared up during the trial.

The case, which will be tried in the Supreme Court, is not an ordinary one, and not only because of the nature and scope of the actions committed and the individuals who committed them: Akhmadzhon was close to Rashidov and was granted unlimited power in his socialist domain. The press and television had so much to say about the case before the investigation had even been completed that the term "Adylovism" even came into being. This is not something we journalists should be proud of, because the law is the law for everyone, including the news media.

Is the author himself violating the law by reporting the charges brought against Odilov and his accomplices? No.

The indictment was signed by the examining magistrate and approved by the procurator, and it was, as I have already said, called sufficient to commit the accused for trial. It will be published in full before the start of the court proceedings, and it is an imposing document—six volumes, including almost 2,000 pages of typewritten text.

I must stress, however, that the guilt of the accused is certainly not decided in a preliminary hearing. As one "old-regime" attorney told the judges: "What you are dealing with is not a fact, but simply the investigators' assertion that this is a fact." The accusations still have to be proved, and this will be done in court.

Uzbekistan Stability, Relationship to Center Viewed

91US0366B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col V. Astafyev, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Political Situation in Uzbekistan: When Emotions Cool Down"]

[Text] Just recently Uzbekistan was viewed as one of the "hot" spots on the union map. People were shocked by the bloody events in Fergana in summer 1989. Echoes of these tragic events were heard in Bukhara and Parkent a year ago. Outbreaks of violence left their devastating traces in Andizhan and Namangan. Like festering sores, the economic, political, social, demographic, and other problems that had accumulated over the years and had never been solved, erupted in murders, pogroms, and impassioned rallies. Skillfully manipulating these difficulties, the leaders of informal associations were able to lure hundreds and thousands of people into public squares and fuel their discontent with demagogic appeals.

All of this was going on just recently, but today Uzbekistan is rightfully included among the most stable regions of the country. The reason for this "Uzbek phenomenon," according to Doctor of Philosophical Sciences G. Shirmatova, is that "the idea of the political and economic sovereignty of the republic and the social protection of the population is being implemented through legislative activity. In contrast to the political and economic chaos in some republics, there are real signs of the normalization of economic affairs in Uzbekistan, and this is playing a significant part in stabilizing the socio-political situation."

The present activities of the republic leadership, focusing primarily on the satisfaction of public needs and the thorough consideration of the people's historical, national, and religious traditions, can be judged from the first ukases of the republic president: "On Increased Benefits for Mothers of Large Families," "On the Results of the Celebration of the 'Navruz' National Holiday," "On Additional Privileges for Invalids Who Fought in the Great Patriotic War, Internationalist Soldiers, and

the Families of Deceased Servicemen," "On the Provision of the Livestock and Poultry on the Private Plots of the Republic Population with Fodder and the Augmentation of Their Animal Husbandry products," "On Higher Wages for Elementary School Teachers," and "On Muslim Pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia."

The president's ukases concerning the allocation for the development of the private subsidiary plots of the rural population by reducing the size of cotton plantations could be called truly revolutionary. After all, land is probably the biggest bone of contention in the republic. To date, 183,000 hectares have already been allocated for this purpose. Over 580,000 families have received plots of land, and another 932,000 families have enlarged their plots. In addition, the sale of young livestock and poultry and of fodder to the population was organized on a broad scale.

Of course, the republic still has a long way to go before it reaches the point of complete abundance and the elimination of all difficulties, but recent accomplishments have certainly helped in stabilizing the sociopolitical situation. By the same token, the economic measures of the republic leadership, its protective social policy, and its consideration of the interests of different social groups have perceptibly weakened the influence of those who gained their authority at the rallies but could not offer the people anything but shocking slogans.

Something else is also noticeable: As long as everything was in a state of confusion and inter-ethnic and other conflicts were flaring up, the leaders of various informal associations felt that they were in the driver's seat, as the saying goes. There was nothing to keep them from arrogantly describing themselves as defenders and representatives of the public interest, falling just short of calling themselves the people's benefactors, but as soon as things went back to normal, they were back on the sidelines.

Realizing that the interest in rally rhetoric was fading and that people were coming to their senses and beginning to put their trust in actions rather than words, they began shrieking about the "stifling of democracy."

This is a general description of the economic, political, and social situation in Uzbekistan just before the union-wide referendum. The Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR had expressed unequivocal support for the referendum. At a session of the Supreme Soviet, republic President I. Karimov stressed: "It seems to me that the people who call the referendum unnecessary simply do not respect the civil rights of our people."

Some of those who call themselves democrats were quite eager to deprive the people of their election rights. The statement of the ERK Democratic Party's indoctrination group frankly said: "We have been against this kind of referendum from the very beginning, but whether we want it or not, it will be held in Uzbekistan. We will be voting against this kind of union and we ask you to vote 'no.'"

Birlik took the same position. People certainly are strange. First they accuse the "partocracy" of not listening to the voice of the people, and then they tell the latter to shut up when the democratically elected leaders of the country and the republic ask the people for advice.

What do they suggest instead of the union of equal sovereign republics? "Complete freedom for the motherland and the people"; "for the future generation to be the masters of their own land"; "freedom from all kinds of dependence"; "for the Uzbek people to occupy a fitting place among the world's nationalities." Is there anything here besides rhetorical slogans? On the other hand, now that a tendency is being observed throughout the world toward unification and stronger economic, political, and other ties between states, the democrats of Uzbekistan are advising self-isolation. What would happen to the millions of people of other nationalities living in our multinational republic?

A more realistic and constructive position, in my opinion, was taken by the overwhelming majority of participants in the debates in the local press in recent months over the future of the country and the republic: Workers, rural inhabitants, and members of the intelligentsia and various public organizations have expressed firm support for the preservation of a renewed union. In a published message to women, the plenum of the republic Women's Council of Uzbekistan declared: "By voting for the union, we are voting for peace, harmony, and civic accord."

The opinion of many inhabitants of Karakalpakstan was reflected in a statement by G. Khodzhiniyazova, chief physician at the Turtkulskiy Rayon Hospital and people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR: "The majority in our republic will vote 'yes.' Karakalpakia has close ties to all parts of the country, and we have no chance of overcoming the ecological disaster without the help of all republics."

I want to repeat that this is the opinion of the majority in Uzbekistan. The inhabitants of the republic will express their final judgment on 17 March. All I can add to this is the information that the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to issue another ballot in addition to the main referendum ballot. It will be worded as follows: "Do you agree that Uzbekistan should remain part of the renewed union (or federation) as a sovereign and equal republic?" As Chairman K. Akhmedov of the Uzbek SSR Referendum Commission explained, the addition of this ballot should not be viewed as the organization of an alternative referendum. It will be done for the purpose of explaining the main question of the referendum in more precise terms.

Figures From Uzbek Prosecutor's Office on 1990 Unrest

91US0392A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
9 Feb 91 p 9

[Article by A. Aleksandrov: "Participants in Mass Outrages Have Been Held Accountable"]

[Text] Yesterday, PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported on the last of the 183 cases instituted in conjunction with mass disturbances in Fergana Oblast in June 1989 going to trial.

The editorial office continues to receive letters and phone calls from readers who are interested in the progress of an investigation into the circumstances of mass disturbances in Andizhan Oblast on 2 May and in Namangan Oblast on 2, 3, 4 December 1990.

As the editorial office was informed by the investigative department of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Procuracy which heads these investigations, 19 criminal cases concerning the events in Andizhan Oblast have already been referred to courts. Guilty verdicts have been rendered in all of these cases. Twenty-nine people have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and the files of 35 other people have been referred to commissions for the affairs of minors. As the case files

suggest, 197 structures, including 40 residential buildings, were damaged as a result of the disturbances. The amount of damage comes to 10 million rubles.

Fourteen criminal cases involving 15 people and pertaining to the well-known facts regarding the murder of servicemen, and mass disturbances in Namangan Oblast have been referred to courts. Six criminal cases involving seven people have already been considered by the Namangan Oblast Court. All of the defendants have been found guilty and sentenced to various penalties. The files of 24 people have been referred to the commissions for the affairs of minors. Forty-eight persons were subjected to statutory penalties. The investigation of other criminal cases continues.

We intend to tell our readers in more detail about the causes and circumstances of the events in Andizhan and Namangan Oblasts in the immediate future.

Congress of Soviet Germans Meets

Postponement Explained

91US0357A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with Yu. Gaar, deputy chairman of the congress organizing committee, by V. Ardayev: "From Competent Sources: The Congress of Soviet Germans Is Being Postponed Nevertheless"]

[Text] As has already been reported (IZVESTIYA no. 581), the opening of the first Congress of Soviet Germans in history, set for 12 March, has been postponed until an undetermined date. At the same time, there have been reports in the press that, despite this decision, the congress will take place as planned. For an explanation, our correspondent has turned to the Yu. Gaar, deputy chairman of the organizing committee charged with the preparing and conducting the Congress of Soviet Germans.

[Ardayev] Yuriy Adolfovich, clearly it is not worth stressing again the impatience with which two and a half million Soviet Germans are awaiting their first congress—indeed, for a majority of them, the very fact that it is being held would mean that, after half a century of oblivion and silence, the country and the state are again ready to address solution of their most pressing problems. However the situation regarding the congress, it appears, is not so simple... Can you tell us about this, in order?

[Gaar] The decision on preparing and conducting a congress of Soviet Germans was approved on 16 June last year by the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities' commission on national policy and interethnic relations and the State Commission for Problems of Soviet Germans. At the same time, these same commissions established our organizing committee, of which USSR Academy of Sciences academician B. Raushenbakh became chairman. It was initially proposed to hold the congress in the middle of last December, but then a different date was named—12 March.

The fact is that the congress required enormous preparation—no, not only purely organizational. It was very important to wait so that, by the time the congress opened, the USSR Supreme Soviet would have considered and passed a law revoking all repressive acts with regard to departed [departirovanniy] peoples and also the ukase defining the status of former labor army members.

Besides this, we considered it important in advance, before the opening of the congress, to coordinate with the parliament and the government the content of the drafts of three basic documents which would later be proposed for the attention of the delegates: These are the Declaration of the congress, a statute on national German self-government within the country, and a draft decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "On State Guarantees of the National Rebirth of USSR Germans." To put

it briefly, we are talking about the establishment of preliminary legal foundations for future solution of the principal problem, of the sacred dream of all Soviet Germans—restoration of our national statehood.

This, I repeat, is our first congress. It is not a goal in itself, but a means toward solution of the problems of our people. And, therefore, we considered that it necessary beforehand to concern ourselves about its good results, to achieve in advance maximum guarantees of subsequent recognition of its decisions by the organs of state authority and the government.

However, the situation within the country during all this time developed in such a way that it constantly prevented the all-union parliament from addressing these documents of vital importance to us. As a result, it was necessary to change the first date for the beginning of the congress. By the second, the Supreme Soviet still had not succeeded in examining all the necessary documents. The organizing committee appealed to the country's leadership and our representatives have had meetings with G. Yanayev and A. Lukyanov.

And only five days before the announced day of opening, a communication came from the State Commission for Problems of Soviet Germans regarding another postponement of the congress. The motives: The USSR Supreme Soviet had not completed consideration of the legal acts necessary for the successful work of the congress and, besides this—the upcoming 17 March all-union referendum, on account of which, "on the level of the country's leadership, it was recognized as expedient to postpone the congress of USSR Germans."

[Ardayev] Do all the organizers of the congress agree with this decision?

[Gaar] No, not all. Back in January, as a result of disagreements that had developed, a group of member our organizational committee (nine out of forty-two persons) left it and, having joined together on the basis of the Moscow headquarters of the "Vozrozhdeniye" all-union society of Soviet Germans, which is headed by the society's chairman, G. Grout, have concerned themselves with preparation of draft alternative documents for the congress, which as a rule bear an ultimative character. As time has gone on, our disagreements have taken on an increasingly irreconcilable character.

After the most recent decision on postponement of the conference, the "radicals" declared their nonacceptance of it. Taking advantage of the fact that a large portion of the delegates, whom we had not been able to notify because of limited time and because of a holiday, nonetheless arrived in Moscow, our internal opposition intends to gather them together for a congress and to conduct it, although, in this case, it hardly will turn out to be a legal one. I do know that, under the signature of our organizing committee, summonses are also going out to other delegates...

[Ardayev] Altogether, how many delegates have been elected to the congress and on the basis of what quotas?

[Gaar] One for each two thousand Soviet Germans, no matter where they are living—strictly on the basis of the last popular census (insignificant exceptions have been made only for residents of Sakhalin and Kamchatka). Altogether, 1,022 delegates have been elected.

[Argayev] How do you assess the existing situation?

[Gaar] As very complicated. In the first place, this second postponement of the congress, witnessing to a lack of attention to the German national problem, will have a negative affect on the mood of Soviet Germans as a whole, many of whom, I assume, are, in turn, losing faith in the possibility of a restoration of justice with regard to our much-suffering people. In connection with this, the organizers of the congress have received an appeal to the delegates in which, in the name of the USSR government, an apology is made to them and to all Soviet Germans for postponement of the congress. And nevertheless... It is sad to think that such a fact will once again urge some Soviet Germans to leave the country. We cannot close our eyes to this: The flow of departing Germans is growing in arithmetic progression every year and last year already reached 150,000 persons.

In the second place, the split that had developed in the "Vozrozhdeniye" society (and today it unites tens of thousands of persons) also will bring nothing good to our common cause.

And, in the third place, the attempts of the "radicals" to act with ultimatums, by nonparliamentary means, can only seriously discredit the very idea of our congress.

I believe that justice will be restored with regard to the Soviet Germans.

Deputies Outline Issues

91US0357B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 March 91 Union Edition p 3

Article by V. Ardayev: "Congress Postponed. Has the Congress Opened?"

[Text] In the previous issue of IZVESTIYA we carried an interview with the deputy chairman of the organizing committee for preparing and conducting the first congress of Soviet Germans, Yu. Gaar—"The Congress of Germans Is Being Postponed Nevertheless." Following this, a group of delegates to this congress came to our editorial offices: K. Kister, A. Ber, V. Kriger, and A. Shtukert. They asked to relate on the pages of IZVESTIYA how events are continuing to develop.

As Yu. Gaar already reported, a decision concerning postponement of the congress was made by the State Commission for Problems of the Soviet Germans in the afternoon of 7 March. On the same day, a governmental

telegram was sent to the chairmen of the republic committees and councils of ministers, kray soviet executive committees, and oblast soviet executive committees, with a request for assistance in timely notification of the delegates that the congress had been put off. There were announcements on radio and television. But...

The telegram—especially in the eastern regions of the country where most Soviet Germans live—arrived only after the end of the working day, with a holiday and two nonworking days ahead. The announcement on "The Beacon" [Mayak] was heard by only a few people (at least, not one of our visitors had heard it). For some reason, information on the "Vremya" program was aired only on the first all-union program, which they watch in the European part... Altogether, by the evening of 11 March, more than 400 delegates to the postponed congress had arrived in Moscow.

The first thing people ran up against was the problem of finding a place to stay, at least for the night. Reservations for a thousand places at the Rossiya Hotel had already been cancelled in connection with postponement of the congress. Rental of the Hall of Columns at the House of Congresses was also refused, so that the arrivals were not even able to meet together: There was no place. In this situation, an unofficial organizing committee, formed on the basis of the Moscow headquarters of the "Vozrozhdeniye" society of Soviet Germans, took the initiative upon itself. With great difficulty, they spread the delegates around where they could and, in order to meet together, rented the house of culture auditorium at the plant imeni Vladimir Ilich. In a meeting with representatives of the delegations on 11 March, the chairman of the State Commission for Problems of Soviet Germans, USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman V. Gusev warned them that if, despite the decision of the commission, the congress nevertheless be opened, then all its activities would be unauthorized and illegal. But, in any case, the situation had already passed out of the control of the official organizers...

In the morning of 12 March, 505 delegates (about half of all those elected) voted for the opening of a congress of Soviet Germans, declaring it to be an extraordinary one. Those assembled expressed a lack of confidence in the official organizing committee and voted in favor of annulling all the documents for the congress prepared by it. Instead of these, they decided to discuss alternative drafts (the same "ultimative" ones about which Yu. Gaar spoke). Having chosen leadership organs, the congress then set about discussion of an alternative report, presented by G. Grout, chairman of the "Vozrozhdeniye" all-union society of Soviet Germans. Thus, the self-organized congress began work, and delegates to it continue to arrive.

Such are the facts. It is unfortunate that it must be affirmed that the long-awaited, first congress of representatives of this much-suffering people in history has ended up being spoiled. Mainly at the fault of its organizers: You will agree that it was necessary to

"apply" more than a little effort and to manifest more than a little lack of organization, formalism, and indifference in order to upset the equilibrium of even these people, known for their discipline and calm, and to force events to take an unforeseen course. To create a situation of nervousness and irritation even where, it would seem, it could least be expected. However, this happened, which is very sad and alarming.

Nothing good is promised by the split that has arisen in the movement of Soviet Germans, which for several decades now has justly aspired to one thing: the restoration of German statehood within the USSR.

While fully sympathizing with the problems of the Soviet Germans, with the unpleasantities that the delegates encountered on the way to the first congress, it nevertheless must be said that it is difficult to consider an "extraordinary congress," opened without observance of even elementary formalities (a quorum, at a minimum, must consist of two-thirds of the total number of those elected) and contrary to the decision of official organs concerning postponement of the congress, as being legal and competent. Even in the most extraordinary situations, law and right cannot be ignored.

Association of Greeks Holds Founding Congress

*LD2903142591 Moscow TASS in English 1229 GSMT
29 Mar 91*

[By TASS Correspondent Viskator Zhilyakov]

[Text] Gelendzhik March 29 TASS—The founding congress of the All-Union Public Association of Greeks, the

first in the history of Soviet Greeks, opened here today. Upwards of 220 delegates from Siberia, the Urals, Bashkiria, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and Georgia, where a great number of ethnic Greeks live, are attending the congress.

"Gelendzhik was not chosen as the venue for the congress by chance," said chairman of the All-Union Association of Pontic Greeks Gavriil Popov.

"Almost one in ten residents of this city is of the Greek nationality. Our society was organized recently. More than 360,000 ethnic Greeks now live in the Soviet Union. The main purpose of the unification is to involve the Greek population vigorously in the country's socio-political and cultural life and educate Greek youth in the spirit of internationalism," Popov said.

Popov was expected to chair the congress, but the current situation in Moscow did not allow him to participate in the forum, which will last for three days. Having addressed the delegates, he returned to Moscow on the same day.

The congress will adopt the rules and programme of the association, elect governing bodies and discuss the development of the Soviet Greeks' national-cultural life.

Representatives from the societies of Soviet Germans, Soviet Koreans, the confederation of Jewish organisations and communities in the USSR, public figures and religious workers from Greece and senior executives of the Greek embassy in the USSR are attending the congress.

Participants welcomed with applause a message of greetings from the Soviet President and parliament.

Afghanistan-USSR-West Europe Drug Trafficking Conduit Examined

91WD0562A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 20 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by P. Timofeyev, our special correspondent, Kabul-Moscow: "Containers With a Double Bottom"]

[Text] I very much wanted to go on this excursion through Kabul. To receive permission for it proved to be not a simple matter, but, finally, all formalities were arranged. We left close to evening. A state security officer was my "guide." The purpose of the trip was to visit the city districts where drugs were pushed and to where they were brought from all Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan.

The Shakhri Nau District. There are small shops in one- and two-story buildings on both sides of the road. Literally everything is on sale: from Soviet electric teapots to "Mercedes" and Japanese television sets of the latest models. The sidewalks almost cleared of snow are filled with people. The work day has ended. Everyone rushes home. Everywhere there are stands and carts with vegetables, fruits, almonds, pistachio nuts, raisins, and other Eastern delicacies.

It is unbelievable, but any drugs can be bought in almost every small shop and from every street dealer here. People say that a few years ago this could be done fully in the open. Now it is more complicated. Nothing will be sold in the usual manner to a stranger, especially if he is European. At least one permanent customer must vouch for you. The person accompanying me does not permit me to conduct an experiment. It is not recommended that a person stop here and, especially, get out of the car.

We drive on. About 15 minutes later we are on the direct highway stretched along a river bed, which is dry at this time. The foot of the mountains is several meters to the right. The houses, which stick to them like honeycombs of bees, rise high up. Here, I am told, are the big shots. This is not a place for small street dealers, but the export market of "white death." Many such seemingly wretched houses—small sheds—have large wholesale warehouses, laboratories with the latest Western equipment, telexes, and telefaxes, which provide Afghan drug mafiosi with instantaneous communication with the whole world.

Passers-by on the street are much fewer. The rare ones, which we have encountered, follow our car with attentive glances. We are just as watchfully observed from many windows. Round-the-clock security is organized professionally. It is virtually impossible to sneak up to a warehouse or a laboratory unnoticed. This district has such a bad reputation that foreigners drive a whole block to detour it and the people of Kabul, who are not connected with drug pushing, do not risk appearing here when it gets dark.

Narcotic substances were probably grown and produced in Afghanistan always. Both the climate and, above all,

national traditions contributed to this. From time immemorial it was believed that the person who ate a cookie sprinkled with opium poppy would be vigorous and fresh for 1 and ½ days.

Virtually all grown narcotic substances were consumed on the domestic market. A significant increase in consumption and production was not observed. However, as of 1978, when together with the revolution a war came to the country, not ending until now, the situation has changed. The production of drugs has increased rapidly. A number of international factors have also had an effect on this; for example, such as the toughening of the fight against this evil in Latin America and in the countries of the "golden triangle" and the introduction of capital punishment for pushers of "white death" in Iran and Pakistan. The recent crisis in the Persian Gulf has also played into the hands of Afghan drug dealers. The established drug trafficking channels to North America and Europe have been cut off. All this has brought the drug problem in Afghanistan to a totally different level.

In a short period the country has become one of the first places in drug production in the world. According to the data of UN experts, from 800 to 1,000 tons of narcotic substances will be produced in Afghanistan during the current year alone. In consumer countries in the last 5 years the demand for strong-acting preparations has increased very rapidly—on the average, by 14 to 16 percent. The toughening of customs rules and legislation and the growing demand force dealers to process raw materials locally. In Afghanistan laboratories are growing like mushrooms. Today only those that are known in the country number about 50. The heroin made in them is of the purest degrees.

Virtually all plantations and most laboratories are located on the territory controlled by the opposition. For field commanders drug pushing has become the main occupation. The old slogans about the holy "jihad" and about the fight against the Kabul Government until the triumphant end now serve rather as a cover. Reports on disagreements in the ranks of the opposition and on armed clashes among individual detachments, as a rule, reflect precisely the fight for plantations and sales channels.

As I was told in Afghanistan's Ministry of State Security, the recent murder of Mulla Nasim, a prominent field commander, no matter with what political colors it was painted, was directly connected with drugs. Mulla Nasim controlled 20 percent of their production. He was not forgiven for the fact that he took 2 million dollars from the Americans, promising to distribute them to peasants so that they would stop growing hemp and poppy. In brief, the money did not reach those to whom it was intended, but remained in the pockets of the ringleader and his closest assistants. However, the sentence had already been pronounced. The people of Gulbbeddin Khekmatiar took away Mulla Nasim. His four brothers took over the business. They claimed that they knew nothing about the 2 million.

In the end, the result was the opposite: Having heard about this money, other provinces sharply increased the number of plantations, apparently in the hope that the Americans would also offer something to other ringleaders...

Even without counting on these "compensatory" millions, production will most probably continue to grow rapidly. The mujahidin, receiving such a fantastic income, can no longer stop. From ordinary producers 1 kg of opium is bought for approximately 28,000 afghanis. At the black market rate this is about 30 dollars. Second-hand dealers sell 1 kg for 270,000 afghanis—350 dollars. On West European markets this opium costs 350,000 to 400,000 dollars. And in North America, even more. Prices are rising constantly.

The profit earned from "white death" is deposited in foreign accounts of opposition leaders, or goes for the purchase of arms for the "fight against the infidels in Kabul," but, in fact, for the protection of laboratories and plantations against competitors.

"Contrary to ideas existing in some Western countries, the Government of Afghanistan and law enforcement services see the entire danger of the situation and do not sit with arms folded," Mohammad Farin, the republic's deputy minister of state security, said in a conversation with me. "Last year bodies of the Ministry of State Security alone destroyed narcotic crops on more than 90 hectares. A total of 5.5 tons of ready hashish and more than 300 kg of opium were removed and destroyed. And this despite the fact that we have no access to most regions where plantations are located. An emergency commission for fighting against this evil headed by the vice-president was established in the republic. The parliament is now considering a new law, which significantly toughens punishments for all crimes connected with drugs."

According to the general, a mass bombing of hemp and opium poppy crops and their large-scale defoliation from army helicopters, technically, do not pose a big problem. However, the fact that hundreds of thousands of Afghans live in these provinces prevents this. By no means are all of them drug dealers. Bombs have been falling on their heads for almost 13 years anyhow...

If to compare Afghanistan with other countries, where narcotic substances are produced and grown, it is now at the second stage of development of the criminal infrastructure. There is a network of well armed fighting detachments trained during the long civil war, which control opium and hemp plantations. For the time being, there are no clear boundaries between their spheres of influence. Therefore, sparks of conflicts flare up periodically. As soon as the final division occurs, drug ring-leaders will set their eyes on Kabul. It cannot be ruled out that Kabul, which has repulsed all the assaults of the opposition, this time will not resist and will surrender to the flow of drug dollars. Then the tumor, as in Colombia, will enter the third stage, which is most dangerous and

almost incurable. For now, at the second stage, an active penetration of the international drug mafia is going on in Afghanistan. The latest case with 2 tons of Afghan hashish detained in Hamburg is a striking example of this. The trafficking operation disrupted at the last moment by German customs officials was carried out according to the classic rules of the international mafia.

The drugs were brought to Kabul and hidden in one of the secret warehouses, apparently, on the remarkable street on which I was driven. Then several containers were found in a dump. They were repaired, hiding places were made, drugs were placed there, and the containers were again brought to the dump. The next stage—the purchase of a cargo of raisins and the registration of false documents for it—passed smoothly. The export cargo was submitted for a customs inspection. Again, there were no difficulties except for the request (the organizers were thoroughly familiar with Afghan reality) that they themselves find containers, which were very scarce. As you realize, the criminals found them easily.

To transport the drugs, the most convenient, the safest, and the presently most widely used route was chosen—through the territory of the Soviet Union. Virtually all of Afghanistan's export cargos—all in containers, in which it is so convenient to make hiding places—pass as transit goods through our country.

About 15 tons of drugs coming as transit goods from Afghanistan have been uncovered in our country in the last 4 years. According to statistics, at best customs officials manage to detain one-tenth of the smuggled drugs. According to some estimates, in our case this percent is much lower. Here it is not a matter of bad work on the part of Soviet customs officials. They, like their Afghan colleagues, cannot manage alone. It is necessary to construct large terminals and special inspection centers equipped with the latest apparatus in places of the biggest crossing of transit containers.

Such centers for collective protection against smuggling cost a fantastic sum. We do not have such money and it is unlikely that it will appear in the very near future.

It turns out that, again, there is only one hope: the West. After all, if to look at this objectively, developed countries with their vast drug markets should be much more interested than the Soviet Union in seeing to it that the poison does not infiltrate through its borders. The sooner a container with hashish or cocaine is uncovered, the better. Everything is seemingly so. Nevertheless, we have not yet received proposals for the construction of such inspection centers. One thing is unclear: Why in this case do we sit and wait for something to be offered to us, while, at the same time, we are not ashamed to ask for money for sneakers, beer, video tape recorders, and cigarettes?

Many people probably know that the foundations for a currency market in one form or another will be established in our country in 3 to 4 years. Right now in big cities there is a large number of stores trading for

currency. Machines, building materials, apartments, and many other things are sold for "hard" money. This means that there will be increasingly more freely convertible currency in the country. Who knows? Perhaps the ruble will soon interest drug dealers no less than the dollar or the mark. It is naive to assume that "businessmen" from Afghanistan, who wish to sell in the Soviet Union goods that bring the highest income, will not appear. Why should they travel far? And they will be able to offer them—they have a great deal of experience in this. Then the transit flow of drugs to the West will become depleted in itself without any terminals.

The law on free departure will increase economic and humanitarian relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan severalfold. Unfortunately, it is quite realistic to assume that our and Afghan drug mafias will merge. The theoretical possibility of saturation of the Soviet market with phosphoric-hydrogen, acetic, and other acids necessary for the production of strong-acting drugs is most dangerous. We have more than enough raw materials. And if we remember that Afghanistan has an abundance of other goods—arms, which are in ever greater demand in our country—there is something to think about.

I do not at all urge that Soviet-Afghan trade relations be limited, that the treaty on the transit of goods through our territory be revised, and that every container arriving in Termez or Kushka be shaken up. This is impossible. However, to turn away from the problem, as from everything connected with Afghanistan—for some reason this is now accepted in our country—is shortsighted, to say the least. We also should not do this, because we are responsible for all the troubles now facing the country, including this one. During the years of stay of Soviet troops the volume of drug production in Afghanistan increased almost fivefold!

The closest interaction of Soviet and Afghan customs services and bodies of state security and internal affairs and the use of the Soviet Union's authority to draw attention to this problem and to give Afghanistan real assistance in the fight against the terrible evil of developed Western countries—according to the opinion of the Afghan people to whom I talked, these are the priority directions, which can, if not reduce, at least halt the production and spread of drugs in Afghanistan and beyond its borders. All this must be done right now, today. If it is not too late...

Kazakh Police Cite Trafficking Growth, Interdiction Efforts

91WD0573A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Mar 91
First Edition p 6

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent T. Yesilbayev: "Black Slough"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—Three guys, each carrying a heavy bag in his hands, seemed suspect to a female resident of the microrayon Aksay-4 in the suburbs of Alma-Ata. Since

there had been no end of burglaries in the city, the woman decided that this had to be reported to the militia. They could have been burglars...

The Alatau ROVD [Rayon Department of Internal Affairs] responded to her alarmed call immediately; an operations group headed by Captain Ye. Alibekov, deputy chief of the Department of Criminal Investigations, immediately drove to the location of the suspect individuals (at the time, they were trying to flag down a taxi in order to go to the railway terminal). Those apprehended turned out to be residents of Baku; 15 kilograms of marijuana were confiscated from them. This time, the militia did not get burglars, but rather larger "fish," drug business operators. Criminal proceedings have now been instituted regarding this case, and an investigation is in progress. According to the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] data, all of those apprehended performed the functions of couriers for a quite extensive network of drug pushers.

Militia Lieutenant Colonel Murat Tumarbekov, a department chief in the Criminal Investigations Administration of the Alma-Ata Internal Affairs Administration, said: "The criminals sell their deadly merchandise in a variety of regions of our country. In the process, they attempt to generate a maximum of profit. For example, the 'black-market' price of a glass of marijuana here ranges between 30 and 50 rubles [R], whereas in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] it reaches R170. The poison is not cheap in Transcaucasia either. This is why emissaries of the narcotics trade criss-cross the country in order to procure dope and sell it profitably. There is absolutely no doubt that this is precisely who our employees have apprehended: During an interrogation, one of them offered an investigator a bribe of R100,000."

Very recently, writing about our "homegrown" drug addicts was not the thing to do. It was believed that we simply did not have either drug addicts or prostitutes because there were no social causes. The incidence of criminal activities by those out to get easy money, for whom trading in dope became the goal of their lives, was hushed up. Drug business operators did, and do, a lot in order to propagate drugs in the process of selling bane. The most frightening thing is that they get children involved in this. It would suffice to mention the following statistics: In 1985, 251 minors addicted to drugs were registered in Kazakhstan alone, whereas last year there were 844. There are more than 7,000 of them throughout the country.

The abrupt growth of the number of drug consumers entailed an increase in the number of violations of the law; after all, a drug addict is a potential criminal. The drug mafia is becoming increasingly arrogant. At present, cases in which they use firearms and other weapons in order to throw off pursuers or save their "sought-after" merchandise are no longer rare. The

weight of the merchandise is not measured in grams but in dozens and hundreds of kilograms and tons.

From a memorandum of the Kazakh SSR MVD:

In July 1990, employees of the criminal investigations department apprehended in Alma-Ata T. Proshkina, with a prior court record, in whose apartment 57 kilograms of marijuana were found and confiscated. In July 1990, five sacks of marijuana weighing 50 kilograms were found by a drug-sniffing dog in a car owned by O. Chonbayev, next to a GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] checkpoint in the village of Blagoveshchenka, Dzhambul Oblast. In December 1990, L. Kononenko and N. Zdorovilov were apprehended in the city of Chimkent. In the course of a search, more than 236 kilograms of drug raw materials, stolen from the Industrial Association Chimkentbiofarm, were confiscated from them. By now, this number has increased to almost 500 kilograms because in the course of the investigation many more drug substances were found. A total of 24 drug addicts have been apprehended in conjunction with this case."

As we can see, large batches of drugs end up in the hands of the drug dealers. As a rule, they are sold in the "black market" where prices increase continuously. For example, the cost of one kilogram of raw opium increased from R30,000 in 1985 to R200,000 in 1990, and that of a kilogram of marijuana from R350 to R1,200 or more. Nonetheless, demand outstrips supply. Where does the "merchandise" come from?

Militia Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Gorelkin, chief of the Kazakh SSR MVD Department for Controlling the Illegal Circulation of Narcotic Substances, said: "There are several such channels. These include theft from enterprises at which substances containing narcotics are used in the production of medicinal preparations and the waste heaps of the Production Association Chimkentbiofarm. The crime situation in the Chu Valley is of particular concern to us. Wild hemp grows in the valley on 138,000 hectares. It is used to produce high-purity marijuana and hashish. It is precisely the place which drug addicts raid from June and to late fall. How are they to be stopped?"

V. Gorelkin went on to say that, in keeping with a decision of the government of Kazakhstan, a special unit for drug control was set up last year with the vigorous assistance of the Gosagrprom [State Agroindustrial Committee]. Experienced detectives, investigators, inspector-dog handlers, chemical experts, and communications engineers became its members. Necessary equipment, uniforms, and communications devices were acquired with the funds allocated by the Gosagrprom, and helicopters were leased. All of this has substantially improved the effectiveness of our difficult and dangerous work. However, the best-trained specialists, experts in their fields, are now leaving because the wages of the personnel of this special unit remained at the same level, whereas those of many employees in the organization of our ministry have increased, since they are getting funds from the Union budget. It is necessary to allocate an additional R600,000 annually from the republic budget in order to preserve the special unit for drug control.

Let me add this: Perhaps, it makes sense to let the special unit retain some of the large amounts of money confiscated from the drug mafia until such time as it becomes unnecessary to maintain a staff of employees fighting the drug operators.

From a memorandum of the Kazakh SSR MVD:

In 1990, the employees of the republic organs of internal affairs apprehended more than 6,500 people carrying drugs. About 10.5 tons of narcotic substances were confiscated from them; 30 drug houses were discovered and eliminated; 4,156 criminal proceedings were instituted, and statutory penalties were imposed on 2,483 people."

The above statistics speak for themselves. Drug addiction and the drug business catch new victims in their nets, including children. The scope of trouble may become more significant unless resolute measures are taken to bring criminal activities to an end.

The complex task of stopping the drug dealers and protecting the people against lethal dope may only be accomplished by the entire community together.

Delay Noted in Development of AIDS Epidemic*LD2203061991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1827 GMT 21 Mar 91*

[By TASS correspondent Eleonora Sutotskaya]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 21 March (TASS)—“There are now 594 people in the USSR infected with the AIDS virus and 54 sufferers from this grave disease, 33 of whom have died. This was stated today at a session of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences by its president, Valentin Pokrovskiy, who heads Soviet research in this field. Commenting on the figures, he said they are three times lower than predicted. “We seem to have succeeded in delaying the development of the epidemic somewhat, but there is no cause for complacency. This highly dangerous infection has been introduced into the country and is affecting more and more victims“. [passage omitted]

Pokrovskiy continued: “Every case of infection is being investigated, and this enables the source and the modes of transmission to be discovered. More than 1,000 diagnostic laboratories and 21 republican and regional centers are engaged in this work. There are 61 institutes studying the scientific problems of AIDS. Diagnostic tests and medicines are being developed and the virus and the ways in which it is transmitted are being studied. One of these—from infected infant to mother—has been described for the first time by Soviet scientists.”

Draft Law on Social, Medical Rehabilitation of Alcoholics Examined*91US0364A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Mar 91 First Edition p 4*

[Article by R. Volzhanin, deputy chief of the Social Rehabilitation Department of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: “Therapeutic Labor Clinics Exclusively for the Inveterate Offender”]

[Text] Therapeutic labor clinics are now the subject of a great deal of discussion. On 28 February 1991 a decree was published on: “Release From the Therapeutic Labor Clinic,” suggesting new solutions to several problems. Besides this, a law: “On the Social and Medical Rehabilitation of Chronic Alcoholics and Drug Addicts” is being drafted. The editors asked Deputy Chief R. Volzhanin of the Social Rehabilitation Department of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to comment on these documents.

The article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by People's Deputy of the RSFSR A. Galishnikov, “Ultimatum to the Victims,” disturbed people in therapeutic labor clinics. Some were indignant: “This is unbridled terrorism! Some deputy (and does he even exist?) is trying to threaten us! What is he saying? Will we have to work on Wednesdays too from now on? And make our own

beds? And never say a cross word to the doctors? What is our Ministry of Health doing about this? When will it take us under its wing?”

Yes, the decree passed on this matter and the one slated to be passed clearly say that people in therapeutic labor clinics will have to work and obey the rules. According to international conventions, work ordered by a court is not forced labor. Incidentally, the wages in treatment clinics are not that bad. Last year the average was over 9 rubles a day, and the monthly wages of some were 400-500 rubles or more.

The “horrors” of the therapeutic labor clinics have recently ceased to be a constant topic in the press. The reader is no longer eager to hear the details, especially after a closer investigation revealed that legislators in other countries are much stricter than ours in their treatment of alcoholics and drug addicts.

The champions of “perestroyka” in the therapeutic labor clinics have felt the heavy breath of drunken criminals on the back of their own neck. The thesis of the alcoholic prisoner of conscience is no protection against drunken brawlers and muggers in the streets at night. Of course, not all of them have had the courage to admit that stirring up all of the controversy over the “prisoners of the therapeutic labor clinics” was, to put it mildly, not quite right.

The reform of compulsory treatment for alcoholism was the topic of a roundtable discussion on 27 February this year. The discussion was organized by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Health Protection Committee. Not one of the speakers suggested the elimination of the therapeutic labor clinics. The possibility of putting them under the control of the Ministry of Health was not discussed either. On the contrary, the participants in the discussion agreed unanimously that establishments of this kind are needed for protection against drunken criminals and for the preservation of the people's mental health.

The position of the RSFSR Ministry of Health has not changed: Medical experts have no wish to take the therapeutic labor clinics under their wing. Furthermore, it does not matter whether they want to or not. Given the present beggarly state of our public health care and the sad experience of the special drug treatment divisions, the RSFSR Ministry of Health is incapable of taking on the additional burden of working with the criminal element.

Does this mean that the problems of the therapeutic labor clinics are nothing more than a fabrication? Certainly not. In 1985 some reformist experts on alcohol abuse decided to put an end to alcoholism at one fell swoop and passed a law stating that the mere refusal to seek voluntary treatment was sufficient grounds to send a person to a therapeutic labor clinic. Of course, this resolution is contrary to international standards and simple common sense. Furthermore, they were also

considering a bill which would have allowed even disabled individuals of the first and second categories, people over the age of 60, and patients with active tuberculosis to be sent to therapeutic labor clinics.

Fortunately, this bill was buried. Nevertheless, an absolutely unprecedented decision was made to open educational treatment facilities for minor drug addicts. Predictably, the child with seven nannies—the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and others—was soon left virtually unsupervised.

Today the work of our therapeutic labor clinics is finally being brought in line with constitutional provisions. The decree: "On Release from the Therapeutic Labor Clinic" changes the grounds for sending citizens to the clinics. From now on, an alcoholic or drug addict can only be sent to a clinic for "systematic disturbances of the peace or infringements of the rights of others." It also strengthens the legal guarantees of citizens sent to the clinics by people's courts. Citizens will have the right to be represented by attorneys in court. The decision of the court can be appealed by the defendant or his attorney or be protested by the prosecutor.

People keep asking us whether it is true that an "amnesty" has been declared for chronic alcoholics and drug addicts. I would like to assure the readers that there is no amnesty. There will be no alcoholic version of the "cold summer of '53."

The decree discusses the release of only the individuals who were sent to the therapeutic labor clinics because they refused voluntary treatment. A procedure has been established for the review of these cases by a commission. Local soviets will form commissions made up of representatives of soviets, public health agencies, the procuracy, and clinic administrations. The commissions will have a month to begin processing the cases. The work will be tedious and time-consuming, and the decree therefore sets no deadlines. The commission's denial of a release request can be appealed in a people's court. The decree specifically says that existing laws on the compulsory treatment and occupational rehabilitation of chronic alcoholics and drug addicts will remain in force until new laws have been passed.

A bill: "On the Social and Medical Rehabilitation of Chronic Alcoholics and Drug Addicts" is also being drafted. It proposes, for example, the removal of restrictions on letters and packages, meetings with relatives, and sums of money for the acquisition of food and other goods in the clinic store.

The bill calls for the obligatory separate maintenance of chronic alcoholics and drug addicts in the therapeutic labor clinics and the separation of citizens with no prior convictions from individuals with prison records. Is there good reason for this? Judge for yourselves: The average "patient" in some of our therapeutic labor clinics has three prior convictions. In addition to their criminal experience and crooked traditions, many "patients" can also take credit for crimes that have not been discovered yet.

In fact, the separate maintenance of different categories of individuals in therapeutic labor clinics was organized long ago wherever possible, but what about the 20 oblasts and republics of the RSFSR with only one clinic apiece? Local soviets should give this matter serious consideration because far from all neighboring oblasts will agree to receive "outside guests" in their clinics.

Different conditions of maintenance are to be established in the therapeutic labor clinics for individuals with different attitudes toward labor and discipline. Justice would probably be served by keeping vicious offenders in stricter confinement than the individuals who have begun to correct their ways. The draft law even envisages temporary leaves to encourage and reward the latter.

At this point, however, I must frankly say that the institution of preferential conditions for some individuals has not proved effective in most therapeutic labor clinics. Hundreds of crimes were committed by individuals who were granted temporary discharges and leaves in 1990, for example, by therapeutic labor clinic administrators. It is quite "convenient" to commit, for instance, a burglary on leave and then return unobtrusively to the therapeutic labor clinic. While the police are looking for you, you are in your "own place" and under guard. This is why the granting of temporary discharges and leaves has to be approached quite judiciously.

In my opinion, there is no good reason to eliminate, as some have suggested, the searches in the therapeutic labor clinics either. Last year, for example, 26,700 liters of alcoholic beverages and 5.7 kilograms of narcotic substances were found during searches. They also turned up attempts to make knives and guns....

The bill suggests that alcoholics receive treatment on a strictly voluntary basis. This will change the relationship between the physician and the patient radically. We are in favor of the use of all the latest forms of treatment, including nontraditional ones, in the therapeutic labor clinics.

These are some of the absolutely new legal standards that are being set for these special establishments today.

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